

VI. *Intersystemic Relations within the Perception of the Historiography of International Relations (Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries)*

1. *Introduction: Historiography of International Relations and World Historiography*

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, European and North American historiography of international relations has followed the view taken by deniers of international law, namely that might is being prioritised over right in the international arena. Under the influence of Leopold von Ranke's writings, historiography of international relations has focused on relations among states within Europe as well as between Europe and European settler colonies in America and the South Pacific. Africa, Asia and those parts of the South Pacific island worlds that had not become destinations for large-scale immigration from Europe, began to be visited by European and North American historiographers of international relations only, once they were coming under colonial rule by European and the US governments.¹ Previous periods as well as aspects of relations not tied to matters of state policy have usually been allocated to historical research in the disciplines of anthropology,² Japanese³ and Chinese⁴ studies. This distribution has obviously been boosted by the pragmatics of research organisation, specifically when it came to the critical scrutiny of sources in original languages. That scrutiny usually demanded linguistic capabilities beyond the standards that general historiographers could achieve, thereby moved into the province of language specialists, dictated a division of labour between these language specialists and methodologically trained historians and eventually contributed to the narrowing of European and North American historians' heuristic interests to issues related to their own areas of origin. As a result, the leading research questions have not been about perceptions of structures and changes of international

¹ For examples see: Roberto Almagià, *Contributi alla storia della conoscenza dell'Etiopia* (Padua, 1941). William Gerald Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan. 1834 – 1858* (London, 1951), pp. 113-193 [Nachdruck. Folkestone 1995]. Beasley, *Collected Writings* (Folkestone, 2001). Carlo Conti Rossini, 'Il "Libro del Conoscimento" e le sue notizie sull' Etiopia', in: *Bollettino della Società Geografica Italiana*, Series IV, vol. 9/10 (1917), pp. 656-679. Hubert Deschamps, *La fin des empires coloniales* (Paris, 1950) [second edn (Paris, 1959); third edn (Paris, 1963); fourth edn (Paris, 1969); fifth edn (Paris, 1975)]. David Kenneth Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires. A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*, second edn (London, 1982) [first published (Frankfurt, 1965); first English edn (London, 1966)]. Fieldhouse, *Economics and Empire* (London, 1973), pp. 91-103. Horst Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien* (Paderborn, 1985) [sixth edn (Paderborn, 2012)]. William W. McOwie, *The Opening of Japan. 1853 – 1855. A Comparative Study of the American, British, Dutch and Russian Naval Expeditions to Compel the Tokugawa Shogunate to Conclude Treaties and Open Ports to Their Ships* (Folkestone, 2006). Ian Nish, *Britain and Japan*, 5 vols (Folkestone, 1994-2005). Jürgen Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus. Geschichte, Formen, Folgen* (Munich, 1995).

² Hans Plischke, *Der Stille Ozean* (Janus-Bücher, 14) (Munich, 1959).

³ Detlef Haberland, *Von Lemgo nach Japan. Das ungewöhnliche Leben des Engelbert Kaempfer. 1651 bis 1716* (Bielefeld, 1990). Peter Francis Kornicki, 'European Japanology at the End of the Seventeenth Century', in: *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 56 (1993), pp. 502-524.

⁴ Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, 'Zentrum und Peripherie in China und Ostasien', in: Weigelin-Schwiedrzik and Sepp Linhart, eds, *Ostasien. 1600 – 1900* (Edition Weltregionen, 10) (Vienna, 2004), pp. 88-92. Yong-Jin Zhang, *China in the International System. 1919-20* (Basingstoke and New York, 1991).

systems, within or beyond which relations among continents occurred. Instead, the nineteenth- and twentieth-century international system was generalised into a seemingly objectively existing entity that was taken for granted.⁵

The consequence of that narrowing of focus has been that the transformation of the perception of several coexisting international systems into the perception of one single global international system in causal connection with the universalisation of European and North American international law during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been left unnoticed in the historiography of international relations. Nevertheless, the simultaneous destruction of the Sino-centric international system during the 1840s is not only well documented in close contemporary records, but has also long been researched in Chinese studies.⁶ However, even the new, revisionist historiography of international relations⁷ has joined the historiography of international law⁸ and historical social sciences⁹ in postulating so-called “entries” into what has come to be termed the “international legal community” during the nineteenth century, and has equated that “international legal community”

⁵ Thus for example: Tomoko T. Okagaki, *The Logic of Conformity. Japan's Entry into International Society* (Toronto and Buffalo, 2013), p. 5 [first published s. t.: *The Sovereign State and Its Conformists. Japan's Entrance into International Society*. Ph. D. thesis, typescript (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2005)], who simply took for granted that “Japan's entry into the European state system” occurred. Jürgen Osterhammel, *China und die Weltgesellschaft* (Munich, 1989), who inserted the political-science term of “world society” into the title of his work without providing a definition for this term in the text of his work. Osterhammel, ‘Weltordnungskonzepte’, in: Jost Dülffer and Wilfried Loth, eds, *Dimensionen internationaler Geschichte* (Studien zur internationalen Geschichte, 30) (Munich, 2012), pp. 409-427, who consociated his concept of “world” ahistorically with his concept of the global “international system”. Even authors, who have postulated a sequence of international systems of varying scope have employed the nineteenth-century biologicistic systems model for all periods under review, thereby ignoring changes of perceptions. See: Barry Gordon Buzan and Richard K. Little, *International Systems in World History. Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford, 2000). Buzan, ‘How Regions Were Made, and the Legacies for World Politics’, in: T. V. Paul, ed., *International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 22-46, at p. 25.

⁶ John King Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, ‘On the Ch'ing Tributary System’, in: *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6 (1941), pp. 135-246. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West. A Documentary Survey. 1839 – 1923* (Cambridge, MA, 1954).

⁷ Sebastian Conrad and Andreas Eckert, ‘Globalgeschichte, Globalisierung, multiple Modernen. Zur Geschichtsschreibung der modernen Welt’, in: Conrad, Eckert and Ulrike Freitag, eds, *Globalgeschichte. Thesen, Ansätze, Themen* (Globalgeschichte, 1) (Frankfurt, 2007), pp. 7-51. Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘Globalgeschichte’, in: Hans-Jürgen Goertz, ed., *Geschichte. Ein Grundkurs*, third edn (Reinbek, 2007), pp. 592-610, at p. 596 [first published (Reinbek, 1998)].

⁸ Kinji Akashi, ‘Japanese “Acceptance” of the European Law of Nations. A Brief History of International Law in Japan. c. 1853 – 1900’, in: Michael Stolleis and Masaharu Yanagihara, eds, *East Asian and European Perspectives on International Law* (Studien zur Geschichte des Völkerrechts, 7) (Baden-Baden, 2004), pp. 1-22. Masaharu Yanagihara, ‘Japan's Engagement with and Use of International Law. 1853 – 1945’, in: Thilo Marauhn and Heinhard Steiger, eds, *Universality and Continuity in International Law* (The Hague, 2011), pp. 447-469. Urs Matthias Zachmann, *Völkerrechtsdenken und Außenpolitik in Japan. 1919 – 1960* (Studien zur Geschichte des Völkerrechts, 29) (Baden-Baden, 2013), p. 1].

