

III. Methodological Problems of the Historiography of the International System as the Historiography of Expansion

The word system came into use in academic diction during the second half of the sixteenth century and initially, as in works by Pierre La Ramée (Petrus Ramus),¹ Giacomo Zabarella,² Bartholomäus Keckermann and others,³ denoted hierarchical orders of parts somehow linked to one another and to a larger whole. However, the concept of system is far older than the appearance of the word in academic diction and has been part of encyclopedic literature since the seventh century.⁴ Since the thirteenth century, the concept has also been behind tangible *realia*, such as the then emerging mechanical clocks.⁵ Since the seventeenth century, the word and the concept of system have mallified into a fashionable colloquialism, thence losing definitional precision. System could then stand for a lecture syllabus as well as for an established administrative practice⁶ and could equally be a reference to procedures of indexing and ordering books or even to an “orderly representation of what has happened in the world visible to us” (eine ordentliche Vorstellung desjenigen, was in der uns sichtbaren Welt geschehen ist) in the form of annals and chronicles.⁷ The concept could even shape the referent matter, with some administrative practice might be turned into a system through the simple fact by becoming so called. From the seventeenth century, the word, the concept and the referent of system have not always been carefully set apart. This statement even applies to international relations. Not only practical politics but also the theory of international relations often

¹ Petrus Ramus, *Dialecticae libri duo* (Paris, 1572) [reprint, edited by Sebastian Lalla and Karlheinz Hülsner (Editionen zur Frühen Neuzeit, 2) (Stuttgart, 2011); English version: *The Logike of the Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr* (London, 1574); reprint of this edn (The English experience, 107) (Amsterdam and New York, 1969)].

² Giacomo Zabarella, *De methodis libri quinque* (Venice, 1578) [reprint, edited by Cesare Vasoli (Bologna, 1985)].

³ Bartholomäus Keckermann ‘Systema disciplinae politicae’, in: Keckermann, *Systema systematum* (Hanau, 1613), pp. 890-1075 [first published (Hanau, 1608); Microfiche edn (Munich, 1992)]. Johann Heinrich Alsted, *Encyclopaedia*, vol. 4 (Herborn, 1630), p. 1638. Elias Reusner, *Opus genealogicum catholicum* (Frankfurt, 1592), s. p., structuring a table of contents as a system.

⁴ Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarvm sive originvm libri XX*, edited by Wallace Martin Lindsay (Oxford, 1911), s. p. Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum naturale* (Douais, 1624) [reprint (Graz, 1964)].

⁵ *Gesta abbatum monasterii S. Albani*, vol. 2, edited by Henry T. Riley (Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores, 28) (London, 1868), pp. 181-199 [reprint (New York, 1964)]. Richard of Wallingford, *An Edition of His Writings*, edited by John D. North, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1976). For studies see: David Saul Landes, *Revolution in Time. Clocks and the Making of the Modern world* (Cambridge, MA, and London, 1984). Ernst Zinner, *Aus der Frühzeit der Räderuhr* (Deutsches Museum, Abhandlungen und Berichte 22) (Munich and Düsseldorf, 1954).

⁶ On eighteenth-century lecture course surveys see: August Ludwig von Schlözer, *Systema politices* (Göttingen, 1771). For cases of administrative use of the term see: Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg, ‘Meynungen des Graffen Kaunitz über das auswärtige System [24 March 1749]’, edited by Reiner Pommerin and Lothar Schilling, in: Johannes Kunisch, ed., *Expansion und Gleichgewicht* (Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, Beiheft 2) (Berlin, 1986), pp. 168-238 [also partly edited in: Alfred Ritter von Arneth, *Geschichte Maria Theresia’s*, vol. 4: Maria Theresia nach dem Erbfolgekriege. 1748 – 1756 (Vienna, 1870), pp. 535-536; reprint (Osnabrück, 1971)].

⁷ On ordering systems for books see: Harald Kleinschmidt, ‘Vom System zur Ordnung. Bemerkungen zu Bewertungen von Sachkatalogen vornehmlich des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts’, in: *Libri 37* (1987), pp. 126-159. On “historical systems” see: Johann Martin Chladenius, *Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung vernünftiger Reden und Schriften* (Leipzig, 1742), pp. 318-319 [reprint, edited by Lutz Geldsetzer (Düsseldorf, 1969)].

convey the impression, as if an international system had quasi tangible reality, if only the word or the concept of system were used. For one, a “state system” (Staaten-System) could feature in the diction of Göttingen historian Arnold Herrmann Ludwig Heeren, who could equip that “system” with “inner freedom, that is the autonomy and mutual independence of its parts” (innere Freyheit, d. i. die Selbständigkeit und wechselseitige Unabhängigkeit seiner Glieder).⁸ Heeren’s “system” thus had its “character” (Charakter) with “freedom” (Freyheit) as a core feature, as if the “state system” were a living person. Heeren’s diction was metaphorical, awarding to the “state system” features of the living body and positioning it in the world as an object seemingly ready for description and analysis.

Furthermore, word and concept of system are not directly applicable to international relations, as it is far from obvious what kinds of units may form parts of such a system and what kinds of hierarchies may exist among them. To raise two questions only, is it possible to equate a state system with an international system and, if so, who determines the hierarchies in it? Usually, answers to these questions have been entrusted to historians, when matters of the past were under review. Thus, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, scholars have sought to apply the concept of the state system to relations among states in late medieval Europe. However, in doing so, they have not derived their concept of system from close contemporary records but have retrospectively applied nineteenth-century political theory by admitting only rulers and governments of states as “actors” in the system. It has been their purpose to trace the nineteenth-century international system to what appeared to be its late medieval roots, thereby claiming quasi tangible objective existence for that system. Twentieth-century research has built on these efforts, even adhering to the nineteenth-century concept of system,⁹ and thus has continued to eliminate changes of perceptions

⁸ Arnold Herrmann Ludwig Heeren, *Handbuch der Geschichte des europäischen Staatensystems und seiner Colonien von der Entdeckung beyder Indien bis zur Errichtung des Französischen Kayserthrons*, second edn (Göttingen, 1811), pp. 5-6 [first published (Göttingen, 1809); third edn (Göttingen, 1819); reprinted in: Heeren, *Historische Werke*, vol. 3 (Göttingen, 1822); reprint of this edn (Frankfurt, 1987)]. On Heeren see: Christoph Becker-Schaum, *Arnold Herrmann Ludwig Heeren. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft zwischen Aufklärung und Historismus* (Frankfurt, 1993). Gerhard Th. Mollin, ‘Internationale Beziehungen als Gegenstand der deutschen Neuzeit-Historiographie seit dem 18. Jahrhundert’, in: Wilfried Loth and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds, *Internationale Geschichte. Themen – Ergebnisse – Aussichten* (Studien zur internationalen Geschichte, 10) (Munich, 2000), pp. 3-30, at pp. 5-6, 18-19.

⁹ Johann Peter Friedrich Ancillon, ‘Nécessité d’une garantie extérieure de l’existence et des droits des états. Pénence générale des peuples de l’Europe à créer un système d’équilibre. Plan et point de vus de cet ouvrage’, in: Ancillon, *Considérations générales sur l’histoire. Ou Introduction à l’histoire des revolutions du système politique de l’Europe pendant les trois derniers siècles* (Berlin and Paris, 1801), pp. 71-99, at pp. 91, 95. Ancillon’s attempt was taken up again, however without reference to Ancillon, by: Walther Kienast, ‘Die Anfänge des europäischen Staatensystems im späten Mittelalter’, in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 153 (1936), pp. 229-271. For the modern age, a similar approach was implemented by: Peter Krüger, ‘Mythen des europäischen Staatensystems. Gleichgewicht, europäisches Konzert, Integration’, in: *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 51 (1999), pp. 100-114. Krüger and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner, eds, *Das europäische Staatensystem im Wandel* (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 35) (Munich, 1996). Heinrich Lutz and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner, eds, *Das Römisch-Deutsche Reich im politischen System Karls V.* (Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 1) (Munich, 1982).

from historiographical descriptions. Practitioners of this line of investigation and description have, therefore, refrained from asking which models contemporaries used to the end of conceptualising international relations.¹⁰ However, choosing the systems model anticipates ascribing identity to the parts and the order among them, as shall be analysed in what follows. Preferences of the use of systems models can be specific to epochs and cultures, with the consequence that the choice of inadequate models can obfuscate description and analysis.

1. The Foundations of General Systems Theory and the Change of Systems Models

Already Arthur Schopenhauer brought to the fore the clash between systems models, pertaining to different epochs. In the preface to his *magnus opus Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. He explained the difference between the full text of a philosophical work in book form and an idea through the analogy between an “architectural system” (architektonischen System) and an “organic link” (organischen Zusammenhang). Accordingly, the work in book form was a “system”, forming „first and foremost an architectural coherence” (allemaal einen architektonischen Zusammenhang), “in which always one part supports the other” (in welchem immer ein Theil den andern trägt). By contrast, “one single idea” (einziger Gedanke) manifests the “cohesion of these parts” (Zusammenhang dieser Theile) as “an organic one, that is, one in which every part contains the whole to the same degree as it is maintained by the whole” (ein organischer, das heißt ein solcher, wo jeder Theil eben so sehr das Ganze erhält, als er vom Ganzen erhalten wird).¹¹ Schopenhauer juxtaposed a large and a small unit, ascribed the same structural feature to both, namely some connection among “parts”, and yet he used different words for both types of structure. He described the first type additively through the model of the house, which appeared to him as the entirety of all parts required to support the structure through a hierarchy of well arranged parts. By contrast, he

¹⁰ This has been the case most notably in recent methodological statements by political scientists and historians, who failed to recognise the significance of the choice of models in systems theory: Barry Gordon Buzan and Richard K. Little, *International Systems in World History. Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 1-6. Eckart Conze, ‘Jenseits von Männern und Mächten. Geschichte der internationalen Politik als Systemgeschichte’, in: Hans-Christof Kraus and Nicklas Thomas, eds, *Geschichte der Politik* (Historische Zeitschrift. Beihefte, N. F. 44) (Munich, 2007), pp. 41-64, at pp. 41-45. On such models see: Martin Kintzinger, ‘Auswärtige Politik und internationale Beziehungen im mittelalterlichen Westeuropa’, in: Dieter Berg, Martin Kintzinger and Pierre Monnet, eds, *Auswärtige Politik und internationale Beziehungen im Mittelalter (13. – 16. Jahrhundert)* (Europa in der Geschichte, 6) (Bochum, 2003), S. 15-19. Harald Kleinschmidt, *Ruling the Waves. Emperor Maximilian, the Search for Islands and the Transformation of the European World Picture c. 1500* (Bibliotheca Humanistica et Reformatorica, 63) (Utrecht, 2008).

¹¹ Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. 1, reprint, edited by Arthur Hübscher (Schopenhauer, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 1) (Mannheim, 1988), pp. VII-VIII [first published (1819); first edn in Schopenhauer’s *Sämtliche Werke*, edited by Julius Frauenstädt (Leipzig, 1938)]. Similarly: Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pöhlitz, *Die Staatswissenschaft im Lichte unserer Zeit*, second edn, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1828), pp. 346-347 [first published (Leipzig, 1824)].

associated the second type integratively with the model of the living body, in which the entirety of the body was present in every “organ” and was, by consequence, larger than the sum of all its “organs”. Both types of links or “connections” (Zusammenhänge), the entire written work as a structural arrangement of ideas and every specific idea on its own, were, to Schopenhauer, as real as they were abstract. He used the word “system” to denote the philosophical construct of ideas but denied the same word to each idea, without using another word in its place. The “system” thus was an additive sum of well-ordered units but did not an integrated superstructure absorbing its units into its own boundaries, while he would not include a more comprehensive “organic” link or “connection” into the meanings attachable to the word “system”. Schopenhauer was not familiar with a word for his second type of link or connection.

Schopenhauer’s choice of words does come along as a surprise. At the latest since the seventeenth century, the technical model of the machine had been in use of European systems theorists, and Schopenhauer’s model was merely a reductionist variant: a assemblage of hierarchically ordered units within a solid frame, perceived as complete¹² and not subject to any change affecting the structure of the system.¹³ The machine, specifically the clock as its prototype, provided the model for the world as a whole (as *systema mundi*),¹⁴ for living bodies, which Hobbes classed as *Automata* and likened to machines,¹⁵ states,¹⁶ even the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, to which Jean-Jacques Rousseau, son of a clockmaker, applied the machine model,¹⁷ armies,¹⁸ complex

¹² Immanuel Kant. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* [(Riga, 1786)], in: Kant, *Werke in zwölf Bänden*, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, vol. 9 (Frankfurt, 1968), p. 19. For Kant’s concept of system see: Gerhard Lehmann, ‘System und Geschichte in Kants Philosophie’, in: Lehmann, *Beiträge zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Philosophie Kants* (Berlin, 1969), pp. 152-170 [first published in: *Il pensiero*, vol. 3, part 1 (1958)].

¹³ Johann Heinrich Lambert, *Logische und Philosophische Abhandlungen*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1787), p. 386 [reprint, edited by Hans Werner Arndt (Lambert, Philosophische Schriften, vol. 7) (Hildesheim, 1969)].

¹⁴ Johann Georg Walch, *Philosophisches Lexikon*, second edn (Leipzig, 1733), s. v. ‘System’. On this aspect of mechanicism see: Klaus Maurice and Otto Mayr, *Die Welt als Uhr* (Munich, 1980) [English version (New York, 1980)]. Otto Mayr, *Uhrwerk und Waage. Autorität, Freiheit und technische Systeme in der frühen Neuzeit* (Munich, 1986) [English version (Baltimore and London, 1986)].

¹⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* [London, 1651], edited by Crawford Brough Macpherson (Harmondsworth, 1981), p. 81; also edited by Richard Tuck (Cambridge, 1991), p. 9. Likewise: René Descartes, *Passions de l’âme*, in: Descartes, *Œuvres et lettres* (Paris, 1952), pp. 775-776.

¹⁶ Keckermann, *Systema* (note 3). Gaspard Real de Curban: *Staatskunst*, vol. 6 (Bamberg, 1790), pp. 582-583.