⁹ Hedley Bull, ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’, in: Bull and Adam Watson, eds, *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 117-126 [further edn (Oxford, 1985)]. Gerrit W. Gong, ‘China's Entry into International Society’, in: Bull (as above), pp. 171-183. Hidemi Suganami, ‘Japan's Entry into International Society’, in: Bull as above), pp. 185-199. Joel David Singer and Melvin Small, ‘The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System. 1815-1940’, in: *World Politics* 18 (1966), pp. 236-282.

with the international system, seen as regulated through norms pertaining to European and North American international law, and has even further distinguished that international system from the rival concept of “international society”.¹⁰ This postulate has been founded upon the alleged practice of some “recognition” of statehood and sovereignty by European and the US governments.¹¹ However, this postulate is not reconcilable with the treaties in existence in large numbers among governments in Europe and North America on the one side, rulers and governments in Africa, West, South, Southeast and East Asia as well as the South Pacific on the other from the latter part of the eighteenth century. Hence, within European and North American international law, states as signatory parties to treaties with European and the US governments, even beyond the confines of Europe and America, had *ipso facto* been recognised not just as sovereign states but also as subjects under international law and, by consequence, were not in need of any further formal act of “recognition”. Instead, with regard to their treaty partners in Africa, West, South, Southeast and East Asia as well as the South Pacific, European and the US governments proceeded, as if these treaties were irrelevant to their conduct of international relations, while they were expanding their colonial rule during the decades around 1900. There were, then, thorough changes of core “structures” of the international system at this time, whence the perception, according to which there should have been one single global international system for a long time,¹² at least for about five hundred years,¹³ is

¹⁰ Mainly Bull distinguished principally between both concepts. See: Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London, 1977) [second edn, edited by Stanley Hoffmann (Basingstoke and New York, 1995); third edn, edited by Andrew Hurrell (Basingstoke and New York, 2002)], at pp. 13-14: “A society of states (or an international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions. If states today form an international society (to what extent they do is the subject of the next chapter), this is because, recognising certain common interests and perhaps some common values, they regard themselves as bound by certain rules in their dealings with one another, such as that they should respect one another’s claims to independence, that they should honour agreements into which they enter, and that they should be subject to certain limitations in exercising force against one another. At the same time they cooperate in the working of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of diplomacy and general international organisation, and the customs and conventions of war. An international society in this sense presupposes an international system, but an international system may exist that is not an international society. Two or more states, in other words, may be in contact with each other and interact in such a way as to be necessary factors in each other’s calculations without their being conscious of common interests or values, conceiving themselves to be bound by a common set of rules, or co-operating in the working of common institutions. Turkey, China, Japan, Korea and Siam, for example, were part of the European-dominated international system before they were part of the European-dominated international society.” Following Bull: Okagaki, *Logic* (note 5), pp. 69-74. For a critical view of this approach see: Harald Kleinschmidt, ‘The So-Called “English School” in International Relations, Its Concept of “International Society” and the Legacy of Colonial Rule’, in: *Tsukuba Hōsei* 61 (2014), pp. 141-162.

¹¹ See, among many: Hersch Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International Law* (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 3) (Cambridge, 1947) [further edn (Cambridge, 1948); reprint (Cambridge, 2013)]. Singer, *Composition* (note 9). The perception is on record already at the turn towards the twentieth century. See: Alexander Freiherr von Siebold, *Der Eintritt Japans in das europäische Völkerrecht* (Berlin, 1900).

¹² André Gunder Frank, ‘A Theoretical Introduction to 5000 Years of World System History’, in: *Review* [Binghamton] 13 (1990), pp. 155-248. Frank and Barry K. Gills, ‘The 5000 Year World System’, in: Fran and Gills, eds, *The World System. Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* (London and New York, 1993), pp. 3-55 [reprints (London and New York, 1996; 1999); first published in: *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 18 (1992), pp. 1-79]. Frank, ‘Immanuel and Me With-Out Hyphen’, in: Giovanni Arrighi and Walter Goldfrank, eds,

untenable for the globe at large. This perception has been tied to culturally specific perceptions of the globe in Europe and North America.¹⁴

Therefore, systems historiography as an aspect of the historiography of perception should be added to the historiography of international relations. Whoever enters that field of study soon finds confirmed a finding that has been well known in historiography for about thirty years, namely that Baroque and Enlightenment universal historiography were shaped universalistically and inclusionistically, whereas nineteenth- and early twentieth-century universal historiography was particularistic and exclusionistic in scope.¹⁵ That is to say that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century historiographers devoted themselves to universal issues, tried to take into their accounts the states of the world known to them,¹⁶ while, at the same time, looking at these states as parts of the divinely ordered or naturally given world and used “state revolution” as a popular term for changes of domestic policy but not for violent transformations of essential state structures. For one, August Ludwig Schlözer wrote in 1772: “As yet, the general look at the entirety of matters is lacking, and it is only that mighty look that transforms an aggregate into a system, reduces all states of the globe to one single unity, namely humanity, and positions the peoples of the globe solely in relation to the

Festschrift for Immanuel Wallerstein (Journal of World Systems Research, vol. 6, issue 2) (2000), pp. 216-231 [<http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/issue/vuew/61>]. Barry K. Gills, ‘World System Analysis, Historical Sociology and International Relations. The Difference a Hyphen Makes’, in: Stephen Hobden and John Hobson, eds, *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 141-161.

¹³ Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, ‘The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System’, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16 (1974), pp. 387-415 [reprinted in: Wallerstein, *The Essential Wallerstein* (New York, 2000), pp. 71-105]. Wallerstein, ‘The Ancient World-Systems versus the Modern Capitalist World-System’, in: *Review* [Binghamton] 14 (1991), pp. 349-385, at p. 360. Wallerstein, ed., *The Modern World-System in the Longue Durée* (Boulder, 2004), pp. 1-3, at p. 1.

¹⁴ For a criticism of systems analysis see: Christopher K. Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, *Rise and Demise. Comparing World-Systems* (Boulder, 1997), p. 8. Chase-Dunn and Eugene Newton Anderson, *The Historical Evolution of World-Systems* (Basingstoke and New York, 2005), p. X.

¹⁵ Jörn Rüsen, ‘Von der Aufklärung zum Historismus. Idealtypische Perspektiven eines Strukturwandels’, in: Rüsen and Horst Walter Blanke, eds, *Von der Aufklärung zum Historismus. Zum Strukturwandel des historischen Denkens* (Historisch-politische Diskurse, 1) (Paderborn, 1984), pp. 5-57, at p. 47. Horst Walter Blanke, ‘Aufklärungshistorie und Historismus. Bruch und Kontinuität’, in: Otto Gerhard Oexle and Jörn Rüsen, eds, *Historismus in den Kulturwissenschaften* (Cologne, 1996), pp. 69-97. Recent research in the history of historiography often characterises nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historiography as “historicist”, even though it was only Friedrich Meinecke, who, against Ernst Troeltsch, first applied the term “historicism” to historiography, narrowed it down to patterns of thinking of historiographers and reduced these patterns to the belief that singular occurrences should be placed into the focus of historiographers. For recent criticisms of Meinecke’s views see: Georg Gershon Iggers, *Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert*, third edn (Göttingen, 2007), p. 24 [first published (Göttingen, 1993); second edn (Göttingen, 1997); English version (Middletown, CT, 1997; 2005; 2012)]. Otto Gerhard Oexle, ‘Meineckes Historismus. Über Kontext und Folgen einer Definition’, in: Oexle (as above), pp. 139-199, at pp. 96-101 [abridged version in: Oexle, *Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeichen des Historismus* (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 116) (Göttingen, 1996), pp. 95-136]. Oexle, ‘Krise des Historismus – Krise der Wirklichkeit’, in: Oexle, ed., *Krise des Historismus – Krise der Wirklichkeit. Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literatur. 1880 – 1932* (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 228) (Göttingen, 2007), pp. 11-116, at p. 95.

¹⁶ Horst Walter Blanke, *Historiografiegeschichte als Historik* (Fundamenta historica, 3) (Stuttgart, 1991), pp. 120-121.

great revolutions of the world.” (Noch fehlet der allgemeine Blick, der das Ganze umfasst: dieser mächtige Blick schafft das Aggregat zum System um, bringt alle Staaten des Erdkreises auf eine Einheit, das menschliche Geschlecht zurück und schätzt die Völker bloß nach ihrem Verhältnisse zu den großen Revolutionen der Welt.)¹⁷ According to Schlözer, the work of universal historiographers consisted mainly in tying together international relations among states everywhere and at all periods into one single narrative: “Every state, be it big or small, powerful or weak, on long or short duration, is in itself part of world history, as least as its generation and decay are concerned.” (Jeder Stat, er mag groß oder kein, mächtig oder schwach, von langer oder kurzer Dauer, gewesen seyn, ist an sich wenigstens was seine Entstehung und Verwesung betrifft, ein Gegenstand der Weltgeschichte.)¹⁸ The “system”, he demanded, was to be a construct of higher order.

By contrast, most nineteenth-century universal historiographers ignored the globe as a whole, even when they used the term universal historiography.¹⁹ In doing so, they looked at successions of states, while crediting “peoples” or “nations” with long-term existence across the periods.²⁰ They noticed

¹⁷ August Ludwig von Schlözer, *Vorstellung seiner Universalhistorie* (Göttingen and Gotha, 1772), pp. 18-19 [reprint, eduted by Horst Walter Blanke (Beiträge zur Geschichtskultur, 4) (Hagen, 1990)]. On Schlözer’s concept of state revolutions see: *ibid.*, p. 1. Likewise: Augustin Schelle, *Abriß der Universalhistorie zum Gebrauch der akademischen Vorlesungen* (Salzburg, 1780), p. 23.

¹⁸ Schlözer, *Vorstellung* (note 17), p. 105. With the term “waning” (Verwesung) of states, Schlözer referred to the universal historiographical sequence of the four world empires. Schlözer distinguishes between “universal history” in the sense of this sequence and “world history”, which, he believed, comprised the history of states, including their respective culture, art of war, shipbuilding and mining: Schlözer, *Vorstellung* (note 17), p. 71. Schlözer, *Weltgeschichte in ihren Haupttheilen im Auszug und Zusammenhange*, vol. 1 (Göttingen, 1785), p. 1. Likewise: Johann Christoph Gatterer, *Versuch einer allgemeinen Weltgeschichte bis zur Entdeckung Amerikens* (Göttingen, 1792), p. 2. On these historiographical conceptions see: André de Melo Araújo, *Weltgeschichte in Göttingen. Eine Studie über das spätaufklärerische universalhistorische Denken. 1756 – 1815* (Bielefeld, 2012), pp. 71-88, 139-140. Robert S. Leventhal, ‘Progression and Particularity. Herder’s Critique of Schlözer’s Universal History in the Context of the Early Writings’, in: Wulf Koepke, ed., *Johann Gottfried Herder. Language, History and the Enlightenment* (Studies in German Literature, Linguistics and Culture, 52) (Columbia, SC, 1990), pp. 25-46. Martin Peters, *Altes Reich und Europa. Der Historiker, Statistiker und Publizist August Ludwig (v.) Schlözer (1735 – 1809)* (Forschungen zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, Marburger Beiträge, 6) (Munster, 2003), pp. 159-205 [second edn (Munster, 2005)]. Johan Zande, ‘August Ludwig Schlözer and the English “Universal History”’, in Stefan Berger, Peter Lambert and Peter Schumann, eds, *Historikerdialoge. Geschichte, Mathos und Gedächtnis im deutsch-britischen kulturellen Austausch. 1750 – 2000* (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 179) (Göttingen, 2003), pp. 135-156.

¹⁹ Thus: Ludwig Rieß, *A Short Survey of Universal History. Being Notes of a Course of Lectures Delivered in the Literature College of the Imperial University of Tokyo*, vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1899), p. 6 [this work, which is exceedingly rare in Europe, should not be mistaken for Rieß’s edition of: Georg Weber, *Weltgeschichte*, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1918)]. In its own time, the controversial compilation by Hans Ferdinand Helmolt, ed., *Weltgeschichte*, 8 vols (Leipzig, 1900-1903), was virtually alone in taking a deviating stance.

²⁰ Paradigmatic: Leopold von Ranke, ‘Umriß einer Abhandlung von der Einheit der romanischen und germanischen Völker und von ihrer gemeinschaftlichen Entwicklung’, in: Ranke, *Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1514* [1824], second edn (Ranke, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 33) (Leipzig, 1874); pp. XV-XXX, at p. XV: “In dieser Vereinigung [nach dem Ende des Römischen Reichs der Antike] haben sich sechs große Nationen, drei, in denen das romanische Element vorherrscht: die französische, spanische, italienische, drei, in denen das germanische: die deutsche, englische, scandinavische ausgebildet.”; p. XVI: three “große Unternehmungen” by six “Nationen”: “die Völkerwanderung, die Kreuzzüge, die Pflanzungen in fremden Welttheilen”. The plural of the first noun “Geschichten” in the title of Ranke’s earliest published work often gets overlooked, for example in: Johannes Fried, *Der Schleier der Erinnerung. Grundzüge einer historischen Memorik*

fundamental changes and spotted them only in Europe and North America.²¹ All “peoples” or “nations” appeared to have their own histories, above which the history of humankind at large appeared to be a negligible matter.²² Put differently: Baroque and Enlightenment historiography of international relations rested upon the postulate that international systems were stable, whereas nineteenth- and early twentieth-century universal historiography of international relations started under the expectation that inner-systemic changes were givens and that, at the same time, a change of the structure of the system as a whole would not occur.

The historiography of historiography has recorded the difference, but has, so far, proved unwilling to describe the process of the change of systems perceptions and, more importantly, from scrutinising the implications of that change. The deficit is surprising, given that the change took place in the context of the amply recorded and well researched transformation of perceptions from mechanismism into biologism at the turn towards the nineteenth century. To anticipate the result of the following discussion: During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, not only international relations but also their contemporary historiography were inclusionistic with regard to inner-systemic as well as to trans-systemic relations, including aspects of non-government interactions across the boundaries of mechanistically conceived international systems. By contrast, in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century perception, international relations were conceived as occurring within one single global international system modelled upon the living body, described exclusionistically with a focus on Europe and European settler colonies and usually in confinement to government foreign policy.²³ That means that the historiography of international relations commonly ignored parts of the world outside Europe and the European settler colonies, while, at the same time, categorising the

(Munich, 2012), p. 206 [first published (Munich, 2004)].