¹⁷ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Extrait du Projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre’, in: Rousseau, *The Political Writings*, edited by Charles Edwyn Vaughan, vol. 1 (reprint (Oxford, 1962), pp. 364-396, at pp. 366-367 [first publication of Vaughan’s edn (Cambridge, 1915); first English version in: Rousseau, *The Works*, vol. 10 (Edinburgh, 1774), pp. 182-191; also edited by Charles Edwyn Vaughan, *Rousseau, A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe* (London, 1917), pp. 5-35; also edited by E. M. Nuttall, *Rousseau, A Project of Perpetual Peace* (London, 1927); also in: Murray Greensmith Forsyth, Harold Maurice Alvan Keens-Soper and Peter Savigear, eds, *The Theory of International Relations* (London, 1970), pp. 127-180; also in: Stanley Hoffmann and David P. Fidler, eds, *Rousseau on International Relations* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 53-100; also in: Moorhead Wright, ed., *The Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power* (London and Totowa, 1975), pp. 74-80; German version in: Kurt von Raumer, ed., *Ewiger Friede. Friedensrufe und Friedenspläne seit der Renaissance* (Freiburg and München, 1953), pp. 343-367].

ordering systems for animate nature¹⁹ as well as fully fledged philosophical ordering systems, the study of which was entrusted to the academic discipline of “systematology”.²⁰

However, towards the end of the eighteenth century, the machine model encountered criticism by theorists, who were complaining that the model could neither cope with changes internal to nor changes of systems. For one, Johann Gottfried Herder, in 1784, classed the world as a “laboratory” bringing forth new species,²¹ and thereby suggested that he was not convinced by the salience of the assumption that the stability of the world was divinely ordained or part of some plan of nature. In 1793, Fichte sharply rejected all hope that the political balance of power, which he described with the machine model, could be anything else but a “chimera”, argued that the balance of power was nothing but an invention by greedy rulers, and adduced the French Revolution as his major piece of evidence in support of his argument.²² In 1803, Scottish lawyer Henry Peter Lord Brougham and Vaux followed suit and equipped “nations” with “passions”, which he deemed incalculable, and he tasked governments of states with equalising the effects of these passions. Simultaneously, talk about “state revolutions” took on a new meaning. Whereas the phase had encapsulated important political decisions by rulers and governments as late as during the 1770s,²³ it began to refer to deep changes of the state system already late in the eighteenth century.²⁴ Already early in the nineteenth

¹⁸ Friedrich Christoph Jonathan Fischer, *Geschichte Friedrichs des Zweyten Königs von Preussen*, part 1 (Halle, 1787), p. 27 [comparison of the Prussian army with a clock]. Friedrich Eckard, *Versuch über die Kunst junge Soldaten zu bilden* (Prague, 1782), pp. 19-20 [comparison of the army with a machine]. Carl Gottfried Wolff, *Versuch über die sittlichen Eigenschaften und Pflichten des Soldatenstandes* (Leipzig, 1776), p. 324 [comparison of a soldier with a machine].

¹⁹ Carl von Linné, *Systema naturae*, first edn (Leiden, 1735) [reprints of this edn (Stockholm, 1977); (Utrecht, 2003)].

²⁰ Etienne Bonnet de Condillac, *Traité des systèmes* (Paris, 1749) [Nachdruck in: Condillac, *Œuvres complètes*, vol. 2 (Geneva, 1973), p. 1]. Paul Henri Thiry d'Holbach, *Système de la nature* (London [recte Amsterdam], 1770) [reprint (Geneva, 2011); further edn (London [recte Amsterdam], 1771; 1780; 1781); (Paris, 1781); reprint of this edn (Paris, 1990); newly edited (Paris, 1821); reprints of this edn (Hildesheim, 1966; 1994)]. Johann Heinrich Lambert, ‘Fragment einer Systematologie [before 1767]’, in: Lambert, *Texte zur Systematologie und zur Theorie der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis*, edited by Geo Siegart (Philosophische Bibliothek, 406) (Hamburg, 1988), pp. 125-144. On Condillac and Holbach See: Hans Mercker, ‘Zwischen Krummstab und Trikolore. Paul Thiry Baron von Holbach im Umkreis der französischen Aufklärung’, in: Hartmut Harthausen, Hans Mercker and Hans Schröter, *Paul Thiry von Holbach. Philosoph der Aufklärung* (Speyer, 1989), pp. 19-43, at pp. 24-26, 29-30. Manfred Naumann, ‘D’Holbach und das Materialismusproblem in der französischen Aufklärung’, in: Holbach, *System der Natur*, German version (Berlin [GDR], 1960), pp. V-LVIII. Naumann, ‘Diderot und das „Système de la nature“’, in: *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Humboldt-Universität in Berlin*. Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe 13 (1964), pp. 145-155. Naumann, ‘Das “Systeme de la nature” in der deutschen Aufklärung’, in: *Lendemains*, vol. 4 (1976), pp. 63-87, vol. 5 (1976), pp. 79-95.

²¹ Johann Gottfried Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, book I, chap. 3, edited by Bernhard Suphan (Herder, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 13) (Berlin, 1887), p. 21.

²² Johann Gottlieb Fichte, ‘Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums über die Französische Revolution [(Danzig, 1793)]’, in: Fichte, *Schriften zur französischen Revolution* (Leipzig, 1988), pp. 37-270, at pp. 90-94 [Microfiche edn of the original print (Munich, 1990); also edited by Reinhard Strecker (Leipzig, 1922)].

²³ Ferdinand Friedrich von Nicolai, ‘Betrachtungen über die vorzüglichsten Gegenstände einer zur Bildung angehender Officiers anzuordnenden Kriegsschule [Ms. Stuttgart, Württembergische Landesbibliothek, Cod. Milit. 2° 33 (1770), fol. 235v]’, edited by Daniel Hohrath, in: *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 41 (1992), pp. 115-141, at p. 123.

²⁴ Gottfried Achenwall, *Vorbereitung zur Staatswissenschaft der heutigen europäischen Reiche und Staaten*

century, political theorists began to delve into biological rhetoric, ascribing features of the living body to states and nations and equipping them with the capabilities of acting as if they were living beings.²⁵ Thus, even the radically conservative Swiss diplomat, Berne patrician, theorist of the state and historian Carl Ludwig von Haller, in 1821, categorised politics as “makrobiotics of states”.²⁶ Schopenhauer wrote his *magnum opus*, before any kind of biologism entered the terminology of systems theory and its applications, that is, before anyone described systems as if they were living

(Göttingen, 1748), p. 10. David Hume, ‘Of National Characters’, in: Hume, *Essays Moral, Political and Literary*, edited by Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose, vol. 1 (London, 1882), pp. 244-258, at p. 244 [reprint (Aalen, 1964)]. Georg Andreas Will, ‘Einleitung in die historische Gelahrtheit und die Methode, die Geschichte zu lehren und zu lernen [Hs. Nürnberg: Stadtbibliothek, Nachlass Will (Bibliotheca Norica Williana), V.612^a; 1766]’, edited by Horst Walter Blanke, ‘Georg Andreas Wills “Einleitung in die historische Gelahrtheit” (1766) und die Anfänge moderner Historik-Vorlesungen in Deutschland’, in: *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften 2* (1984), pp. 222-265, at p. 225 [also in: Blanke and Dirk Fleischer, eds, *Theoretiker der deutschen Aufklärungshistorie*, vol. 1 (Fundamenta historica, 1) (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 313-350, at p. 320]. Johann Stephan Pütter, *Grundriß der Staats-Veränderungen des Teutschen Reiches*, second edn (Göttingen, 1755) [first published (Göttingen, 1752)]. Johann Gottlieb Steeb, *Versuch einer allgemeinen Beschreibung von dem Zustand der ungesitteten und gesitteten Völker nach ihrer moralischen und physicalischen Beschaffenheit* (Karlsruhe, 1766), pp. 100-101. Johann Christoph Gatterer, ‘Vom historischen Plan und der darauf sich gründenden Zusammenfügung der Erzählungen’, in: Gatterer, ed., *Allgemeine historische Bibliothek*, vol. 1 (Halle, 1767), pp. 15-89, at p. 62-63 [also in: Blanke (as above), pp. 621-662]. Gatterer, *Einleitung in die synchronistische Universalhistorie zur Erläuterung seiner synchronistischen Tabellen*, part I (Göttingen, 1771), p. 1. Ferdinand Nicolai, ‘Betrachtungen’ (note 23), p. 123. August Ludwig von Schlözer, *Vorstellung seiner Universalhistorie*, vol. 1 (Göttingen and Gotha, 1772), p. 1 [reprint, edited by Horst Walter Blanke (Beiträge zur Geschichtskultur, 4) (Hagen, 1990)]. Gottlob David Hartmann, ‘Ueber das Ideal einer Geschichte’, in: *Der Teutsche Merkur 6* (1774), pp. 195-213 [reprinted in: Hartmann, *Nachgelassene Schriften*, edited by Christian Jakob Wagenseil (Gotha, 1779), pp. 245-270; also in: Blanke (as above), pp. 688-697, at p. 689]. Augustin Schelle, *Abriss der Universalhistorie zum Gebrauch der akademischen Vorlesungen* (Salzburg, 1780), p. 23. Claude François Xavier Millot, *Universalhistorie alter, mittlerer und neuer Zeiten*, German version, edited by Wilhelm Ernst Christiani, part 9 (Leipzig, 1787) [first published (Paris, 1772-1773); English version (London, 1779)]. Ewald Graf von Hertzberg, ‘Mémoire sur les révolutions des états, externes, internes et religieuses [1786/87]’, in: *Mémoires de l’Académie Royale* (Berlin, 1791), pp. 665-673. Johann Friedrich Freiherr von und zu Mansbach, *Gedanken eines norwegischen Officiers über die Patriotischen Gedanken eines Dänen über stehende Heere, politisches Gleichgewicht und Staatsrevolution* (Copenhagen, 1794). Woldemar Friedrich von Schmettow, *Patriotische Gedanken eines Dänen über stehende Heere, politisches Gleichgewicht und Staatsrevolution*, second edn (Altona, 1792), p. 111 [first published (Altona, 1792)], who already juxtaposed the older, conventional concept of revolution against the new one, implying a complete and violent turnover of state institutions. Schmettow, *Erläuternder Commentar zu den Patriotischen Gedanken* (Altona, 1793). The new concept of revolution was already fully present in: Nicolaus [Niklas] Vogt, *Anzeige wie wir Geschichte behandelten, benutzen und darstellen werden bei Gelegenheit der ersten öffentlichen Prüfung der philosophischen Klasse* (Mainz, 1783), p. 3. Johann Heinrich Campe, *Briefe aus Paris während der Revolution geschrieben [1789-1790]*, edited by H. König (Berlin, 1961), p. 256. For reviews of the history of the concept of revolution see: Ernst Wolfgang Becker, *Zeit der Revolution! – Revolution der Zeit? Zeiterfahrungen in Deutschland in der Ära der Revolutionen. 1789–1848/49* (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 129) (Göttingen, 1999), pp. 38-48. Karl Griewank, *Der neuzeitliche Revolutionsbegriff* (Weimar, 1955), pp. 187-209 [second edn (Frankfurt, 1969; third edn (Hamburg, 1992)]. Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Historische Kriterien des neuzeitlichen Revolutionsbegriffs’, in: Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt, 1979), pp. 67-86.

²⁵ Pölitz, *Staatswissenschaft* (note 11), vol. 1, pp. 346-347, vol. 3, pp. 16-17. Carl von Rotteck and Carl Welcker, ‘Gleichgewicht’, in: Rotteck and Welcker, eds, *Staats-Lexikon*, vol. 7 (Altona, 1839), pp. 41-61. Welcker, *Die Vervollkommnung der organischen Entwicklung des deutschen Bundes zur bestmöglichen Förderung deutscher Nationalenheit und deutscher staatsbürgerlicher Freiheit* (Karlsruhe, 1831). Heinrich Ahrens, *Die Philosophie des Rechts. Die organische Staatslehre auf philosophisch-anthropologischer Grundlage* (Vienna, 1850).

²⁶ Carl Ludwig von Haller, *Restauration der Staats-Wissenschaft*, vol. 3: Makrobiotik der Patrimonial-Staaten, Hauptstück 2: Von den unabhängigen Feldherren oder den militairischen Staaten, second edn (Winterthur, 1821) [first published (Winterthur, 1818); reprint of the second edn (Aalen, 1964)].

bodies; nevertheless, he used this very model in his description of an idea. In doing so, he was among the first to expand the meaning of the word “organ” beyond biology to intellectual and social matters. During the remaining part of the nineteenth century, the word “organ” turned into a colloquialism in academic diction,²⁷ whereas older usages, such as in musical practice²⁸ became obsolete at least in some European languages. Schopenhauer thus knew the biologicistic systems model without associating the model with the word “system”.

For a long time, research in the histories of philosophy,²⁹ literature,³⁰ the sciences³¹ medicine³² and law³³ has recognised the transformation of the systems model around 1800 as part and parcel of a more wide-ranging change of the perception of the world, from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century mechanicism to nineteenth- and early twentieth-century biologism. Hence, the history of systems models has to be integrated into the broader history of perception. That principle also applies to the social sciences, which became home to the biologicistic rhetoric of “organs” during the nineteenth

²⁷ Francis William Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State* (New York, 1910). Albert Theodor van Krieken, *Über die sogenannten organischen Staatstheorien* (Leipzig, 1873).

²⁸ Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht and Frieder Zaminer, eds, *Ad organum faciendum. Lehrschriften der Mehrstimmigkeit in nachguidonischer Zeit* (Mainz, 1970), pp. 46-47.

²⁹ Hans Blumenberg, ‘Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie’, in: *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 6 (1960), pp. 7-142. Friedrich Kambartel, ‘“System“ und “Begründung“ als wissenschaftliche und philosophische Ordnungsbegriffe bei und vor Kant’, in: Jürgen Blühdorn and Joachim Ritter, eds, *Philosophie und Rechtswissenschaft* (Frankfurt, 1969), pp. 100-112. Ahlrich Meyer, ‘Mechanische und organische Metaphorik politischer Philosophie’, in: *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 13 (1969), pp. 147-163. Manfred Riedel, ‘System, Struktur’, in: Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, eds, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, vol. 6 (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 285-322. Otto Ritschl, *System und systematische Methode in der Geschichte des wissenschaftlichen Sprachgebrauchs und der philosophischen Methodologie* (Bonn, 1906), esp. p. 58. Bernd Roeck, *Reichssystem und Reichsherkommen* (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Abteilung Universalgeschichte, 112 = Beiträge zur Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte des Alten Reichs, 4) (Stuttgart, 1984), pp. 30-31, 34. Alois von der Stein, ‘Der Systembegriff in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung’, in: Alwin Diemer, ed., *System und Klassifikation in Wissenschaft und Dokumentation* (Meisenheim, 1968), pp. 3-9. Christian Strub, ‘System und Systemkritik in der Neuzeit’, in: Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, eds, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, new edn, vol. 10 (Basle, 1998), col. 825-856.

³⁰ Meyer Howard Abrams, ‘Coleridge’s Mechanical Fancy and Organic Imagination’, in: Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp* (New York, 1976), pp. 167-177.

³¹ Karl M. Figlio, ‘The Metaphor of Organization’, in: *History of Science* 14 (1976), pp. 17-53.

³² Gunter Mann, ‘Medizinisch-biologische Ideen und Modelle in der Gesellschaftslehre des 19. Jahrhunderts’, in: *Medizinhistorisches Journal* 4 (1969), pp. 1-23. Mann, ed., *Biologismus im 19. Jahrhundert* (Studien zur Medizingeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, 5) (Stuttgart, 1973).

³³ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Der Staat als Organismus’, in: Böckenförde, *Recht, Staat, Freiheit* (Frankfurt, 1991), pp. 263-272. Helmut Coing, ‘Bemerkungen zur Verwendung des Organismusbegriffs in der Rechtswissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland’, in: Gunter Mann, ed., *Biologismus im 19. Jahrhundert* (Studien zur Medizingeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, 5) (Stuttgart, 1973), pp. 147-157. Thomas Ellwein, ‘Die Fiktion der Staatsperson’, in: Ellwein and Joachim Jens Hesse, eds, *Staatswissenschaften. Vergessene Disziplin oder neue Herausforderung?* (Baden-Baden, 1990), pp. 99-110. Erich Kaufmann, ‘Über den Begriff des Organismus in der Staatslehre des 19. Jahrhunderts’, in: Kaufmann, *Rechtsidee und Recht* (Göttingen, 1960), pp. 46-66. Henry John McCloskey, ‘The State as an Organism, and as an End in Itself’, in: *Philosophical Review* 72 (1963), pp. 306-326. Judith E. Schlanger, *Les métaphores de l’organisme* (Paris, 1971). Hans Erich Troje, ‘Wissenschaftlichkeit und System in der Jurisprudenz des 16. Jahrhunderts’, in: Jürgen Blühdorn and Joachim Ritter, eds, *Philosophie und Rechtswissenschaft* (Frankfurt, 1969), pp. 63-88. James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State. 1900 – 1918* (Boston, 1968).

century, even forming part of its basic vocabulary.³⁴ Words such as “organism”, “organisation” and their derivatives, “national body” (Volkskörper), “state organ” as well as “social body” (Socialer Körper) turned into regular phrases of social science theoretical literature.³⁵ For one, Niklas Luhmann, as late as in 1987, could, with unrestricted claim of arguing something self-evident, maintain that it “makes little sense to say that societies were no organisms or not to distinguish, as in the school tradition, between organic bodies (composed of interlinked parts) and societal bodies (composed of unrelated parts)” (wenig sinnvoll zu sagen, Gesellschaften seien keine Organismen oder im Sinne der Schultradition zwischen organischen Körpern (bestehend aus zusammenhängenden Teilen) und gesellschaftlichen Körpern (bestehend aus unzusammenhängenden Teilen) zu unterscheiden).³⁶ Luhmann thus equated what he termed “systems”, with living bodies and, like Schopenhauer, resorted to the word “organic”, when referring to an entirety of “interlinked parts”. However, unlike Schopenhauer, Luhmann did not have in mind abstract ideas but apparently concrete and seemingly objective systems of all kinds, from local “systems of elementary interaction” established ad hoc (Systemen elementarer Interaktion) to global or non-global world systems as the largest thinkable entities (Zusammenhängen), irrespective of their existence in time and space. Like political scientist Karl Wolfgang Deutsch³⁷ before him, Luhmann was familiar with the change of systems models,³⁸ but he chose to downgrade that change of a terminology nicety: Past theorists having used the word *systema* since Antiquity, had, he opined, been aware that “the whole was the totality of all parts” (das Ganze die Gesamtheit der Teile), but had not been able to explain, how “the whole” (das Ganze) “might be highlighted at the level of its parts” (auf der Ebene der Teile als Einheit zur Geltung gebracht werden könne). The possibility of that explanation, he claimed, arose only “in the course of the transition to modern society” (im Übergang zur modernen Gesellschaft),³⁹ that is, within the framework of the use, not of the additive, mechanistic, but the integrative biologicistic systems model. Luhmann thus unscrupulously subjected the change of systems models to the idea of progress.

The idea of progress had taken roots in the history of perception at the turn towards the nineteenth century and had then promoted the generation of visions of the alleged “step ladder” (Stufenleiter) of humankind, which were fashionable at the time around 1800.⁴⁰ Later on, around the middle of the

³⁴ Dazu siehe F. Barnard, ‘Metaphors, Laments and the Organic Comments’, in: *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 32 (1966), pp. 281-301. Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, ‘Mechanism, Organism and Society. Some Models in Natural and Social Science’, in: *Philosophy of Science* 18 (1951), pp. 230-252. Martin Landau, ‘On the Use of Metaphor in Political Analysis’, in: *Social Research* 28 (1961), pp. 331-343.

³⁵ For example: Albert Schäffle, *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers*, vol. 4 (Tübingen. 1881).

³⁶ Niklas Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme* (Frankfurt, 1987), p. 17.

³⁷ Deutsch, ‘Mechanism’ (note 34).

³⁸ Luhmann, *Systeme* (note 36), pp. 20-21.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Christoph Meiners, ‘Betrachtungen über eine Stufenleiter der Humanität’, in: Meiners, *Untersuchungen über die*

nineteenth century, jurists concocted projections of a future “society of peoples” (Völkergesellschaft), to which humankind appeared to be progressing through the continuous numerical enlargement of its communities and the simultaneously enhancing intensification of their social cohesion. That “society of peoples” appeared to be accomplishable in view of the then apparently newly established technological, economic and political networking facilities.⁴¹ The seemingly ever closer global networking among communities of humankind would, theorists expected, help enforcing some “law of world communication” (Recht auf Weltverkehr), which would at last embrace the entire world and subject it to the rule of law.⁴² During the second half of the same century, theorists pointed to the then rapidly growing number of international “organisations”, all together forming the equivalent of a world government, through whose activities the regulation of world communication would turn international politics into world domestic politics.⁴³ Likewise, big technology projects appeared to induce the willingness for cooperation among governments of sovereign states, thereby in turn boosting the establishment of world government.⁴⁴ This concept of the world system, constituted under the rule of law, was represented by a number of phrases, such as “world theatre” (Welttheater),⁴⁵ “legal community” (Rechtsgemeinschaft)⁴⁶ or “family of nations”.⁴⁷ The common feature behind these phrases was their reference to acting persons, as if states, nations and societies were enlarged individuals. This world

Verschiedenheiten der Menschennaturen in Asien und den Südländern, in den ostindischen und Südseeinseln nebst einer historischen Vergleichung, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, 1815), pp. 110-138. Samuel Thomas Soemmerring, *Ueber die körperliche Verschiedenheit des Negers vom Europäer*, second edn (Frankfurt and Mainz, 1785) [first published (Mainz, 1784); newly edited in: Soemmerring, *Anthropologie. Über die körperliche Verschiedenheit des Negers vom Europäer*, edited by Sigrid Oehler-Klein (Soemmerring, Werke, vol. 15) (Stuttgart, 1998)].

⁴¹ Johann Baptist [Giovanni Battista] Fallati, ‘Die Genesis der Völkergesellschaft’, in: *Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft* 1 (1844), pp. 160-189, 260-328, 538-608. Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, vol. 1 (New York and London, 1877), pp. 265-287 [first published (London, 1876); further edns (London, 1882; 1893); (New York, 1897; 1901; 1906; 1912); reprints (Osnabrück, 1966); edited by Stanislaw Andreski (London and Hamden, CT, 1969); (Westport, CT, 1975); edited by Jonathan H. Turner (New Brunswick, 2002)].

⁴² Georg Jellinek, *Die rechtliche Natur der Staatsverträge. Ein Beitrag zur juristischen Konstruktion des Völkerrechts* (Vienna, 1880), p. 42.

⁴³ Walther Max Adrian Schücking, ‘Die Organisation der Welt’, in: *Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen. Festgabe für Paul Laband* (Tübingen, 1908), pp. 533-614, at pp. 594-595 [separately printed (Tübingen, 1908)].

⁴⁴ Frederick Charles Hicks, *The New World Order. International Organization, International Law, International Cooperation* (New York, 1920), p. 13. David Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (London, 1933), pp. 48-52 [Dodge Lectures at Yale University].

⁴⁵ Ernst Immanuel Bekker, *Das Recht als Menschenwerk und seine Grundlagen* (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos.-Hist. Kl. 1912, Nr 8) (Heidelberg, 1912), p. 3.

⁴⁶ Jellinek, *Natur* (note 42), p. 48. Heinrich Triepel, *Völkerrecht und Landesrecht* (Leipzig, 1899), pp. 76, 80-81 [new edn (Tübingen, 1907); reprint (Aalen, 1958); French version (Paris, 1920)], used the variant “plurality of persons legitimised to legislate law” (zur Rechtsschöpfung befähigte Personenmehrheit).

⁴⁷ Lassa Francis Oppenheim, *International Law*, vol. 1 (London and New York, 1905), pp. 280-281 [second edn (London and New York, 1912); third edn, edited by Ronald F. Roxburgh (London and New York, 1920-1921); fourth edn, edited by Arnold Duncan McNair (London and New York, 1926); fifth edn, edited by Hersch Lauterpacht (London and New York, 1935); sixth edn, edited by Hersch Lauterpacht (London and New York, 1944); seventh edn, edited by Hersch Lauterpacht (London and New York, 1948; 1952-1953); eighth edn, edited by Hersch Lauterpacht (London and New York, 1955; 1957; 1963); ninth edn, edited by Robert Yewdall Jennings and Andrew Watts (Harlow, 1992; 1996; 2008)].

system was conceived as global, even though not all states, nations and societies were to find admission into it. Quite on the contrary, the system was imagined as a club of states not subject to any form of colonial rule by European governments, the US governments or the governments of settler colonies within the British Empire, such as Australia and New Zealand. Hence, this system excluded the majority of the world population. The system, thus conceived, appeared to have “characteristics” as structures, which were deemed difficult to change, as if written into the system’s body. Among these structural characteristics were, among others, the link between the system and its units, cast into the terms of a hierarchical order, constituting the existential dependence of the units upon the system as a whole; the type of units, which were identified solely as states or governments of states; the modalities of interactions among the units themselves and as parts of the system, mainly equated with the economic, military and political decisions and actions by governments of states. Moreover, so-called “functions” supplemented the “characteristics” and consisted mainly in tasks to be performed by the system, such as securing the boundary of the system towards its environment, inducing the units to shape the interactions among themselves to the benefit of the system as a whole, promoting some “differentiation” among them units and regulating the interactions between the system and its environment. Yet, in all such descriptions of the world system, the question remained unanswered, what the system’s environment might be, whenever the system was imagined as a global one. Since the early twentieth century, the dualism of “structures” and “functions” solidified and has shaped specifically social science systems theory, with securing the system’s boundary coming to rank as the main “function”. Thus, Friedrich Ratzel could, with reference to the state as a system, define the border as the skin of the political body,⁴⁸ and Talcott Parsons could claim that some “boundary-maintaining capability” was the definitional condition for the “pattern maintenance” all sorts of social systems, including what he termed the “world political community”.⁴⁹ And even Luhmann could postulate that “all systems” had been established through “borders, that is, a difference between system and environment” (alle Systeme konstituierten sich durch Grenzen, nämlich durch eine Differenz von System und Umwelt).⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Friedrich Ratzel, *Politische Geographie*, third edn, edited by Eugen Oberhummer (Munich and Berlin 1923), p. 434 [first published (Munich and Berlin, 1897)]. A similar imagery is in: Nathaniel Curzon, *Frontiers* (Oxford, 1907), p. 42. Karl Haushofer, *Grenzen in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung* (Berlin, 1927).

⁴⁹ Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York and London, 1951), pp. 481-482. Parsons, ‘Order and Community in the International Social System’, in: James Nathan Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1961), pp. 120-129, at p. 123. On Parsons’s concept of the “world political community” in critical distance to the counterargument that there should have been a “polarization” during the intense phase of the Cold War, see: Talcott Parsons, ‘Polarization of the World and International Order’, in: Parsons, *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (New York, 1967), pp. 466-489, at p. 467 [first published in: *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 6 (1961); reprinted in: Marcello Truzzi and Philip B. Springer, eds, *Solving Problems. Essays in Relevant Sociology* (Pacific Palisades, CA, 1976), pp. 329-347; Bryan S. Turner, eds, *The Talcott Parsons Reader* (Oxford and Malden, MA, 1999), pp. 237-253].

⁵⁰ Niklas Luhmann, ‘Einfache Sozialsysteme’, in: Luhmann, *Soziologische Aufklärung*, vol. 2: Aufsätze zur Theorie der Gesellschaft (Opladen, 1975), pp. 21-38, at p. 28.

The social science concept of system, as shaped in general systems theory,⁵¹ has proved rather stable since the second half of the nineteenth century.⁵² It has encompassed, as its definitional elements, the postulates that a system have “characteristics”, as if a system was a living body with features written into it, and that the entirety of a system should be accepted as larger than total sum of its “functionally differentiated” units. The implication of this systems perception has been that the entirety of the system can not be additively derived from the sum of its units but that, instead, the system constitutes all units as such. Moreover, the assumption has been dominant that a system should exist “for itself”, as if being an objectively given matter of fact, independent of subjective perceptions of those acting in or observing a system. Likewise, the expectation has continued that a system should be recognisable from the patterns of interaction among its units, with these patterns forming the platform for projections, not merely of future interactions among the units, but also of upcoming changes falling within the range of modifications that theorists deemed to be possible within the system. In its ascribed capability of constituting its units, a system appears like an acting person, with its actorhood capability penetrating from the system into its units. As a system should use its capability of constituting its units, the units become structurally dependent upon their system in the same way as “organs” in a living body cannot “function” without the body. These postulates and assumptions, built into general structural functionalist social science systems theory, have also found their way into specific theories, mainly world systems theory, international systems theories, various theories of world society and theories of world history. These theories shall now be discussed in turn.

2. World Systems Theory

Building on *dependencia* theory⁵³ and the concept of unequal development, world systems theory

⁵¹ Karl Ludwig von Bertalanffy, ‘An Outline of General Systems Theory’, in: *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 1 (1950), pp. 134-165, at pp. 155-157. Bertalanffy, ‘General Systems Theory’, in: *General Systems* 7 (1962), pp. 1-20, at p. 7. Bertalanffy, *General System Theory* (London, 1971) [tenth edn (New York, 1988)]. R. C. Buck, ‘On the Logic of General Behavior Systems Theory’, in: *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Sciences* 1 (1956), pp. 223-237, at pp. 225-226.