²¹ Leopold von Ranke, ‘Osmanen’, in: Ranke, *Die Osmanen und die spanische Monarchie im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, fourth edn (Ranke, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 35) (Leipzig, 1877), pp. 3-83, at p. 82: “Die Verödung der schönsten Länder der Erde, die sie eingenommen, scheint es genugsam zu bestätigen. Auch sich selbst haben sie nicht kultivieren mögen. ... zu einer freien Entwicklung des Geistes haben sie es nie gebracht, sie sind immer Barbaren geblieben.” Leopold von Ranke, *Über die Epochen der Neueren Geschichte. Vorträge dem König Maximilian II. von Bayern gehalten* [Berchtesgaden, 25. September – 13. Oktober 1854], edited by Hans Herzfeld (Laupheim, 1955) [first printed edn, edited by Alfred Dove (Berlin, 1888); critical edn, edited by Theodor Schieder and Helmut Berding (Ranke, *Aus Werk und Nachlaß*, vol. 2) (Munich, 1971)], pp. 27-33: ‘Erster Vortrag’ [25 September 1854], at p. 28: “fürs erste findet sich der größte Teil der Menschheit noch im Urzustande, im Ausgangspunkt selbst, und dann fragt sich, was ist Fortschritt? ... Allein es gibt in der Menschheit überhaupt doch nur ein System von Bevölkerungen, welche an dieser allgemein historischen Bewegung teilnehmen, dagegen andere, die davon ausgeschlossen sind. Wir können aber im allgemeinen auch die in der historischen Bewegung begriffenen Nationalitäten nicht als im stetigen Fortschritt befindlich ansehen. Wenden wir z. B. unser Augenmerk auf Asien, so sehen wir, daß dort die Kultur entsprungen ist, und daß dieser Weltteil mehrere Kulturepochen gehabt hat. Allein dort ist die Bewegung im ganzen eher ein rückläufige gewesen; denn die älteste Epoche der asiatischen Kultur was die blühendste; die zweite und dritte Epoche, in welcher das griechische und römische Element dominierten, war schon nicht mehr so bedeutend, und mit dem Einbrechen der Barbaren – der Mongolen – fand die Kultur in Asien vollends ein Ende.”

²² Leopold von Ranke, ‘Vorrede’, in: Ranke, *Weltgeschichte*, fourth edn, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1886), pp. V-X.

²³ Paradigmatic: John Robert Seeley, *The Expansion of England. Two Courses of Lectures* (London, 1921) [first published (London, 1883)].

international system as global and subject to the control and European and the US governments. That type of historiography, thus, was based upon the perception of the international system as a global entity and located universality within it, while restricting the material contents of historical narratives to matters emerging mainly from Europe and North America and denying the existence of any kind of history to other parts of the globe. In adhering to that perception, the historiography of international relations projected its own contemporary and culturally specific perception of the international system not just upon other parts of the globe, but also upon the past as a whole. The historiography of international relations during the latter part of the twentieth century did not proceed along fundamentally different lines.²⁴

In what follows, this claim shall be defended in three steps. First, I intend to specify the relevance of types of sources upon which universal historiography as historiography of international relations has been founded, even when and where the narrated interactions were not subsumed into the label of “international relations”. Second, I shall scrutinise some select historiographical findings relevant to the empirical conduct of international relations as transforming from inclusionism to exclusionism. Third, I shall analyse the transformation of the theory of international relations at the turn towards the nineteenth century, taken to represent the transformation of the perception of international systems as part of a divinely ordered world into the perception of the international system as an integrated but chaotic entity.

2. Sources and methodological Foundations of the Historiography of international relations during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

It is only since the nineteenth century that the history of international relations has been related to the histories of “peoples” or “nations”²⁵ and the history of states and empires.²⁶ The terms *histoire des relations internationales* and “history of international relations” came up around the middle of the century,²⁷ found wide application in English and French texts only during the twentieth century.²⁸

²⁴ For examples see: Buzan, *Systems* (note 5). Winfried Baumgart, *Europäisches Konzert und nationale Bewegung. Internationale Beziehungen. 1830 – 1878* (Handbuch der Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen, 6) (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zurich, 1999), pp. 429-501. Michael Erbe, *Revolutionäre Erschütterung und erneuertes Gleichgewicht. Internationale Beziehungen. 1785 – 1830* (Handbuch der Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen, 5) (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zurich, 2004), pp. 373-391.

²⁵ Leopold von Ranke, *Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1514* [1824], second edn (Ranke, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 33) (Leipzig, 1874).

²⁶ Arnold Herrmann Ludwig Heeren, *Handbuch der Geschichte des europäischen Staatensystems und seiner Colonien von der Entdeckung beyder Indien bis zur Errichtung des Französischen Kayserthrons*, second edn (Göttingen, 1811) [first published (Göttingen, 1809); third edn (Göttingen, 1819); reprinted in: Heeren, *Historische Werke*, vol. 3 (Göttingen, 1822); reprint of this edn (Frankfurt, 1987)].

²⁷ François Laurent, *Histoire du droit des gens et des relations internationales*, 18 vols (Paris, 1850-1870) [new

Prior to the nineteenth century, narratives about the history of international relations came along under a wide variety of rubrics and, correspondingly, were variegated, even though they took roots in common perceptions and tasks. The main text sorts featuring narratives about the history of international relations were universal historiography, thoroughly intertwined with its general statistics (as descriptions of states of the world)²⁹ and the historiography of the expansion of empires and dynasties. Universal historiography and world statistics, as a rule, encompassed international relations as interactions across the boundaries of states and systems. The ordering principles of universal historiography combined space and time, while those informing world statistics were confined to aspects of space,³⁰ while states ranked as firm and stable parts of the world conceived in accordance with the machine model.³¹ Authors devoting themselves to universal historiography and world statistics were usually not interested in matters of domestic state policy,³² but directed their attention to what they perceived as “contemporaneous” issues (das Gleichzeitige)³³ within the “history of the larger occurrences of revolutions” (Historie der grössern Begebenheiten der Revolutionen).³⁴ Tracing back the particular chronologies, each peculiar to a single state³⁵ to the postulate of the common origin of humankind was not a problem, as long as the belief in the factuality of the creation myth of the Old Testament lasted,³⁶ and, to the second half of the

edns of vols 1-4 (Paris, 1855-1861; 1879-1880); second edn of vols 1-4 (Paris, 1861-1863); second edn of vols 6, 7 (Brussels, 1865)].

²⁸ Pierre Renouvin, ed., *Histoire des relations internationales*, 5 vols (Paris, 1954) [new edn in 3 vols (Paris, 1994)]. Edmund Aloysius Walsh, SJ, ed., *The History and Nature of International Relations* (New York, 1922).

²⁹ On the beginnings of statistics see: Arno Seiffert, ‘Conring und die Begründung der Staatenkunde’, in: Michael Stolleis, ed., *Hermann Conring (1606 – 1682)* (Historische Forschungen, 23) (Berlin, 1983), pp. 202-214. Gabriella Valera, ‘Statistik, Staatengeschichte, Geschichte im 18. Jahrhundert’, in: Hans Erich Bödeker, Georg Gersholm Iggers and Peter Hanns Reill, eds, *Aufklärung und Geschichte. Studien zur deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert* (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 81) (Göttingen, 1986), pp. 119-143, at pp. 121-124. Markus Völkl, ‘German Historical Writing from the Reformation to the Enlightenment’, in: José Rabasa, Masayuki Satō, Edoardo Tartolo and Daniel Woolf, eds, *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*, vol. 3 (Oxford, 2012), pp. 324-346, at p. 336. Reinhold Zehrfeld, *Hermann Conrings Staatenkunde* (Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen. Section 1, vol. 5) (Leipzig, 1926).

³⁰ For the ordering principles of universal historiography see below, notes 61ff.; for the spatial ordering principles of global statistics see: Johann Georg Meusel, *Lehrbuch der Statistik* (Leipzig, 1792) [fourth edn (Leipzig, 1817)]. By contrast, Johann Christoph Gatterer, *Ideal einer allgemeinen Weltstatistik* (Göttingen, 1773), pp. 43-46, preferred a systematic arrangement.

³¹ August Ludwig von Schlözer, *Allgemeines StatsRecht und StatsVerfassungslehre* (Göttingen, 1793), pp. 3-4.

³² Gottfried Achenwall, *Vorbereitung zur Staatswissenschaft der heutigen fürnehmsten Europäischen Reiche und Staaten* (Göttingen, 1748), pp. 43-44 [second edn (Göttingen, 1749)]. Achenwall [praes.] und Johann Justus Henne [resp.], *Notitia rerum publicarum academiis vindicata*. LLD thesis (University of Göttingen, 1748). August Ludwig von Schlözer, *Systema politicae* (Göttingen, 1771). Meusel, *Lehrbuch* (note 30), p. 1.

³³ Johann Christoph Gatterer, ‘Vom historischen Plan und der darauf sich gründenden Zusammenfügung der Erzählungen’, in: Gatterer, ed., *Allgemeine historische Bibliothek*, vol. 1 (Halle, 1767), pp. 15-89, at pp. 62-63.

³⁴ Johann Christoph Gatterer, *Einleitung in die synchronistische Universalhistorie zur Erläuterung seiner synchronistischen Tabellen* (Göttingen, 1771), p. 1.

³⁵ Johann Christoph Gatterer, *Abriß der Chronologie* (Göttingen, 1777), at pp. 258-262, explained, among other things, the “Chronology of the Chinese” (Zeitrechnung der Chineser).

³⁶ Georg Andreas Will, ‘Einleitung in die historische Gelahrtheit und die Methode, die Geschichte zu lehren und zu lernen [1766; Ms. Nuremberg: Stadtbibliothek, Will Papers (Bibliotheca Norica Williana), V.612^a]’, edited by Horst Walter Blanke, ‘Georg Andreas Wills “Einleitung in die historische Gelahrtheit” (1766) und die Anfänge

eighteenth century, that same belief supported adherence to the time span of roughly 6000 years covering the entire history of the world.³⁷

Imperial and dynastic historiography varied some of these themes, perceptions and tasks, without overthrowing them. In lieu of the focus of universal historiography and world statistics on the “revolutions” and the anonymous “facta”,³⁸ occurrences seemingly provoking the “revolutions”, the historiography of empires and dynasties placed at their core the wills of state rulers, who appeared to be determined to control other states and their inhabitants. Imperial historiography followed this pattern already during the sixteenth century with regard to the expansion of Portuguese rule to zones along the coasts of Africa and the Indian Ocean.³⁹ In doing so, it used for its own narrative framework the claims for imperial authority, which King Emanuel I of Portugal had articulated.⁴⁰ In this way, the historiography of quasi-imperial expansion, offered a narrative of the history of international relations in Portuguese perspective. Its ordering principle was spatial, its task the presentation of rulers’ actions portrayed as successes.⁴¹ In a wider sense, imperial historiography

moderner Historik-Vorlesungen in Deutschland’, in: *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* 2 (1984), pp. 222-265 [also edited in: Horst Walter Blanke and Dirk Fleischer, eds, *Theoretiker der deutschen Aufklärungshistorie*, vol. 1: Die theoretische Begründung der Geschichte als Fachwissenschaft (Fundamenta historica, vol. 1, part 1) (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 313-350], at p. 225, believed that “the history of the fates of nations and states” was the equivalent of “a diary of divine providence and government” (die Geschichte von den Schicksalen der Völker und Staaten ... ein Tagebuch der Vorsehung und Regierung Gottes).

³⁷ Georg Horn, *Dissertatio de vera aetate mundi* (Leiden, 1659). Benjamin Hederich, *Anleitung zu den fürnehmsten Historischen Wissenschaften* (Berlin, 1709), pp. 99-110 [further edn (Wittenberg, 1711)]. Giambattista Vico, *Principij di scienza nuova d’intorno alla commune natura delle nazione* (Naples, 1744), s. p.: “Tavola cronologica”. Gatterer, ‘Plan’ (note 33), p. 67. Gatterer, *Einleitung* (wie Anm. 34), passim. Schlözer, *Vorstellung* (note 17), p. 52. These statements came on record despite then already vocal criticism of the biblical time frame for human history. For discussions of chronology in the eighteenth century see: Martin John Spencer Rudwick, *The Meaning of Fossils*, second edn (Chicago and London, 1985) [first published (London, 1972)]. Donald J. Wilcox, *The Measurement of Time. Pre-Newtonian Chronologies and the Rhetoric of Relative Time* (Chicago and London, 1987).

³⁸ Schlözer, *Vorstellung* (note 17), p. 45.

³⁹ João de Barros, *Da Asia* (Lisbon, 1787) [first published (Lisbon, 1553); new edn (Lisbon, 1945-1946)]. On Barros see: Diogo Ramada Courto, ‘European Historiography on the East’, in: José Rabasa, Masayuki Satō, Edoardo Tartolo and Daniel Woolf, eds, *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*, vol. 3 (Oxford, 2012), pp. 536-555, at pp. 540-541.

⁴⁰ Manuel I, King of Portugal, *Carta das novas que vieram a el rei mossa senhor do descobrimento do preste João* (Lisbon, 1521) [newly edited by Armando Cortesão (Lisbon, 1938)]. Manuel I, *Copia de una littera del Re de Portugal mandada a el Re de Castalle del viagio e successo da India* (Rome, 1505) [reprint, edited by E. de Canto (Lisbon, 1906); also edited s. t.: ‘Carta de El-Rei D. Manuel ao Rei Catholico, 1505’, in: *Documentos sobre os Portugueses em Mozambique e na Africa Central*, vol. 5 (Lisbon, 1966), p. 47; English version, edited by Sergio J. Pacifici, *Copy of a Letter of the King of Portugal Sent to the King of Castile Concerning the Voyage and Success of India* (Minneapolis, 1955)]. Manuel I, *Epistola serenissimi Regis Portugaliae de victoria contra infideles babita. Ad Julium Papam, secundum que ad Sacrum Collegium Reverendissimum Dominorum Cardinalium* (Augsburg, 1507). Manuel I, *Serenissimi Emanuelis Portugaliae Regis ad Julium II Pontificum Maximum Epistola de prouinciis, ciuitatibus, terris et locis orientalis partis siue ditioni fideisque christiane nouissime per eum subactis* (Augsburg, 1508). On these texts see: Luís Filipe F. R. Thomaz, ‘L’idée imperial Manueline’, in: Jean Aubin, ed., *La découverte, le Portugal et l’Europe. Colloque 1988* (Paris, 1990), pp. 35-103.