⁵² Walter Buckley, *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, 1967). David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York, 1965), esp p. 21. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 92-94, 111-112, 118. Kalevi Jaako Holsti, *International Politics*, third edn (Englewood Cliffs, 1977), pp. 29-30 [restated in the sixth edn (Englewood Cliffs, 1992), pp. 15-16]. Robert T. Holt, ‘A Proposed Structural-Functional Framework’, in: James C. Charlesworth, ed., *Contemporary Political Analysis* (New York, 1974), pp. 87-107, at pp. 88-89.

⁵³ Samir Amin, *L'échange inégal et la loi de la valeur* (Paris, 1973) [second edn (Paris, 1988)]. Amin, ‘The Ancient World-Systems versus the Modern Capitalist World-System’, in: *Review* [Binghamton] 14 (1991), pp. 349-385, at p. 360. André Gunder Frank, ‘A Theoretical Introduction to 5000 Years of World System History’, in: *Review* [Binghamton] 13 (1990), pp. 155-248, at pp. 157, 164, 188.

has rested on the assumption that a system should be defined as the solid frame for interdependent “actions” of autonomous, yet hierarchically ordered units and have planetary extension as a seemingly given objective reality. Beyond these basics, the theory admits various perceptions of what may constitute the “world”, with these perceptions being specific in space and time. Thus, as a rule, advocates of the theory have sought to avoid the equation of the “world” with the globe,⁵⁴ nevertheless, they have insisted that only a world system with global extension can embrace the “world” as a whole. By consequence, it has become possible, within the theory, to categorise “world historiography” as “planetary history”,⁵⁵ whereas the concept of system, informing the theory, has been left undefined as a rule.⁵⁶ Consequently, world systems theorists have taken for granted the premises of structural functionalist social science systems theory. Initially, the theory was applied to a time span of about 5000 years, for which the systems concept was deemed acceptable.⁵⁷ However, despite the long time span, the theory has not contained any analytical tools ready to cope with systems change. Within the theory, systems appeared like monads, linked with their environment only through venues necessary for the self-preservation of the system.

Along these lines, and again in explicit agreement with *dependencia* theorists,⁵⁸ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein has formulated his variant of the theory of a system, to which he usually refers with the hyphenated phrase “world-system”, and has, more precisely than theorists working with the notion of unequal development, spelt out the assumptions informing his theory. Wallerstein classes “world” as a category of perception, specific in space and time and not necessarily identical with the globe. However, as Wallerstein takes states to be units in his “world-system”,⁵⁹ he ascribes to it objective reality during the time span of approximately 12.000 years, in the course of which changes of types of world systems is supposed to have taken place. According to Wallerstein, one of these changes resulted in the formation of the specifically global “world-system”,⁶⁰ a process that he appears to

⁵⁴ André Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills, ‘The 5000 Year World System’, in: Frank and Gills, eds, *The World System. Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* (London and New York, 1993), pp. 3-55 [reprints (London and New York, 1996; 1999); first published in: *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 18 (1992), pp. 1-79]. Frank, ‘Immanuel and Me With-Out Hyphen’, in: Giovanni Arrighi and Walter Goldfrank, eds, *Festschrift for Immanuel Wallerstein* (Journal of World Systems Research, vol. 6, nr 2). 2000, pp. 216-231, at p. 225 [<http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/issue/vuew/61>]. Barry K. Gills, ‘World System Analysis, Historical Sociology and International Relations. The Difference a Hyphen Makes’, in: Stephen Hobden and John Hobson, eds, *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 141-161.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-17.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, passim.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵⁸ With explicit reference to: Emmanuel Arrighi, *Unequal Exchange* (London, 1972) [first published (Paris, 1969)].

⁵⁹ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, vol. 1: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origin of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. (New York, San Francisco and London, 1974), p. 15.

⁶⁰ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, ‘World System versus World-Systems’, in: Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills, eds, *The World System. Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* (London and New York, 1993), pp. 292-298, at pp. 294-295 [reprints (London and New York, 1996; 1999); first published in: *Critique of Anthropology* 11 (1991)].

categorise as a linear expansion of the geographical reach of his “world-system” but has not causally explained. Next to the “world-system”, “world empires”, “world economies” and “mini-systems” feature as further types of world systems.⁶¹ During the early phase of the 12.000-year period, he credits the world systems with an extension of about 5000 years.⁶² For the later “world economies”, he posits that all of them had transformed themselves into “world empires” up to the fifteenth century.⁶³ However, the “world-system”, in his view, is unique and came into existence during the fifteenth century. Wallerstein regards his “world-system” as surpassing all other legally constituted entities in size and, at least in his methodological writings on systems theory from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, emphasised that the units of this system maintained only economic ties among each other. In other words, Wallerstein defined his “world-system” as a “world economy” that did not transform into a “world empire” but into a type of world system *sui generis* and has existed as such for more than 500 years. He has, though, admitted that, during this period, his “world-system” has continuously changed some of its non-essential parts, has taken up “cultural links”, has made “political arrangements” and had acquired even “confederated structures”, as if it has performed as a personal actor.⁶⁴

Wallerstein has been unwilling to install “characteristics” into his “world empires” and “world economies”, but left them unspecified. With regard to his “world-system”, which he classed as „modern“, however, he has been more precise than other theorists in marking the system’s “characteristics” and allowing for transformations of some of these “characteristics”. For one, he states that the geographical reach of the “world-system” quickly expanded to the boundaries of the globe during the nineteenth century, allegedly due to economic necessity. Yet, Wallerstein overlooks that European colonial “world empires” not just constituted his “modern world-system” but also, and even in the main, through their political interactions provoked the global expansion of the “world-system” with its dominant “structures”.⁶⁵ Hence, the global extension of Wallerstein’s “world-system” has been a perception that cannot be grasped solely in economic terms but has

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Wallerstein, *World-System* (note 59), p. 15, following Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York, 1969), p. 11 [first published (Glencoe and London, 1963); further edn (New Brunswick and London, 1993)].

⁶³ Wallerstein, *World-System* (note 59), p. 16.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 15. Wallerstein, ‘The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System’, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16 (1974), pp. 387-415 [reprinted in: Wallerstein, *The Essential Wallerstein* (New York, 2000), pp. 71-105]. Wallerstein, Terence K. Hopkins, Robert L. Bach, Christopher K. Chase-Dunn and Ramkrishna Mukherjee, eds, *World-Systems Analysis* (Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi, 1982). Wallerstein, ‘World-Systems Analysis’, in: Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner, eds, *Social Theory Today* (Cambridge and Stanford, 1987), pp. 309-324, at pp. 309, 320, 322-323. Ders., ‘World-System’ (note 60).

⁶⁵ Harald Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen* (Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 216-249. Ders., *Geschichte des Völkerrechts in Krieg und Frieden* (Tübingen, 2013), pp. 274-340. Hans-Heinrich Nolte, *Weltgeschichte. Imperien, Religionen und Systeme. 15. – 19. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 2005).

resulted from the specific political thought patterns current in Europe during the nineteenth century. However, Wallerstein's self-contradictory approach to the "characteristics" of his "world-system" is not limited to statements concerning the system's expansion but also affect what he has to say about the system's boundaries. On the one side, he argues that the system has "bounds" only and that it would be hard to refer to these "bounds" as "boundaries", whereby he seems to consider "boundaries" as lines demarcating territories defined in administrative terms.⁶⁶ On the other side, he insists that his "modern world-system" is a system like all others, with the self-evident implication that this "world-system" has not only "boundaries", but also "structures, membership groups, rules of legitimation and coherence".⁶⁷ This statement corresponds with the demands of social science structural functionalist systems theory and, like the latter, leaves unanswered the question what should constitute these "boundaries" and where they should be considered to exist.

His contradictoriness even extends to specifications of further "characteristics". Thus, in the passage just quoted, he lists legitimacy rules as legal "characteristics", while, in another passage, he insists categorically that his "modern world-system" has only "economic links" as its core "characteristics", because it is, in his view, in essence not a "political entity".⁶⁸ Following Fernand Braudel,⁶⁹ he isolates as the overall "characteristic" the intrasystemic division of labour among units in the system, ranked hierarchically from a ruling centre at the top, semiperipheries in the middle and a dependent periphery at the bottom. He seeks to determine that hierarchy through a scale of options for actions, reserved for the centre but denied to the periphery and mainly concerning decisions about the "organisation" of the division of labour and the allocation of value to core trading goods to the advantage of the centre and the disadvantage of the periphery. He sees the centre as dominated by the drive for incessant capital accumulation,⁷⁰ and postulates that these "characteristics" have petrified the "structures" of his "modern world-system"

Wallerstein's theory betrays dependence on social science structural functionalist systems theory also through the choice of words. Thus, he labelled his "modern world-system" "mortal" on the simple grounds that, as an historically generated unit, it will be bound to perish.⁷¹ He also

⁶⁶ Wallerstein, *World-System* (note 59), p. 15.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 347.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁶⁹ Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol. 3 (New York, 1984) [first published (Paris, 1980)].

⁷⁰ Wallerstein, 'World-System' (note 60).

⁷¹ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, ed., *The Modern World-System in the Longue Durée* (Boulder, 2004), pp. 1-3, at p. 1. The principal expectation that the "modern capitalist world-system" is doomed to fall apart is to be found already in: Wallerstein, 'Rise' (note 64), pp. 390-391. Wallerstein, 'The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World-Economy', in: Gerhard Lenski, ed., *Current Issues and Research in Macrosociology* (International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, 37) (Leiden, 1984), pp. 100-108, at pp. 100-101 [reprinted in: Wallerstein, *The Essential Wallerstein* (New York, 2000), pp. 253-263].

consociated his system with attributes of life in postulating: “Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension, and tear it apart, as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others. One can define its structures as being at different times strong or weak in terms of the internal logic of its functioning.” He insisted that his “modern world-system” shared structural “characteristics” with all other systems: “what characteristics [sic!] a social system in my view is the fact that life within it is largely self-contained and that the dynamics of its development are largely internal.”⁷² He expected that the interactions among units within the system were “organic”.⁷³ Hence, Wallerstein the living body as the model for his “modern world-system” as if it were a monade, whose transformations, he believed, would result from internal forces alone. These forces can, according to Wallerstein, emerge from the system’s units, when the units direct their forces against one another, thereby causing frictions and tensions. The system, in turn, might extract some “dynamics” from these forces, using them for its own “development”, while these forces might also destroy the system.

Wallerstein’s “modern world-system” thus comes along as a living person capable of acting in accordance with its own agenda, pursuing its own goals and seeking its own, apparently recognisable “advantages”, and seems to betray “patterns of actions” as its “functions”.⁷⁴ Through this metaphorical diction, Wallerstein delved into the imagery of nineteenth century social theory, contrary to his own critique of the limited argumentative usefulness of what he termed nineteenth-century “paradigms”.⁷⁵ For one, not only Hegel but also Clausewitz had instilled into their philosophical and military theories the expectation that contestations and resulting tensions would generate progress.⁷⁶

Within systems theory, the definition argued by Christopher Chase-Dunn, in explicit opposition against, was far more parsimonious, although Chase-Dunn used “world-systems” terminology. According to this definition, “world-systems”, were “intersocietal networks”, in which interactions, such as trade, war, marriage, information, were relevant for the “reproduction of the internal

⁷² Wallerstein, *World-System* (note 59), p. 347.

⁷³ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, ‘The States in the Institutional Vortex of the Capitalist World Economy’, in: *International Social Science Journal* 32 (1980), pp. 743-751, at p. 744.

⁷⁴ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, ‘World-Systems Analysis. Theoretical and Interpretative Issues’, in: Wallerstein, Terence K. Hopkins, Robert L. Bach, Christopher K. Chase-Dunn and Ramkrishna Mukherjee, eds, *World-Systems Analysis* (Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi, 1982), pp. 91-103, at p. 93.

⁷⁵ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science. The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms* (Cambridge, 1991).

⁷⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, part I, book IV, chap. 9 (Frankfurt, Berlin and Vienna, 1980), pp. 229-234 [fourth edn of this edn (Berlin, 2003); first edited by Marie von Clausewitz (Berlin, 1832); sixteenth edn, edited by Werner Hahlweg (Bonn, 1952); nineteenth edn (Bonn, 1980); reprint of this edn (Bonn, 1991)].

structures” of units in systems and could trigger significant changes of “local structures”.⁷⁷ In other words: “world-systems” are, according to Chase-Dunn, entities facilitating interactions and networking among their units but, once having been established, can have effects on unit “characteristics” ranked as “structures”. Chase-Dunn went even further in expecting that the effects of these changes might not be restricted to contingent matters but might be relevant for every “world-system”. Chase-Dunn thus described every “world-system” as an inter-societal entity, while not limiting its “characteristics” to economic matters but admitting such patterns of interaction as marriage relations as systemic in addition to trade. Every “world-system” and its units are actors in Chase-Dunn’s perception and create and maintain systemic relations through their actions. Because the units of a “world-system” engage in their systemic relations for the sole purpose of boosting their own reproduction, they have to be subject to the law of life and death. Put differently, Chase-Dunn, like Wallerstein employed the model of the living body in his systems theory. Despite explicit opposition against Wallerstein’s theory, Chase-Dunn thus used conventional social science structural functionalist systems theory as the platform for his systems definition.