⁴¹ Historiographers succeeded to such an extent that their descriptions could be taken to be accounts of facts still in the twentieth century. See: George Modelski, ‘The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State’, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (1978), pp. 214-235 [reprinted in: Andrew Linklater, ed.,

thus, could not be restricted to matters pertaining to the Holy Roman Empire, as this was and remained conceived as a universal empire *per se* that could not expand and was not categorised as an institution of rule established through human will. Hence, the Holy Roman Empire could become subject to “revolutions”⁴² only in accordance with divine will.⁴³

Dynastic historiography, with a focus on international relations, mainly consisted in the historiography of the Habsburg dynasty. Since Mennel⁴⁴ and Stabius⁴⁵ at the turn towards the

International Relations. Critical Concepts in Political Science, vol. 4 (London and New York, 2000), pp. 1340-1360].

⁴² For the world empires of Antiquity, universal historiographers conceived processes of successive foundations and destructions. Thus: Gatterer, *Einleitung* (note 34), pp. 103-629.

⁴³ Thus already: Engelbert, Abbot of Admont, ‘De ortu et fine Romani imperii’, edited by Melchior Goldast von Heimingsfeld, *Politica imperialia* (Frankfurt, 1614), pp. 753-773, at p. 755.

⁴⁴ On Mennel see: Peter P. Albert, ‘Die habsburgische Chronik des Konstanzer Bischofs Heinrich von Klingenberg’, in: *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 20 (1905), pp. 179-223, at pp. 182-196. Gerd Althoff, ‘Studien zur habsburgischen Merowingersage’, in: *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 87 (1979), pp. 71-100, at pp. 77-90, 96-97. Ernst Breisach, *Historiography*, second edn (Chicago and London, 1994), p. 167 [first published (Chicago and London, 1983)]. August Buck, *Das Geschichtsdenken der Renaissance* (Schriften und Vorträge des Petrarca-Instituts Köln, 9) (Krefeld, 1957). Gerhart Burger, *Die südwestdeutschen Stadtschreiber im Mittelalter* (Böblingen, 1960), p. 275. Karl Heinz Burmeister, *Neue Forschungen zu Jakob Mennel*, in: *Geschichtsschreibung in Vorarlberg* (Bregenz, 1973), pp. 49-69. Burmeister, ‘Jakob Mennel auf dem Reichstag zu Freiburg 1498’, in: *Innsbrucker historische Studien* 1 (1978), pp. 215-219. Anna Coreth, *Österreichische Geschichtsschreibung in der Barockzeit (1620 – 1740)* (Vienna, 1950), pp. 27-49. Robert Folz, *Le souvenir et la légende de Charlemagne* (Dijon, 1950), pp. 539-542. Eva Irblich, ‘Jakob Mennel, Fürstliche Chronik’, in: Irblich, ed., *Thesaurus Austriacus* (Vienna, 1996), pp. 142-154. Paul Joachimsmen, *Geschichtsauffassung und Geschichtsschreibung in Deutschland unter dem Einfluß des Humanismus* (Beiträge zur Kultur des Mittelalters und der Renaissance, 6) (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 91-104, 277 [reprint (Aalen, 1968)]. Fritz Koreny, ‘“Ottoprecht fürscht“ [!]. Eine unbekannt Zeichnung von Albrecht Dürer – Kaiser Maximilian I. und sein Grabmal in der Hofkirche zu Innsbruck’, in: *Jahrbuch der Berliner Museen*. N. F., vol. 31 (1981), pp. 127-148. Georg Kugler, *Eine Denkschrift Dr. Jakob Mennels, verfaßt im Auftrage Maximilians I. für seinen Enkel Karl*. Ph. D. thesis, typescript (University of Vienna, 1960), fol. 35-58. Simon Laschitzer, ‘Die Heiligen aus der “Sipp-, Mag- und Schwägerschaft” des Kaisers Maximilian I.’, in: *Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen des Allerhöchsten Kaiserhauses* 4 (1886), pp. 75-88. Laschitzer, ‘Die Genealogie des Kaisers Maximilian I.’, in: *Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen des Allerhöchsten Kaiserhauses* 8 (1888), pp. 20-31. Alphons Lhotsky, ‘Studien zur Ausgabe der Österreichischen Chronik des Thomas Ebendorfer’, in: *Deutsches Archiv für Geschichte des Mittelalters* 6 (1943), pp. 198-210. Lhotsky, ‘Apis Colonna. Fabeln und Theorien über die Abkunft der Habsburger’, in: *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 55 (1947), pp. 171-245, at pp. 205-206 [reprint in: Lhotsky, *Aufsätze und Vorträge*, edited by Hans Wagner and Heinrich Koller, vol. 1 (Munich, 1971), pp. 7-102]. Lhotsky, ‘Dr. Jacob Mennel. Ein Vorarlberger im Kreise Kaiser Maximilians I.’, in: *Alemannia* 10 (1936), pp. 1-15 [reprint in: Lhotsky, (as above), vol. 2, pp. 289-311]. Lhotsky, ‘Neue Studien über Leben und Werk Jacob Mennels’, in: *Montfort* 6 (1951/52), pp. 3-12 [reprint in: Lhotsky, (as above), vol. 2, pp. 312-322]. Theodor Mayer, ‘St. Trudpert und der Breisgau’, in: Mayer, ed., *Beiträge zur Geschichte von St. Trudpert* (Veröffentlichungen des Oberrheinischen Instituts für Geschichtliche Landeskunde Freiburg im Breisgau, 3) (Freiburg, 1937), pp. 11-30 [reprinted in: Mayer., *Mittelalterliche Studien* (Lindau and Constance, 1959), pp. 273-288]. Gert Melville, ‘Geschichte in graphischer Gestalt’, in: Hans Patze, ed., *Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsbewußtsein im späten Mittelalter* (Vorträge und Forschungen, herausgegeben vom Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für mittelalterliche Geschichte, 31) (Sigmaringen, 1987), pp. 57-154, at pp. 97-107. Dieter Atermens, ‘Geschichte und Dynastie. Zu Methode und Ziel der “Fürstlichen Chronik” Jakob Mennels’, in: Kurt Andermann, ed., *Historiographie am Oberrhein* (Oberheinische Studien, 7) (Sigmaringen, 1988), pp. 121-153. Jean-Marie Moeglin, ‘Dynastisches Bewußtsein und Geschichtsschreibung. Zum Selbstverständnis der Wittelsbacher, Habsburger und Hohenzollern im Spätmittelalter’, in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 256 (1993), pp. 593-635, at pp. 629-630. Marianne Pollheimer, ‘Wie der jung weiß kunig die alten gedachtnus insbesondere lieb het. Maximilian I., Jakob Mennel und die frühmittelalterliche Geschichte der Habsburger in der “Fürstlichen Chronik”’, in: Richard

sixteenth century, it stood under the requirement of the critical scrutiny of records.⁴⁶ Whereas Mennel saw as his main task the tracing of the Habsburg dynasty as bearers of universal monarchy to the Trojans of Antiquity through past *migrationes gentium*,⁴⁷ historiographers working under Emperor Charles V took the Spanish conquests of parts of America and the Caribbean as the background, against which the Habsburg dynasty could appear as the holders of universal rule.⁴⁸ While, according to Mennel's construction, the Habsburg claim towards universal rule was to be based on the singularity of Habsburg genealogical descent, that means, it was not necessarily tied to the manifest execution of rule,⁴⁹ the Burgundian chancellery in service to Charles V derived the emperor's precedence from the pragmatism of missionary and military expansion, thereby responding to the transformation of the European world picture taking place at the time. Among other, Paolo Giovio, in his emblem book, rationalised the use of Charles's Burgundian device *Plus Ultra*, in use since 1516, with the argument that the successful conquest of the "West Indies" was