Moreover, Chase-Dunn agreed with Wallerstein in positioning his “world-systems” within a time span of approximately 12.000 years⁷⁸ and taking into consideration a wide variety of systems and systems types. In his historical world picture, merely groups identified as non-residential, are not equipped with the capability of generating systems relevant patterns of interaction. Nevertheless, Chase-Dunn’s categorisation of “world-systems” as “intersocietal networks”, in contradistinction to Wallerstein, results in the claim that “world-systems” may cover different types of groups as their units. Thus, Chase-Dunn included systems of kin groups, tributary systems jointly with the “world-system” of states into his systems definition. For the period since the seventeenth century, he maintained that only one single type of “world-systems” were remaining, because the other types of “world-systems”, as systems based on kin groups and tributary relations appeared to belong to the more distant past. Consequently, Chase-Dunn’s list of examples for systemically relevant interactions (trade, war, marriage, information) seems to be meant to be an array of systems, each existing within a specific time span, while the various constitutive types of interactions do not always have to appear in a system. This interpretation, although never spelt out in Chase-Dunn’s text, seems advisable, as marriage relations at a systemically relevant level may be hard to accept within a “world-system” of states. However, Chase-Dunn postulates, along Wallersteinian lines of argument, that the spatial reach of systems as “intersocietal networks” has continuously expanded during the past 12.00 or so years.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Christopher K. Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, *Rise and Demise. Comparing World-Systems* (Boulder, 1997), p. 8.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁷⁹ Christopher K. Chase-Dunn and Eugene Newton Anderson, *The Historical Evolution of World-Systems*

All these theories share the attempt to place “world-systems” mainly on economic matters with no more than subsidiary recourse to politics and without recourse to law.⁸⁰ Wallerstein, it is true, admits the possibility of a secondary acquisition of political “characteristics” by his “modern world-system” in his course of its own transformations; in his late papers, he also introduces the concept of “culture”, understood as some “idea-system”, as a factor of transformation;⁸¹ and in the fourth volume of his grand chronological narrative of that system, published in 2011, he not only accepts culture as that factor of transformation but, on the basis of other sociological theories,⁸² even grants the social sciences the status of a systemically relevant actor and adds them to his descriptive categories.⁸³ Yet, he continues to deny to politics as well as to culture the rank of an original “characteristic” of his “modern world-system” and completely eliminates the law. The remaining theories pertaining to this group, did not comment on political and cultural impacts with their systems definitions. Hence, the reception of world systems theories, beyond the bounds of sociology, within which these theories first appeared, has remained limited in scope. For one, political scientist Andrew Little could, still in 2000, insist that Wallerstein’s “world-system” theory had not penetrated into political science.⁸⁴ Little’s statement may not have been intended to apply to the entire discipline, but only to the so-called English School in International Relations, yet the fact of the matter is that Wallerstein’s theory is, as a rule, conspicuously absent from handbooks on international relations theories mostly of British provenance.⁸⁵ This is, nonetheless, surprising, because the concept and the model of the “world-system” corresponds rather closely with the concept and model of the international system in the focus of political science theories.

(Basingstoke and New York, 2005), p. X.

⁸⁰ The lack of consideration specifically of legal norms with regard to the description of systems in Wallerstein’s work is noteworthy in view other authors, working in the same field contemporaneously rank norms among the definitional elements of systems. See: Rolf Sprandel, *Mentalitäten und Systeme* (Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 113-115.

⁸¹ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, ‘Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System’, in: Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture, Essays on the Changing World-System* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 158-183, at p. 166 [first published in: *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies* 21 (1989); reprinted in: Mark Featherstone, ed., *Global Culture* (London, 1990); also in: Wallerstein, *The Essential Wallerstein*, New York, 2000], pp. 264-291].

⁸² John W. Meyer, ‘Die Weltgesellschaft und der Nationalstaat’, in: Meyer, *Weltkultur. Wie die westlichen Prinzipien die Welt durchdringen* (Frankfurt, 2003), pp. 85-132, at p. 85 [first published in: *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (1997), pp. 144-181].

⁸³ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, ‘Liberalism as Social Science’, in: Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, vol. 4: *Centrist Liberalism Triumphant. 1789 – 1914* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2011), pp. 219-273.

⁸⁴ Andrew Little, ‘Systems, History, Theory and the Study of International Relations’, in: Barry Gordon Buzan and Andrew Little, *International Systems in World History* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 31-32.

⁸⁵ Wallerstein’s work was not mentioned as containing a distinct theory of its own in: Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, eds, *International Relations Theories* (Oxford, 2007). Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford, 2008). The disciplinary boundaries between sociology and political science appear to have obstructed the reception of Wallerstein’s work outside the confines of sociology.

3. *Theories of the International System*

The reasons for the sluggish reception of world systems theory in International Relations to the 1990s were neither the Marxist rhetoric to which mainly Wallerstein has been adhering, specifically his use of the concept of the capitalist mode of production that he took over from *dependencia* theorists, nor the explicitly critical approach of world systems theorists to society, as such approaches have also been common in International Relations.⁸⁶ Rather, what seems to have formed an obstacle against the the reception of world systems theory was the continuing existence, in the discipline of International Relations, of system theories from the third decade of the twentieth century, that is, long before Wallerstein began his work. In the discipline, the concept of system had then already encompassed a system of global extension.⁸⁷ Theorists using the concept and word of system at that time were looking at actions in war and peace and focused their theory-making efforts on the League of Nations.⁸⁸ Already Joseph Toynbee, who was working on his theory of “civilisations” during the 1920s, proposed to provide a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the rise and fall of “civilisations” as monadic large-scale entities to which he applied the model of the living body and placed their sequence within a time span of 6000 years. He saw each of these entities coming and going within a global system, but would only accept what he termed the “Western Civilization” to have accomplished global extension in itself, pointing at European colonial rule as the mechanism of the globalisation of “Western Civilization” into a single world-wide system.⁸⁹ Subsequent theorists, among them Edward Hallett Carr and Hans-Joachim Morgenthau, sketched, what they took to be the international system, as a frame of inter-state relations extending across periods, and they identified states not only as units of but also as quasi-personal actors in the system,

⁸⁶ Barry Gordon Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Brighton, 1983) [second edn (New York, 1991); reprint (New York, 2007)]. Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda* (London, 1993); Buzan, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge, 2009). Robert Cox ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders. Beyond International Relations Theory’, in: Cox, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 85-123 [first published in: *Millennium* 10 (1981), pp. 126-155; also in: Robert Owen Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York, 1986)]. Buzan, ‘Production, the State and Change in World Order’, in: Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Nathan Rosenau, eds, *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges* (Lexington, MA, and Toronto, 1989), pp. 37-50, at pp. 41-42. Ekkehard Krippendorff, ‘Die Entstehung des internationalen Systems’, in: *Neue politische Literatur* 22 (1977), pp. 36-48, at p. 36. Dieter Senghaas, *Zum irdischen Frieden. Erkenntnisse und Vermutungen* (Frankfurt, 2004).

⁸⁷ Arthur James Grant, Arthur Greenwood, J. D. Hughes, Philip Henry Kerr, 11th Marquis of Lothian and F. F. Urquhart, *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London, 1916). David Jayne Hill, *World Organization as Affected by the Nature of the Modern State* (New York, 1911). Edmund Aloysius Walsh, SJ, ed. *The History and Nature of International Relations* (New York, 1922). On these studies see: Harald Kleinschmidt, *The Nemesis of Power* (London, 2000), pp. 186-187.

⁸⁸ Hicks, *World Order* (note 44). Veit Valentin, *Geschichte des Völkerbundsgedankens in Deutschland* (Berlin, 1920). Hans Wehberg, *Grundprobleme des Völkerbundes* (Berlin, 1926). Elizabeth York [= Lottie Elizabeth Bracher], *Leagues of Nations* (London, 1919). Alfred Eckhard Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (London, 1936).

⁸⁹ Arnold Joseph Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. 9 (Oxford, 1954), pp. 413-414.

again equipped with the paraphernalia of living beings.⁹⁰ Eventually, the 1950s witnessed the emergence of a theory of the then explicitly so called international system.⁹¹

These theorists of the international system anticipated world systems theory in categorising the units of the international system as autonomous, not subjected to any overarching institution of rule and yet tied together through systemic relations among one another. Both groups of theorists, then, ranked the international or the world system among social systems and ascribed “characteristics” to them. For theorists of the international system, however, these “characteristics” did not exist in hierarchies of economic centre-periphery relations, but in the capability of exercising military-political power. In this respect, theorists expected that the states they were willing to recognize as actors in the system, would agglomerate around several so-called „poles”, as moths circle around light.⁹² Kenneth Neal Waltz, influential theorist of international relations during the 1980s and early 1990s, did not explicitly discuss the theoretical foundations of his usage of the concept of international system, but explained the conditions under which, in his view, this concept of the international system might to be applied usefully in the corresponding theory. To Waltz, the system appeared as an integrated whole comprising all its essential units. He differentiated this usage of the concept from what he called an analytical approach and conspiciated with Newtonian physics. This analytical method was, Waltz insisted, meaningful, if the units of a whole could be separated from one another easily and then subject to analytical scrutiny. Only under the condition that this procedure was not possible, because the “organisation” of a whole was influenced by the “behavior” of the units, with the units thus not being separable, the use of the concept of system was mandated.⁹³ Like Schopenhauer, Waltz differentiated thus between an additive-mechanicist and an integrative-biological concept of system, but, unlike Schopenhauer, reserved the word system for the latter type. Waltz thus again modelled his international system upon the premises of social science structural functional systems theory, as if the international system was a living body and had been equipped with the capability of acting as a quasi person. Consequently, Waltz demanded that the use of the concept of system was mandatory, if the system and its units mutually influenced each other and would thereby become integrated into some indissolvable whole.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis. 1919 – 1939*, second edn (London, 1946) [reprint (Basingstoke, 1993); first published (London, 1939)]. Hans-Joachim Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, fifth edn (New York, 1973), pp. 114-129 [first published (New York, 1948); second edn (New York, 1954); third edn (New York, 1960); fourth edn (New York, 1967)]. Barry Gordon Buzan, ‘The Theoretical Toolkit of This Book’, in: Buzan and Andrew Little, *International Systems in World History* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 68-110, at p. 69.

⁹¹ Morton A. Kaplan, ‘The International System’, in: Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York, 1957), pp. 22-36. Kenneth Neal Waltz, ‘Theory of International Relations’, in: Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds, *International Politics* (Handbook of Political Science, 8) (Menlo Park, 1959), pp. 1-85.

⁹² Kenneth Neal Waltz, ‘The Stability of a Bipolar World’, in: *Daedalus* 93 (1964), pp. 881-909, at pp. 882-887.

⁹³ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA, 1979), p. 39.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

The systems model of social science structural functional systems theory was the common ground, on which both the sociological “world-systems” theory and the political science theory of international systems were built. Some historically minded political science theorists, operating in critical distance to mainstream International Relations, have measured the time span of what they considered as the international terms in approximately 500 years and, like “world-systems” theorists, have traced its origin to the beginning of the European conquest of America.⁹⁵ These parallelisms featured by both, international systems theories and “world-systems” theory, could be supplemented by further items and they have revealed the same model, upon which both sets of theories were constructed, as they employed the same principal concept of system. Both sets of theories have not been limited to the perception of the global extension of international or “world-systems”, but have also been applied to non-global systems; yet both were rooted in the same postulate that the current “world-system”⁹⁶ and the current international system are global in reach: “*International systems*, meaning the largest conglomerates of interacting and interdependent units that have no system level above them. Currently this encompasses the whole planet, but in earlier times there were several more or less disconnected international systems existing simultaneously.”⁹⁷

4. Theories of World Society and of World History

Partly in critical evaluation of international systems theory, partly uninfluenced by theories both of the international system and the “world-system”, the argument found wide acceptance, primarily in sociology, but also in political science, that some world society should be regarded as existent as a matter in which all humans are “somehow clinging together” (Menschen irgendwie zusammenhängen).⁹⁸ This world society, often conceptualised as a social system, was given out as an

⁹⁵ George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Basingstoke, 1987). William A. Thompson, *On Global War* (Columbia, SC, 1988), pp. 14, 34, 40-44. Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Of Systems and Boundaries. Reflections on the Formation of the State System’, in: *World Politics* 39 (1986), pp. 27-52. For a study see: Harald Kleinschmidt, ‘Historical Method and the History of International Relations’, in: Martin Kintzinger, Wolfgang Stürmer and Johannes Zahlten, eds, *Das Andere wahrnehmen. August Nitschke zum 65. Geburtstag* (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna, 1991), pp. 653-670.

⁹⁶ Wallerstein, *World-System* (note 71), pp. 1-2.

⁹⁷ Buzan, ‘Toolkit’ (note 80), p. 69 (emphasis in the original). Likewise: Little, ‘Systems’ (note 74), pp. 18-22. Robert G. Wesson, *State Systems. International Pluralism, Politics and Culture* (New York, 1978), pp. 28-35.

⁹⁸ Niklas Luhmann, ‘Die Weltgesellschaft’, in: Luhmann, *Soziologische Aufklärung*, vol. 2: Aufsätze zur Theorie der Gesellschaft (Opladen, 1975), pp. 51-71, at p. 51 second edn (Opladen, 1982); third edn (Opladen, 1986); first published in: *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie* 57 (1971)]. The debate replaced the older discussion on the possibilities of the establishment of a world state and integrated this notion into the overarching idea of global governance of world society. This idea had been advocated by Hiroyuki Katō, *Der Kampf ums Recht des Stärkeren und seine Entwicklung* (Tokyo, 1893), pp. 186-188 [further edn (Berlin, 1894)], who, already at the end of the nineteenth century, envisaged a process, through which the larger states of the world, then engaged in peaceful communication among themselves and in international organizations, were on the way out of the state of nature to

“historically new phenomenon” (historisch neuartiges Phänomen) and linked to the potential for global interaction, in turn having emerged only during the nineteenth century.⁹⁹ The world society was ranked as a social system like all other and appeared to rest “on a conception of functional unity” (auf einer funktionalen Einheitskonzeption), whose “point of connectivity” (Bezugspunkt) “was to be found solely in the system’s environment” (nur in der Umwelt des Systems gefunden werden).¹⁰⁰ As a system, world society was to comprise all “communicatively comprehensible human experiences and actions” (kommunikativ erreichbaren menschlichen Erlebnisse und Handlungen) and to “exist in the fulfillment of its function of providing an ordered environment to its systemic units” (existiert in der Erfüllung seiner Funktion, den Teilsystemen eine geordnete Umwelt bereitzustellen). Put differently: world society was, like a world system as well as an international system, not just the mere sum of its constitutive units but a whole promoting or even enforcing the integration of its “subsystems” as units and “operating” “out there” (da draußen operiert)¹⁰¹ According to this theory, world society was an actor providing something equivalent of

the condition of a an integrated societal organism, from out of which a world state might emerge in the future. After World War I, the League of Nations served as the institution with which the concept of a world state might be connected. Thus: Albert Pfaul, *Weltstaat und Weltverfassung* (Düsseldorf, 1929). After World War II, the world state appeared to be in demand not primarily for the purpose of regulating world intercourse but the forebearer of world sovereignty to the end of preventing the outbreak of future wars. In this view, world sovereignty was to replace state sovereignty and was to evolve from the UN Charter. The world state counted as necessary for the safeguard of humanity and so-called “civilisation”. Thus: Kisaburō Yokota, ‘Sekai kokka ron’, in: *Sekai*, nr 9 (September 1946), pp. 17-29. Yokota, *Sekai kokka no mondai* (Tokyo, 1948), pp. 5, 16-20, 127-189. Yokota was under strong influence by the legal philosophy of Hans Kelsens, who derived what he considered to be the necessity of a world state from the indivisible principle of justice enforceable only on the globe at large. On this concept of the world state see: Ulrich Thiele, ‘Kelsens Weltstaatspostulat als Interpretation des zweiten Definitivartikels der Kantischen Friedensschrift’, in: Hauke Brunkhorst and Rüdiger Voigt, eds, *Rechts-Staat. Staat, internationale Gemeinschaft und Völkerrecht bei Hans Kelsen* (Baden-Baden, 2008), pp. 347-363. Similarly to Yokota’s were the arguments by: Robert M. Hutchins and G. A. Borgese, eds, for the Committee to Frame a World Constitution, *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution* (Chicago, 1948) [German version s. t.: *Weltverfassung. Ein amerikanischer Entwurf. Vorgelegt vom Ausschuss zur Schaffung einer Weltregierung, bestehend aus Gelehrten der amerikanischen und kanadischen Universitäten* (Cologne and Opladen 1948)]. Rosika Schwimmer, *Der Weltstaat. Mitteilungsblatt der Weltstaat-Liga*, nr 6 (Munich, 1948), p. 76. And subsequently: Otfried Höffe, ‘Eine Weltrepublik als Minimalstaat. Zur Theorie internationaler politischer Gerechtigkeit’, in: Reinhard Merkel and Roland Wittmann, eds, “*Zum ewigen Frieden*”. *Grundlagen, Aktualität und Aussichten einer Idee von Immanuel Kant* (Frankfurt, 1996), pp. 154-171. In the perception of Socialist international legal theorists, however, these world-state projects were nothing feeble attempts at the abolishment of the sovereignty of Socialist states. Thus: Herbert Kröger, ed., *Völkerrecht. Lehrbuch*, vol. 1 (Berlin [GDR], 1973), pp. 150-152, 330-331. Roland Meister, *Ideen vom Weltstaat und der Weltgemeinschaft im Wandel imperialistischer Herrschaftsstrategien* (Zur Kritik der bürgerlichen Ideologie, 29) (Berlin [GDR], 1973), pp. 35, 38, 40-44, 46-48 [further edn (Frankfurt, 1973)]. Grigorij Ivanovič Tunkin, *Das Völkerrecht der Gegenwart. Theorie und Praxis* (Berlin, 1963), pp. 151-159 [first published]Moscow, 1962]. On the position of Socialist theorists see: Theodor Schweisfurth, ‘Die Völkerrechtswissenschaft der Sowjetunion’, in: *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht* 34 (1973), pp. 1-51, at pp. 45-47.

⁹⁹ Luhmann, ‘Weltgesellschaft’ (note 98), p. 53.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 59.

¹⁰¹ Niklas Luhmann, ‘Weltzeit und Systemgeschichte’, in: Peter Christian Ludz, ed., *Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte* (Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 16, Sonderheft) (Opladen, 1972), pp. 81-115, at pp. 85-86. Luhmann, ‘Weltgesellschaft’ (note 88), p. 59. Luhmann, *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt, 1997), p. 35. Luhmann, ‘The Autopoiesis of Social Systems’, in: Felix Geyer and Johannes van der Touwen, eds, *Paradoxes. Observation, Control and Evolution of Self-Steering Systems* (London, 1986), pp. 172-192, at p. 179.

public goods and was, in this respect, similar to the concept of the “society of peoples” of nineteenth-century international legal theory.¹⁰² It thus has all “characteristics” of a system according to nineteenth-century social science structural functional systems theory and performs as an historically unique actor, which has the capability of successively “incorporating” all other social systems existing next to it. As in world systems theory and in international systems theory, it remains unclear, how the system’s environment should be imagined. Within systems theory, the features distinguishing world society from world system or international system remain unspecified, yet the theory portrays world society not primarily as a club of states but, so to speak, as a social container for states and the frame, in which global governance takes place, that is, the theory portrays the world state as a type of social grouping manifest in global communication or as a “social system of highest order” (soziales System höchster Ordnung).¹⁰³

Peter Heintz, *A Macrosociological Theory of Social Systems*, part III (Berne, 1972). Heintz, ‘Der heutige Strukturwandel der Weltgesellschaft’, in: *Universitas* 29 (1974), pp. 449-556. On the claim of the “actor” “property” of systems see also: Mathias Albert, ‘On the Modern Systems Theory of Society and IR. Contacts and Disjunctures between Different Kinds of Theorizing’, in: Albert and Lena Hilkermeier, eds, *Observing International Relations. Niklas Luhmann and World Politics* (London, 2004), pp. 13-29, at pp. 15-16. Stefan Rossbach, “‘Corpus mysticum’. Niklas Luhmann’s Evolution of World Society’, in: *ibid.*, pp. 44-56, at p. 49. Rudolf Stichweh, ‘Zur Genese der Weltgesellschaft [1998]’, in: Stichweh, *Die Weltgesellschaft. Soziologische Analysen* (Frankfurt, 2000), pp. 245-267, at pp. 249-250 [first published in: Manfred Bauschulte, Volkhard Krech and Hilge Landweer, eds, *Wege – Bilder – Spiele. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Jürgen Frese* (Bielefeld, 1999), pp. 289-302].

¹⁰² Fallati, ‘Genesis’ (note 41). Nevertheless, a recent theorist has claimed that the concept of world society already existed in the eighteenth century, connecting it mainly with Kant’s work (even though Kant did not use the word *Gesellschaft* in the context of his peace theory and explicitly rejected terms such as “Völkerstaat” (state of nations) and “Weltrepublik” (world republic) and would only admit a “federalism of independent states” (Föderalismus freier Staaten). See: Immanuel Kant, ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’, Zweiter Definitivartikel first published (Königsberg, 1795)], in: Kant, *Werke in zwölf Bänden*, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, vol. 11 (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 193-251, at pp. 208-213. Rudolf Stichweh, ‘Zur Theorie der Weltgesellschaft [1993]’, in: Stichweh, *Die Weltgesellschaft. Soziologische Analysen* (Frankfurt, 2000), pp. 7-30, at p. 7 [first published in: *Soziale Systeme* 1 (1995), pp. 29-45]. By contrast, the word “Société” did appear in the handbook on the law among states by: Emer[ich] de Vattel, *Le droit des gens. Ou Principes de la loi naturelle appliquées à la conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains Préliminaires*, § 12 (London [recte Neuchâtel], 1758), p. 8 [second edn (Paris, 1773); third edn (Amsterdam, 1775); Nouvelle édition, edited by Silvestre Pinheiro-Ferreira, Jean Pierre Baron de Chambrier d’Oleires and Paul Louis Ernest Pradier-Fodéré (Philadelphia, 1863); reprint of the first edn, edited by Albert de Lapradelle (Washington, 1916); reprint of the reprint (Geneva, 1983)]; the word denoted the community of all states and Vattel took this community to be existing by nature (“la grande Société établie par la Nature entre toutes les Nations”). To this “grande Société”, Vattel ascribed the task of assisting states in their bid for self-perfectioning.

¹⁰³ Stichweh, ‘Theorie’ (note 102), pp. 11-12, here with reference to Parsons (note 49), whom Stichweh took to be theorist of world society *avant la lettre*. At another point, Stichweh raised, at least for the twentieth century and contra Luhmann, world society to the all-embracing type of social gathering and commits himself to the assumption that “all societies are world societies, that they are all marked by the projective constitution of a world horizon, which, in turn, comprises everything that is otherwise excluded from social systems through system/environment-distinctions” (daß alle *Gesellschaften Weltgesellschaften* sind, daß sie sich alle durch die projektive Konstitution eines Welthorizontes auszeichnen, der alles umschließt, was andererseits durch System/Umwelt-Unterscheidungen als Gesellschaftssysteme ausgeschlossen wird). See: Rudolf Stichweh, ‘Konstruktivismus und Theorie der Weltgesellschaft’, in: Stichweh, *Die Weltgesellschaft. Soziologische Analysen* (Frankfurt, 2000), pp. 232-244, at p. 237 [first published in: *Kunst, Literatur, Theorie* 4 (1997), pp. 91-97; also in: Andreas Reckwitz and Holger Sievert, eds, *Interpretation, Konstruktion, Kultur* (Opladen, 1999), pp. 208-218]. See also: Stichweh, ‘Genese’ note 101), p. 237, for his claim of the singularity of world society. Global communication as the essential “property” of world society has been argued by: Mathias Albert, ‘Weltgesellschaft

Since the 1908s, a group of scholars around John Meyer at Stanford University has subjected the concept of world society to empirical scrutiny and, in agreement with social science systems theory, has examined states as units of world society. In doing so, this group of scholars has elevated the concept of world society to the level of an overarching concept comprising in itself the international system together with the states forming its units.¹⁰⁴ The group advocates the optimistic position that world society, as it sees it, will not legitimise states, but will ensure that “nation states” under review, will “appropriate standardised identities and structures under very little constraint and controls” (Nationalstaaten unter sehr wenig Zwang und Kontrollen von außen standardisierte Identitäten und Strukturen zueigen machen).¹⁰⁵ However, following the tradition of social science structural functional systems theory, the group treats “nation states”, in general terms and without admitting variations and difference, as actors, which it even equips with “identities”, thus again modelling world society according to the living body. Yet, there is no specifications of these “identities”.¹⁰⁶ In

und Weltstaat’, in: Albert, Bernhard Moltmann and Bruno Schoch, eds, *Die Entgrenzung der Politik* (Frankfurt, 2004), pp. 223-240, at pp. 223, 234-237. Stichweh, ‘Konstruktivismus’ (as above), p. 239. Peter Heintz, *Die Weltgesellschaft im Spiegel von Ereignissen* (Diessenhofen, 1982), esp. p. 12.

¹⁰⁴ George M. Thomas and John W. Meyer, ‘Regime Changes and State Power in an Intensifying World-State-System’, in: Albert Bergesen, ed., *Studies in the Modern World System* (New York, 1980), pp. 139-158, at p. 140, 142. Meyer, ‘The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation State’, in: Meyer, George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez and John Boli, eds, *Institutional Structure. Constituting State, Society and the Individual* (Newbury Park, 1987), pp. 41-70. George M. Thomas, ‘Differentiation, Rationalization and Actorhood in New Systems and World Culture Theories’, in: Mathias Albert, Lars-Erik Cederman and Alexander Wendt, eds, *New Systems Theories of World Politics* (Basingstoke and New York, 2010), pp. 220-248, at pp. 232-238. Rudolf Stichweh, ‘Zum Gesellschaftsbegriff der Systemtheorie. Parsons und Luhmann und die Hypothese der Weltgesellschaft’, in: Bettina Heintz, Richard Mönch and Hartmann Tyrell, eds, *Weltgesellschaft. Theoretische Zugänge und empirische Problemlagen* (Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Sonderheft 1) (Stuttgart, 2005), pp. 174-185, at pp. 176-178, with reference to Parsons. Jens Greve and Bettina Heintz, ‘Die “Entdeckung” der Weltgesellschaft. Entstehung und Grenzen der Weltgesellschaftstheorie’, in: Heintz (as above), pp. 89-119, at pp. 91-111, who regard Kaplan and Wallerstein, together with other, as world systems theorists.

¹⁰⁵ Meyer, ‘Weltgesellschaft’ (note 82), p. 131. Likewise: Stichweh, ‘Theorie’ (note 102), pp. 23-26. On this aspect of world society see: Chris Brown, ‘World Society and the English School. An “International Society” Perspective on World Society’, in: *European Journal of International Relations* 7 (2001), pp. 423-441, at pp. 426-427. Brown, ‘The “English School” and World Society’, in: Mathias Albert and Lena Hilkermeier, eds, *Observing International Relations. Niklas Luhmann and World Politics* (London, 2004), pp. 59-71, at pp. 66-68, 90.

¹⁰⁶ The World Society Research Group, active at Frankfurt and Darmstadt, does not position world society explicitly within the frame of social science systems theory, but brings to the fore supportive arguments for its view that world society is not a society in accordance with Ferdinand Tönnies’s term, but rather a community, as world society is based on tradition rather than on purposeful rational agreements. See: World Society Research Group Darmstadt – Frankfurt, ‘In Search of World Society’, in: Mathias Albert, Lothar Brock and Klaus-Dieter Wolf, eds, *Civilizing World Politics. Society and Community beyond the State* (Lanham, MD, 1995), pp. 1-17, at pp. 6-7, 12. For discussions of these concepts see: Barry Gordon Buzan, *From International to World Society. English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 95) (Cambridge, 2000). Buzan and Richard Little, ‘International Systems in World History. Remaking the Study of International Relations’, in: Stephen Hobden and John Hobson, eds, *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 200-221. The Frankfurt-Darmstadt Research Group considers world society as a type of social organization, to which it does not want to apply the concept of system. Also replacing the term society by community: Jens Bartelson, ‘Making Sense of a Global Civil Society’, in: *European Journal of International Relations* 12 (2006), pp. 371-395. Bartelson, *Visions of World Community* (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 1-18. Ulrich Beck, ed., *Perspektiven der Weltgesellschaft* (Frankfurt, 1998), pp. 7-11. Oliver Kessler, ‘World Society, Social

formulating its optimistic stance on the allegedly insignificant constraint, the group, however, overlooks the considerable and excessively painful political and military coercion, with which non-traditional collective identities were imposed upon population groups under colonial rule¹⁰⁷ and which post-colonial theory has revealed.¹⁰⁸ Even though the group and its supporters did not overlook the strong influence of European values which went along with the superimposition of the collective identities, it did determine culture as the main venue of the superimposition and pointed to intellectuals and other types of communicators as the transmitters of these values. In opting for this view, they presented the global superimposition of perceptions of the world society as a selfevident, unilateral, purportedly rational and even value-free process, the implementation of which does not appear to be in need of justification in view of the suffering of the victims of that superimposition.¹⁰⁹

Some theorists rooted in British political science defined the concept of world society in a slightly different but not completely opposing manner. They posited it as a global frame of ordering not only for states as quasi personal actors but also for other types of actors, such as civil society organisations.¹¹⁰ They saw world society in this sense,¹¹¹ sometimes also referred as “World Political System”,¹¹² as the facilitator of the legitimation of states as sovereign institutions under international law.¹¹³ Theorists left unanswered the question, where from world society might derive the legitimacy

Differentiation and Time’, in: *International Political Sociology* 6 (2012), pp. 77-94. Martin Shaw, *Theory of the Global State. Globality as an Unfinished Revolution* (Cambridge, 2000). Rudolf Stichweh, *Das Konzept der Weltgesellschaft. Genese und Strukturbildung eines globalen Gesellschaftssystems* (Lucerne, 2009).