Corradini, Christina Pössel and Philip Shaw, eds, *Texts and Identities in the Early Middle Ages* (Denkschriften der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philos.-Hist. Kl., 344 = Forschungen zur Geschichte des Mittelalters, 12) (Vienna, 2006), pp. 165-176. Karl Schmid, "'Andacht und Stift". Zur Grabmalplanung Kaiser Maximilians I.', in: Schmid and Joachim Wollasch, eds, *Memoria* (Münsterische Mittelalter-Schriften, 48) (Munich, 1984), pp. 750-71. Marie Tanner, *The Last Descendants of Aeneas. The Hapsburgs and the Mythic Image of the Emperor* (New Haven and London, 1993), pp. 103-109. Folkmar Thiele, *Die Freiburger Stadtschreiber im Mittelalter* (Veröffentlichungen aus dem Archiv der Freiburg im Breisgau, 13) (Freiburg, 1973). Ludwig Welti, 'Dr. Jakob Mennel, Hofgeschichtsschreiber Maximilians I.', in: *Montfort* 22 (1970), pp. 16-33. Willi Werth, 'Zum realen Kern der Passio sancti Thrudperti im St. Galler codex 577', in: *Schau-ins-Land. Zeitschrift des Breisgau-Geschichtsvereins* 95/96 (1976/77), pp. 145-164. Hermann Wiesflecker, *Kaiser Maximilian I.*, vol. 5 (Munich, 1986), pp. 365-368.

⁴⁵ In 1515, Johannes Stabius voiced scathing criticism of Mennel's historiography under the title "Scriptum Joannis Stabii super conclusionibus genealogie illustrissime Austrie". The text is extant in Ms. Vienna: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 3327, esp. fol. 15. In the introduction to this text, Stabius maintained that Mennel's genealogical constructions were not based on scrutiny of sources and should therefore be rejected as a whole. For the text see: Joseph Chmel, *Die Handschriften der k. k. Hofbibliothek in Wien im Interesse der Geschichte, besonders der österreichischen*, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1840), p. 487. Emperor Maximilian I responded to Stabius's criticism by requesting a further opinion on Mennel's work, this time by the Divinity School of the University of Vienna. The School provided the opinion in 1518 and confirmed the essence of Mennel's statements. The text is extant in Ms. Vienna: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 10298, the relevant passages are on fol. 1^v, 3^v, 7^r, 12^v.

⁴⁶ On Mennel's critical approach see: Harald Kleinschmidt, *Ruling the Waves. Emperor Maximilian I, the Search for Islands and the Transformation of the European World Picture c. 1500* (Bibliotheca reformatrica et humanistica, 63) (Utrecht, 2007), pp. 142-146.

⁴⁷ Jakob Mennel, *Der "Habsburger Kalender" (Urfassung) [1513 x 1514]*, edited by Wolfgang Irtenkauf (Litterae, 66) (Göppingen, 1979), pp. 1-4. Mennel, *Cronica Habsburgensis nuper rigmatice edita* (Constance, 1507), VV 25-50 [edited by Albert, 'Chronik' (note 44), pp. 213-214]. Mennel, *Fürstlich Chronick kayser maximilians geburt spiegel*, 5 vols in 6 parts. Ms. Vienna: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 3072x, 3073, 3074, 3075, 3076, 3077, vol. 1 = Cod. 3072x. [abridged printed versions. t.: *Ain hüpsche Chronick von Heidnischen vnd Christenkunigen der Teutschen vnnnd Welschen franken* (Freiburg, 1523)].

⁴⁸ Francesco Mauroliano, *Della storia della Sicilia* (Palermo, 1849), pp. 342-346. V. Castaldo, 'Il viaggio di Carlo V in Sicilia (1535), secondo una cronaca manoscritta napoletana', in: *Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale*, Second Series, vol. 5 (1929), pp. 85-108. Vincenzo Cazzato, 'Le feste per Carlo V in Italia', in: Marcello Fagiolo, ed., *La città effimera e l'universo artificiale del giardino* (Rome, 1980), pp. 22-35. Vincenzo Saletta, 'Il viaggio in Italia di Carlo V', in: *Studi Meridionali*, vol. 8 (1976), pp. 286-327, 452-479, vol. 10 (1977), pp. 78-114, 268-292, 420-442, vol. 11 (1978), pp. 329-341.

⁴⁹ For example, Maximilian I based his claim for rule over "Seven Kingdoms" on Habsburg genealogy; see: Ms. Vienna: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 2800, fol. 48^v.

superior to all glorious achievements of the Roman emperors of Antiquity and intertwined the transgression of the columns of the Gaditan Hercules with the Humanist *querelle des anciens et modernes*.⁵⁰ According to this interpretation, Charles was the lord of the Old World in his capacity as Roman Emperor and simultaneously lord of the New World in his capacity as ruler of the Spanish Kingdoms.⁵¹ The combination of both ruling offices appeared to convey upon him more glory than any previous emperor had ever had.⁵² Subsequently, the same interpretation was applied to King Philip II of Spain.⁵³ From the seventeenth century, the Habsburg residing in Vienna took over the device *Plus Ultra* and applied it to themselves. Thus, the two “Columnae Colossicae” at the front of the Vienna Karlskirche, designed by Johann Bernhard Fischer von Erlach the Elder under Emperor Charles VI, featured a reference to the “ancient device of honour of the Glorious Emperor Charles V” (das alte Ehren-Zeichen des Glorwürd[igen] K[aisers] Caroli V),⁵⁴ and further “two columns with the Plus Ultra of Charles V” were to be erected “as statues” (zweye Säulen Plus Ultra des Caroli V. in Bildhauerei) next to a huge globe.⁵⁵ However, the dynastic historiography compiled under Charles VI, confined itself to narrating the services members of the dynasty had devoted to the Empire, while abandoning the explicit genealogical link of the Habsburgs with the Trojans.⁵⁶

The survey shows that universal historiography and world statistics, the historiography of imperial

⁵⁰ Paolo Giovio, *Dialogo dell'impresie militari et amorose*, edited by Maria Luisa Doglio (Rome, 1978), pp. 46-47 [first published (Venice, 1558)].

⁵¹ Sandra Sider, ‘Transcendent Symbols for the Hapsburgs. Plus Ultra and the Columns of Hercules’, in: *Emblematica* 4 (1989), pp. 257-271, at p. 259, takes Pittioni’s claim that Charles had “[r]itrovo noue terre e nouo mondo”, was a variant of the phrase “et vidi caelum novum et terram novam” from the Revelation of John, 21,1, but does not take into consideration that the “finding” of “new lands” referred to edicts in the name of Pope Alexander VI, specifically: Alexander VI, Pope, ‘Bulla Inter caetera [3 May 1493]’, edited by Josef Metzler, *America Pontificia primi saeculi evangelizationis. 1493 – 1592*, nr 1, vol. 1 (Vatican City, 1991), pp. 72-75.

⁵² Thus explicitly: Giovanni Battista Pittioni, *Impresie nobili et ingeniose di diversi Prencipi et d'altri personaggi illustri* (Venice, 1566), nr 4. Likewise: Hernando de Soto, *Emblemas moralizadas* (Madrid, 1599), fol. 40^v [reprint, edited by Carmen Bravo-Villasante (Publicaciones de la Fundación Universitaria Española, 9) (Madrid, 1873)]. Georg Saueremann [Sauromannus], *Hispaniae consolatio* (Louvain, c. 1520), fol. C II^v.