¹⁰⁷ Among many, yet with unsurpassed forcefulness: Adiele Eberechukwu Afigbo, ‘The Background to the Southern Nigeria Education Code of 1903’, in: *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 4 (1968), pp. 197-225 [reprinted in: Afigbo, *Nigerian History, Politics and Affairs*, edited by Toyin Falola (Trenton and Asmara, 2005), pp. 611-640]. Afigbo, ‘Oral Tradition and the Political Process in Pre-Colonial Nigeria’, in: *Nigerian Heritage* 11 (2002), pp. 11-25. Afigbo, ‘Anthropology and Colonial Administration in South-Eastern Nigeria. 1891 – 1939’, in: Afigbo, *Nigerian History* (as above), pp. 343-360. Afigbo, ‘The Diplomacy of Small-Scale States. A Case Study from Southeastern Nigeria’, in: Afigbo, *Nigerian History* (as above), pp. 145-156.

¹⁰⁸ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *The Post-Colonial Critic*, in: Spivak, *The Post-Colonial Critic*, edited by Sarah Harasym (London and New York, 1990), pp. 67-74, at pp. 72-73. Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reasoning* (Cambridge and London, 1999).

¹⁰⁹ Meyer, ‘Weltgesellschaft’ (note 82). Stichweh, ‘Konstruktivismus’ (note 103), p. 249. Wallerstein, *World-System*, vol. 4 (note 82), has shifted towards this interpretation and has identified intellectuals as promoters of his “world-system” for the nineteenth century.

¹¹⁰ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London, 1977) [second edn, edited by Stanley Hoffmann (Basingstoke and New York, 1995); third edn, edited by Andrew Hurrell (Basingstoke and New York, 2002), pp. 276-281]. Bull, ‘The Third World and International Society’, in: *Yearbook of World Affairs* (1979), pp. 15-31, at p. 26.

¹¹¹ These theorists have imposed a sharp distinction between world society and “international society”, which they categorise as a club of states, whose members they expect to have agreed upon the recognition of common political values, political cooperation and respect for international legal norms: Bull, *Society* (note 110), p. 16. Brown, ‘School’ (note 105), p. 69.

¹¹² Buzan, *Society* (note 106), p. 27. Buzan, ‘The English School as a New Systems Theory of World Politics’, in: Mathias Albert, Lars-Erik Cederman and Alexander Wendt, eds, *New Systems Theories of World Politics* (Basingstoke and New York, 2010), pp. 195-219, at pp. 213-214, has called attention to parallels between the systems theories of the so-called “English School” and Meyer’s Stanford School, while maintaining that the Stanford School had shaped its concept of world culture as the legitimiser of state sovereignty in proximity to the “English-School” concept of “international society” as a club of states.

¹¹³ Ian Clark, *International Legitimacy and World Society* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 37-82. Clark, *Hegemony in*

for performing as the facilitator of state legitimacy, as they sharply reject as unempirical any attempt to call in natural law the ultimate “source”, from which world society might have obtained its capability. These theorists, thus, tacitly assumed that world society simply has to take up the kind of “functions”, which nineteenth-century legal theorists had already consociated with their construct of the “legal community”.¹¹⁴

Independent from work by these theorists, yet on the basis of issues raised by the Stanford group and of Luhmannian theorising, a yet another concept of world society has been shaped, which is supposed to have been constituted on the basis of global communication through language and ritual interactions as well as through mobility in space, and, subsequently, to have become segmented into so-called “functional systems” (Funktionssysteme) such as politics, the economy and law. This type of world society has been described as a pure construct, without specific locales and institutional components, and yet being capable of acting self-referentially to the end of differentiating itself as a system against its systemic environment made up from non-human organic and anorganic systems. World society in this sense is perceived as embracing states, while it does not feature as its genuine “characteristic” the ordering of global relations as relations among states. Instead, its core structure is supposed to be some “semantic form” (semantische Form), which the political system within world society is expected to ascribe to itself. However, the theory posits that a process of “world state formation” is taking place within world society as “a form of structuration within world society” (eine Form der Strukturbildung innerhalb der Weltgesellschaft), and assumes that this process of “world state formation” has already become manifest through the making of a “global social policy” (globalen Sozialpolitik).¹¹⁵ Against the backdrop of social science structural functionalist systems theory, however, world society, specifically, though not exclusively in this variant, has been constructed as a comprehensive and superior whole, in which the alleged process of “world state formation” is taking place, because, so the defensive argument runs, only “the embedding” of that process “in a world society” (Einbettung in eine [sic!] Weltgesellschaft) allows

International Society (Oxford, 2011), pp. 73-97.

¹¹⁴ Jellinek, *Lehre* (note 46). Triepel, *Völkerrecht* (note 46).

¹¹⁵ Mathias Albert, *Zur Politik der Weltgesellschaft. Identität und Recht im Kontext internationaler Vergesellschaftung* (Weilerswist, 2002), pp. 67-81. Albert, ‘Weltgesellschaft’ (note 93), pp. 223-240. Albert, ‘Politik der Weltgesellschaft und Politik der Globalisierung. Überlegungen zur Emergenz von Weltstaatlichkeit’, in: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 34, Sonderheft (2005), pp. 223-238. Albert, ‘Einleitung. Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit. Neubestimmung des Politischen in der Weltgesellschaft’, in: Albert and Rudolf Stichweh, eds, *Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit. Beobachtungen globaler politischer Strukturbildung* (Wiesbaden, 2007), pp. 9-24, at p. 21. Albert, Oliver Kessler and Stephan Stetter, ‘The Communicative Turn in IR Theory’, in: *Review of International Studies* 34, Special Issue (2008), pp. 43-67. Albert, ‘Modern Systems Theory and World Politics’, in: Albert, Lars-Erik Cederman and Alexander Wendt, eds, *New Systems Theories of World Politics* (Basingstoke and New York, 2010), pp. 43-68, at pp. 52, 53, 55. Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Kolja Möller, *Der Kampf um globale soziale Rechte. Zart wäre das Größte* (Schriftenreihe. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1308) (Berlin, 2012), pp. 47-63.

the differentiation between “world-statehood” (Weltstaatlichkeit) and the apparent “additive linking of national and regional statehood” (Zusammenfügen nationaler und regionaler Staatlichkeit).¹¹⁶ At the level of pure constructiveness, this reasoning once again reveals Schopenhauer’s dualism of the mechanistic and the biologicistic systems models and is based on the assumption that world society can only promote “world state formation” if and as long as it is modelled upon the living body. Within this logic, the simple question again remains unanswered, how world society can become legitimised to fulfill its task. Moreover, the problem remains unsolved how this alleged process of “world state formation” can find acceptance in all those parts of the world, in which Western system models neither find recognition nor appreciation or have been imposed in consequence of colonial rule.

All these theories of world society operate on the postulate of the “worldliness” (Welthaftigkeit) of actions having taken place at the global level or having had global effects. However, they leave unspecified the criteria, according to which agreement can be facilitated about the “worldliness” of actions across cultures. In view of the debates about glocalisation¹¹⁷ these criteria must stay controversial at minimum for the twenty-first, the twentieth and the nineteenth centuries, while, for the more distant past, the category of “worldliness”, as a means of determining what should be admitted into narratives of world history, turns into a chimera. This is so, because the beginning of world history has commonly been associated with the beginning of the “worldliness” of the so-called “high cultures”, without the slightest consideration of the questions, what a “high culture” might be and what in it might justify ascriptions of the status of its presumed “worldliness”.¹¹⁸ Therefore, world historiography, as the manufactured historical dimension of world society, is nothing a collection of premature judgments and prejudices.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Albert, ‘Weltstaat’ (note 115), p. 10.

¹¹⁷ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire. Die neue Weltordnung* (Frankfurt, 2002), p. 13 [first published (Cambridge, MA, 2001)]. Philip Pomper, Richard H. Elphick and Richard T. Vann, eds, *Theorizing Empire* (History and Theory, vol. 44, nr 4) (Middleton, MA, 2005). Roland Robertson, ‘Social Theory, Cultural Relativity and the Problem of Globality’, in: Anthony B. King, eds, *Culture, Globalization and the World-System* (London, 1991), pp. 69-90, at p. 77. Robertson, *Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture* (London and Thousand Oaks, 1992), esp. pp. 61-84 [reprints (London and Thousand Oaks, 1993; 1994; 1996; 1996; 2000)].

¹¹⁸ Alfred Heuß, ‘Möglichkeiten einer Weltgeschichte heute’, in: Heuß, *Zur Theorie der Weltgeschichte* (Berlin, 1968), pp. 1-26, at pp. 5-6, 16-19. Heuß, ‘Über die Schwierigkeit, Weltgeschichte zu schreiben’, in: *Saeculum 27* (1976), pp. 1-35, at pp. 3, 20-28.

¹¹⁹ Thus already the criticism of Heuß’s arguments by: Franz Hampl, ‘Universalhistorische Betrachtungsweise als Problem und Aufgabe, ihre Bedeutung in Theorie und Praxis der modernen Geschichtswissenschaft’, in: Hampl, *Geschichte als kritische Wissenschaft*, vol. 1: Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft und Universalgeschichte, edited by Ingomar Weiler (Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft, 17) (Innsbruck, 1974), pp. 132-181, at p. 152. Recent studies on the methodology of world historiography are concerned with these problems only insofar as they request the overcoming of eurocentrism. See: Peter Gran, *Beyond Eurocentrism. A New View of Modern World History* (New York, 1996). Protagonists of global history try to circumvent the issue by focusing on what they take to be an interactionist approach or *histoire croisée*: Jeremy Martin Black, *Introduction to Global Military History. 1775 to the Present Day* (Abingdon, Oxon, 2005). Sebastian Conrad and Andreas Eckert, ‘Globalgeschichte, Globalisierung, multiple Modernen. Zur Geschichtsschreibung der modernen Welt’, in: Conrad, Eckert and Ulrike

5. *Systems Theory, Systems Models and the History of the World System*

However world society gets defined or perceived, its concept, like those informing the world system and the international system have been formed under the impact of social science structural functionalist systems theory. This theory, then, proved to be consequential for the choice of models, upon which suprastatal regional, international, continental and global systemic ordering frames have been conceptualised. It thus cannot transcend this model that has been derived from biology and abstracted from the living body. The limitation of the theory is deplorable, because the ordering frame, which the underlying model is intended to rationalise, has appeared in Europe only at the turn towards the nineteenth century and has been imposed elsewhere in the world only during the twentieth century. By contrast, older ordering frames as systems were drawn on models, which were not taken from biology. At least for all systems that had been in use up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, a gap thereby arises between contemporary perceptions and retrospectively applied theories, whenever the biologicistic systems model gets applied. This gap weakens the validity of retrospective theories. Regrettably, the gap also impacts on Wallerstein's "world-systems theory",

Freitag, eds, *Globalgeschichte. Thesen, Ansätze, Themen* (Globalgeschichte, 1) (Frankfurt, 2007), pp. 7-51. Conrad, *Globalgeschichte* (Munich, 2013). Michael Geyer, *Entwicklungen in der Geschichtswissenschaft, Teil 2: Universal, Welt- und Globalgeschichte* (Beiträge zur Historischen Sozialkunde, 32) (Vienna, 1998). Margarete Grandner, Dietmar Rothermund and Wolfgang Schwentker, eds, *Globalisierung und Globalgeschichte* (Vienna, 2005). Monica Juneja and Margrit Pernau, 'Lost in Translation? Transcending Boundaries in Comparative History', in: Heinz Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka (eds), *Comparative and Transnational History. Central European Approaches and New Perspectives* (New York and Oxford, 2009), pp. 105-129, at 117: "British history, so it was believed, could still be understood in and from within Britain alone. This is exactly the proposition that the New Imperial History has called into question in the last ten years." Theodore Herman von Laue, 'World History, Cultural Relativism and the Global Future', in: Philip Pomper, Richard H. Elphick and Richard T. Vann, eds, *World History* (Oxford and Malden, MA, 1998), pp. 217-233. Matthias Middell, 'World Orders in World Histories before and after World War I', in: Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds, *Competing Visions of World Order* (New York, 2007), pp. 97-119, at pp. 103-107. Middell and Katja Naumann, 'Global History and the Spatial Turn. From Impacts of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization', in: *Journal of Global History* 5 (2010), pp. 149-170. Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Globalgeschichte', in: Hans-Jürgen Goertz, ed., *Geschichte. Ein Grundkurs*, third edn (Reinbek, 2007), pp. 592-610, at p. 596 [first published (Reinbek, 1998)]. Shalini Randeria, 'Geteilte Geschichte und verwobene Moderne', in: Jörn Rüsen, Hanna Leitgeb and Norbert Jegelka (eds), *Zukunftsentwürfe. Ideen für eine Kultur der Veränderung* (Frankfurt and New York, 1999), pp. 87-96. Dietmar Rothermund, 'Globalgeschichte als Interaktionsgeschichte. Von der Außereuropäischen Geschichte zur Globalgeschichte', in: Rothermund, *Aneignung und Selbstbehauptung. Antworten auf die europäische Expansion* (Munich, 1999), pp. 194-216. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'Connected Histories. Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia', in: *Modern Asian Studies* 31 (1997), pp. 735-762. Eric Weitz, 'From the Vienna to the Paris System. International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportation and Civilizing Missions', in: *American Historical Review* 113 (2008), pp. 1313-1343. Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, 'Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der Histoire Croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen', in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002), pp. 607-636. Werner and Zimmermann, 'Penser l'histoire croisée. Entre empirie et réflexivité', in: Werner and Zimmermann (eds), *De la comparaison à l'histoire croisée* (Le genre humain, 42) (Paris, 2004), pp. 15-49. Werner and Zimmermann, 'Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity', in: *History and Theory* 45 (2008), pp. 30-50.

even though this theory has been subject to the most far-reaching methodological and metatheoretical considerations among all social science systems theories.¹²⁰ This is so because Wallerstein, like all other systems theorists, chose to apply the biologicistic model not merely for his own time, but to impose it upon all periods he reviewed prior to the nineteenth century. Consequently, Wallerstein is not capable of taking into account past systems perceptions, different from his own, and their transformations in time. Wallerstein's and other systems theories can, therefore, not be applied to the history of perceptions, but are based on the postulate that past world systems should always have been perceived as apparently objective entities, seemingly recognisable from empirical evidence and matching biologicistic modelling. In view of the fact that Wallerstein and other systems theorists, almost exclusively, use aggregate data as sources of information, often laid down in secondary historiographical narratives, is this metatheoretical postulate risky at minimum, for it does not allow theorisations about systems not drawn on the biologicistic model. Yet this was precisely the case in Europe from the beginning seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century, when mechanistic models formed the basis for the contemporary use of the systems concept.¹²¹ Moreover, in China, what might there be regarded as a systems concept, was based on ethical categories to the very end of the nineteenth century.¹²² Specifically, the ethical context of theorising about systems supported the expectation that the pursuit of economic interest cannot be regarded as the final goal of human action, and thereby stands against the a priori demand from world systems

¹²⁰ Among many see: Janet Lippman Abu-Lughod, 'The World-System Perspective in the Construction of Economic History', in: Philip Pomper, Richard H. Elphick and Richard T. Vann, eds, *World History* (Oxford and Malden, MA, 1998), pp. 69-80. Stanley Aronowitz, 'A Metatheoretical Critique of Wallerstein's *The Modern World System*', in: *Theory and Society* 10 (1980), pp. 503-520, at pp. 504-505, 511-512. Elson E. Boles, 'Assessing the Debate between Abu-Lughod and Wallerstein over the Thirteenth-Century Origins of the Modern World-System', in: Salvatore J. Babones and Christopher K. Chase-Dunn, eds, *Routledge Handbook of World-Systems Analysis* (London and New York, 2012), pp. 21-29, at pp. 21-22, 28. Robert Brenner, 'Das Weltsystem. Theoretische und historische Perspektiven', in: Jochen Blaschke, ed, *Perspektiven des Weltsystems. Materialien zu Immanuel Wallerstein, "Das moderne Weltsystem"* (Frankfurt and New York, 1983), pp. 80-111, at pp. 90, 94. Robert A. Dodgshon, 'The Early Modern World-System', in: Hans-Jürgen Nitz, ed., *The Early Modern World-System in Geographic Perspective* (Erdkundliches Wissen, 10) (Stuttgart, 1993), pp. 26-41, at pp. 27-28. Kajsa Ekholm, 'On the Limitations of Civilization. The Structure and Dynamics of Global Systems', in: *Dialectical Anthropology* 5 (1980), pp. 155-166, at pp. 155, 158, 161. Barry K. Gills, 'International Relations Theory and the Processes of World History', in: Hugh C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarian, eds, *The Study of international Relations* (New York, 1989), pp. 103-154, at pp. 127-128, 140. W. L. Goldfrank, 'Wallerstein's World-System. Roots and Contributions', in: Babones (as above), pp. 97-103. Stephen Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology* (London, 1998), pp. 142-165. Anthony D. King, 'Spaces of Culture, Spaces of Knowledge', in: King, ed., *Culture, Globalization and the World-System* (London, 1991), pp. 1-18, at pp. 4-5, 10 [reprints (Basingstoke, 1993; 1995; 1997; 1998; 2002); (Minneapolis, 2000; 2005); (Minneapolis, 2007)]. Hans-Heinrich Nolte, 'Das Weltsystem-Konzept. Debatte und Forschung', in: Margarete Grandner, Dietmar Rothermund and Wolfgang Schwenker, eds, *Globalisierung und Globalgeschichte* (Vienna, 2005), pp. 115-138. Theda Skocpol, 'Wallerstein's World Capitalist System', in: *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1976), pp. 1075-1090, at pp. 1076-1078.

¹²¹ See above, section I.

¹²² Ju-Jia Ou, *Zhì xīn bào*, nr 38 (1897), pp. 444-445 [partly translated in: Rune Svarverud, *International Law and World Order in Late Imperial China. Translations, Reception and Discourse. 1840 – 1911* (Sinica Leidensia, 78) (Leiden, 2007), p. 202].

theorists that world systems had, at least initially, economic “characteristics” only.¹²³ Hence, systems theories and categories of the perception of human action enter into conflict.

The imposition of the concept of and the model for world and international systems upon past systems is, needless to say, legitimate. However, it is useful solely under the condition that it opens new venues for the acquisition of knowledge. But the possibilities of the fulfillment of this condition is insecure in general terms and not given at all in the case of what might be termed the Chinese world system, because this system was not structured in terms of economic relations,¹²⁴ but by the normative rituals of rule and the patterns of actions that the ritual demanded on all sides, up to the middle of the nineteenth century at minimum.¹²⁵ With regard to Europe, the imposition of the biologicistic systems model entails the concoction of systems “characteristics”, which are neither compatible with contemporary systems theory nor on record in contemporary detailed systems descriptions.

Answers to source-critical questions, how a world or an international system is structured, that is, what “characteristics” it may have in contemporary perception, what kinds of units may constitute its parts and how they add up to or integrate into the system or appear to do so, crucially depend upon the models, which contemporaries employed in their usages of words and definitions of concepts. The mechanistic systems model did not provide for growth options in the form of expansion of the system’s boundary, as it allowed for other intrasystemic transformations only on a limited scale. A mechanistically modelled system was, thus, perceived as stable within its boundaries and was destroyed when these boundaries were lifted. Such a system was not applicable to the globe at large, even though the world as a whole could be likened to the machine. But the world as a machine was not a world state, that is, not a container for culture, politics and economics and, by consequence, not a space in which systemic interactions could be possible. Rather, it was the object of philosophical and scientific speculative theorising and reduced to an ordering frame for the maintenance of stability. Interactions at the global level were, within this frame, inter-systemic in the sense that they bridged gaps between systems. When this systems model became applied to international relations, the admission of pluralism of coexisting international systems on the globe was mandatory, within each of which interactions would preferably take place. Only in the comprehensive speculative view of a few philosophers, such as Christian Wolff, the several coexisting international systems could

¹²³ Wallerstein, *World-System*, vol. 1 (note 59), pp. 347 and elsewhere. Similarly: Frank, ‘World System’ (note 53), p. 3.

¹²⁴ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, ‘The World-System’, in: *International Social Science Journal* 32 (1980), pp. 744. Wallerstein, ‘World-System’ (note 74), pp. 747-748. Wallerstein, ‘World Systems Analysis’ (note 64), p. 101.

¹²⁵ Yen-Ping Hao and Erh-Min Wang, ‘Changing Chinese Views of Western Relations. 1840-95’, in: Denis Twitchett and John King Fairbank, eds, *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 11: Late Ch’ing. 1800 – 1911, part 2 (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 142-201, at p. 154. Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Völkerrechts* (note 65), pp. 306-311.

become inserted into the world styled as a clock. For that world, Wolff created his *Civitas maxima*, not as an institution but as an unlegislated metaphysical legitimation instance under natural law.¹²⁶ Within the analytical framework of the semantic triangle, the word system remained constant in European theoretical diction, yet it stood for a variety of concepts, change among which intensified at the turn towards the nineteenth century and which resulted in an exchange of systems models. The latter change was part of the general epistemological transformation from mechanicism into biologism. The concept and the referent matter remained undistinguishable across the change of systems models. But this just says that systems are categories of perception.

The historiography of international relations thus makes explicit the change of systems perceptions from the recognition of the pluralism of several coexisting international systems to the claim that only one global international system exists. It connects this change with the general transformation of mechanicism into biologism or from the machine to the living body in Europe at c. 1800. As both processes initially took place in Europe only, they were culturally specific. Moreover, the biologically conceived international system, expanding in European perception during the nineteenth century, was imposed upon other parts of the world, not only by way of the use of military force and diplomatic pressure, but also through historiography. Therefore, the analysis of the imposition of the European biologicistic international system in Africa, Asia and the South Pacific, together with the cultural, economic and political conflicts arising from the imposition process, are issues to which the historiography of international relations should direct its interests. Put differently: the historiography of international relations cannot overcome the limitations of positivist description nor avoid its becoming employed in strategies of the legitimation of colonial rule, unless it criticises the process of the globalisation of the biologically modelled international system using evidence from the history of perception.

The same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, for the historiography of international law. Within the historiography of perception it treats the transformations of theories of the derivation of international legal norms depending on the change of systems models. For example, European international legal theories, tied to the mechanistic systems model, supported the expectation that international legal norms could, within a mechanistically constructed international system, both be set through human action by way of the conclusion of treaties between states and be derived as unset norms from divine

¹²⁶ Christian Wolff, *Jus Gentium methodo scientifico pertractatum* (Halle, 1749), pp. 6-9 [reprint, edited by Marcel Thomann (Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke*, Series B, vol. 25) (Hildesheim and New York, 1972)]. The passage refutes the proposition that Wolff's *civitas maxima* should have been conceived as an institution: Francis Cheneval, 'Der presumptive vernünftige Konsens der Menschen und Völker. Christian Wolffs Theorie der Civitas Maxima', in: *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie* 85 (1999), pp. 563-580. Cheneval, 'Auseinandersetzungen um die Civitas Maxima in der Nachfolge Christian Wolffs', in: *Studia Leibnitiana* 32 (2001), pp. 125-144.

will or the dictates of nature. By contrast, as far as legal relations across systems boundaries were concerned, for example between states in Europe on the one side, Africa, Asia and the South Pacific on the other, the expectation held that legal norms would follow from divine will or natural commands only. The distinction between intra- and inter-systemic modes of the derivation of international legal norms collapsed after the transformation of the mechanistic into the biologicistic systems perception in Europe and North America. Following the collapse of the conventional derivation strategy in European and North American perception, and, to the end of the nineteenth century, only there, all international norms were to be derived in accordance with a single theory, set as accepted throughout the globalised and biologicistically conceived international system. But that did not mean that the European and North American systems perception and the theory of the derivation of international legal sentences attached to it, *eo ipso* found acceptance everywhere on the globe, because the modes of the derivation of international legal norms had been strikingly similar in European seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theories and theories regarded as valid elsewhere in the world while continuing there to the end of the nineteenth century.¹²⁷ The results of the change of systems perception were contestations about the applicability of derivation theories, and in the course of these conflicts, governments in Europe and North America took to the strategy of enforcing its own derivation theory by way of the use or threat of use of military force and the exercise of diplomatic pressure. In turn, these conflicts seemed to confirm the skeptical position of European and North American international legal theorists, who insisted that international legal norms could only have a chance of becoming enforceable through purposeful human action, including the use of military force and diplomatic pressure whenever necessary. Among the victims of use of military force and diplomatic pressure, these conflicts also resulted in a lasting rejection of international law as conceived and implemented *pro domo* and because most states in Africa, West, South, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific were excluded from the club of states among which international law had been accepted as house law. Taking the stance that governments of states placed outside the club were neither willing nor able to subject themselves to international legal norms, derived in accordance with European and North American theory, European and North American international legal theorists positioned the global international system as the ordering frame for the international legal theory they advocated, and excluded states from the applicability of these norms as long as these states had formally “entered” the international system, formed by the exclusionistic club of states, through acts of grace extended to newly coopted members. The instrument commonly used to

¹²⁷ Ou (note 122). Japan, Gaikoku jimu sōtoku 外国事務総督, [Note by the Meiji-Government, dated 8 February 1868, on treaties in force between Japan and other states, written by Toshimichi Ōkubo and Munemitsu Mutsu], in: *Dai Nihon gaikō bunsho*, nr 97, vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1936), pp. 227-228. Nana Agyeman Prempeh I., *The History of Ashanti Kings and the Whole Country Itself. And Other Writings* [written in 1922], edited by Albert Adu Boahen, Emmanuel Akyeampong, Nancy Lawler, T. C. McCaskie and Ivor Wilks (Sources of African History, 6) (Oxford and New York, 2003), pp. 151-152, 155.

coerce the validification of international legal norms according to European and North American legal theory, were so-called peace treaties, which were rarely concluded as agreements ending wars but were usually made out with the formulary of treaties of trade and amity.¹²⁸ According to doctrines favoured by nineteenth- and twentieth-century European and North American international legal theorists, international legal norms could only flow from state will, that is, only governments of sovereign states could set new international legal norms and could only do so through the instrument of international legal treaties. These governments were bound to direct their will towards the agreement of binding agreements between states thereby forming the legal community, within which alone legal norms could be regarded as enforceable.¹²⁹ The international legal community was therefore regarded as the essential precondition for the existence of international law. However, the limited and positivistic perception of the conditions of the validification of international legal norms did not suffice to promote a global comprehensive international legal community. For the simultaneous practice of European and North American colonial rule stood against the guarantee of the statehood, sovereignty and subjecthood under international law of all then existing states in Africa, West, South, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific that were tied together with European and North American states through international legal treaties and yet found themselves placed under colonial institutions, mainly colonies and protectorates. European and North American colonial governments denied subjecthood under international law as well as, in many cases, also sovereignty and, in a few cases, even statehood to all these state in Africa, West, South, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, which they prevented by treaty from exercising their legal rights under international law in war and peace and thereby barred them from “entry” into the international legal community.

The transformation of the use of international systems models thus confirms the gap in thematic focuses of the historiographies of international relations and international law, as sketched in Chapter I, yet in different accentuation at the turn towards the nineteenth century. Up until the end of the eighteenth century, the historiography of international law documented the limits of the enforceability of set international legal norms together with the recourse to natural law in efforts to derive the universal demand of *pacta sunt servanda*.¹³⁰ By contrast, the historiography of

¹²⁸ See the survey in: Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Völkerrechts* (note 65), pp. 368-377.

¹²⁹ Triepel, *Völkerrecht* (note 46).

¹³⁰ Twentieth-century historically oriented international legal theory has, in retrospect, laid great weight upon contractual agreements relating to so-called “amity lines” as seeming boundaries limiting the validity of international legal norms during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, these claims left unconsidered the usual statements, featured in these agreements, concerning recognition of natural law as a universally valid legal framework and as the foundation of international law. See: Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum* [in its main parts completed prior to the end of World War II] (Cologne, 1950), pp. 60-61 [reprints (Berlin, 1974; 1988; 1997)]. Wilhelm Georg Carl Grewe, *Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte*, second edn (Baden-Baden, 1988), pp. 187-188 [*Habilitationsschrift* (University of Königsberg, 1941); first, unpublished printing (Leipzig, 1945); first book-trade edn (Baden-Baden, 1984); English version (Berlin, 2000)]. For criticism see: Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Völkerrechts* (note 65), p. 162.

international relations, for the same span of time, displayed the limitations of the legal bondedness of the military and political action of those who believed to act in accordance with international legal norms. For the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the historiographies of international law and international relations have opened the abysses of the abuse of international law as a means of legitimising the use of force by governments in Europe and North America.