⁵³ Sebastian de Covarrubias y Orozco, *Emblemas morales*, Centura I (Madrid, 1610), nr 34.

⁵⁴ Carl Gustav Heraeus, *Vermischte Neben-Arbeiten* (Vienna, 1715), fol. F [1^r]. Likewise: Heraeus, *Inscriptiones et symbolae varii argvmenti* (Nuremberg, 1721), p. 76, who, in this passage, referred to the Temple of Solomon and St Karl Borromaeus as further weitere links for the symbolism of columns.

⁵⁵ Hans Sedlmayr, ‘Die Schauseite der Karlskirche in Wien’, in: Sedlmayr, *Epochen und Werke. Gesammelte Schriften zur Kunstgeschichte*, vol. 2 (Vienna and Munich, 1960), pp. 174-187, at p. 184, note 14.

⁵⁶ Marquard Herrgott, *Genealogia diplomatica Augustae Gentis Habsburgicae*, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1737), esp. pp. 263-264. Trojan descent was featured indirectly even in this work, namely in the appendix containing the “Acta S. Trutperti Martyris Collata cum tribus manuscriptis San-Gallensis” (pp. 285-298). This text names some “Otperto” (p. 296), through whom Mennel had traced the Habsburgs via the Merovingians to the Trojans. See: Mennel, *Chronick* (note 47), vol. 2, Cod. 3073, fol. 2^v, 26^f: “Otpertus erster Graff zu Habsburg”. On Herrgott see: Alphons Lhotsky, *Österreichische Historiographie* (Österreich-Archiv, 1) (Vienna, 1962), p. 122. Howard Louthan, ‘Austria, the Habsburgs and Historical Writing in Central Europe’, in: José Rabasa, Masayuki Satō, Edoardo Tortarolo and Daniel Woolf, eds, *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*, vol. 3 (Oxford, 2012), pp. 302-323, at pp. 320-321. Another dynastic historiographer circumvented the complexity of Habsburg consanguineal relations by excluding Habsburg imperial activities from dynastic historiography and allocating them to the historiography of the Empire and Spain. See: August Benedict Michaelis, *Einleitung zu einer vollständigen Geschichte der Chur- und Fürstlichen Häuser in Teutschland*, vol. 1 (Lemgo, 1759), p. 202.

expansion and dynastic historiography als text sorts shared the common feature of striving for the inclusion of as many parts of the globe and their inhabitants as possible.⁵⁷ “Human beings are societal in kind and made for as well as obliged to life in society. But societies can neither exist without memories of and news about occurrences, nor, even less so, can they actually accomplish their principally achievable goals.” (Der Mensch ist von geselliger Art, und zum gesellschaftlichen Leben gemacht und verpflichtet. Gesellschaften aber können ohne Andenken und Nachrichten von Begebenheiten weder bestehen, noch auch vielweniger alle ihre möglichen Absichten erreichen),⁵⁸ was the judgement of Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, the German editor of the anonymous *English World History* widely used during the eighteenth century. Baumgarten would not accept the idea that there might be “peoples without history”. Hence, universal historiographers had to meet the challenge of bringing the entire globe into the temporal dimension of their narratives, irrespective of membership of states in a specific international “system”.⁵⁹ Universal historiographers like Gatterer circumvented the ever-threatening capitulation vis-à-vis the numbers of occurrences to be narrated using an analogy from geography: “If one pays attention to the purpose, why a universal history is

⁵⁷ Schlözer, *Vorstellung* (note 17), p. 105.

⁵⁸ Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, ‘Vorrede Herrn D. Baumgartens’, in: Baumgarten, ed., *Uebersetzung der Allgemeinen Welthistorie, die in Engeland durch eine Gesellschaft von Gelehrten ausgefertigt worden*, vol. 1 (Halle, 1744), separate pag., pp. 3-58, at p. 25. However, Gatterer contested this view. See: Gatterer, *Ideal* (note 30), p. 16, arguing that global statistics would not offer a survey of all “nations” (Völker), but only those havng gathered into states: “einige Völker sind wild. ... Wilde Völker haben keinen Staat, also auch keine Statistik, sie haben nicht einmal eine eigene Historie.” Apparently influenced by Rousseau’s theory of the social contract and of the historiography of human culture of the 1760s [Isaak Iselin, *Ueber die Geschichte der Menschheit*, vol. 1 (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1764), pp. 81-162, 163-243. Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of the Civil Society* (Edinburgh, 1966), pp. 81-82 (reprint, edited by Louis Schneider (New Brunswick, NJ, 1890); first published (London, 1773); reprint of the original edn (London, 1969))], Gatterer identified the state of nature as the continuind condition of the absence of the state and the prevailing of “savagery”. According to Samuel von Pufendorf, *Einleitung zu der Historie der vornehmsten Reiche und Staaten*, vol. 1 (Frankfurt, 1709), pp. 1-2, there were no states before the Flood, but then only kin groups as the largest type of group. By contrast, John Millar, *Observations Concerning the Distinctions of Ranks in Society* (London, 1771), pp. 176-194 [fourth edn (Edinburgh, 1806); reprint (Aalen, 1986)], spotted apparent “Primitiveness” in the remote history of Europe and the Mediterranean area. Likewise: Pierre-Joseph Neyron, *Essai historique et politique sur les garanties et en général sur les méthodes diverses des anciens et des nations modernes d’assurer les traités publics* (Jena, 1777), pp. 10-11. Or the historiography of the Scottish Enlightenment and the research programm on the “history of humankind” see: David Allan, ‘Scottish Historical Writing of the Enlightenment’, in: José Rabasa, Masayuki Satō, Edoardo Tartolo and Daniel Woolf, eds, *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*, vol. 3 (Oxford, 2012), pp. 497-517, at pp. 507-512. Jörn Garber, ‘Von der “Geschichte des Menschen” zur “Geschichte der Menschheit”. Anthropologie, Pädagogik und Zivilisationstheorie in der deutschen Spätaufklärung’, in: *Jahrbuch für historische Bildungsforschung* 5 (1999), pp. 31-54. Melo Araújo, *Weltgeschichte* (note 18), pp. 110-124. Hartmut Zedelmaier, ‘Zur Idee einer “Geschichte der Menschheit” in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts’, in: Zedelmaier, Winfried Müller and Wolfgang J. Smolka, eds, *Universität und Bildung. Festschrift für Laetitia Boehm zum 60. Geburtstag* (Munich, 1991), pp. 277-299.

⁵⁹ Gatterer, ‘Plan’ (note 33), pp. 53-54. He knew eight so-called “National Systems” (Nationalsysteme): “das Assyrisch-Medische, das Persische, das Griechisch-Makedonische, das Römische, das Parthisch-Persische, das Fränkisch-Teutsche, das Arabische, und das Tatarische” (p. 42), thereby combining the conventional doctrine of the four world empires, apparently following Johann Philipp Sleidan, *De quattuor summis imperiis libri tres* (Strasbourg, 1556), with empires arising after the end of Antiquity. Defferent from Gatterer, Erlangen historian Georg Andreas Will criticised Sleidan’s practice of ordering universal history according to the modell of the four world empires. See: Will, ‘Einleitung’ (note 36), pp. 247-250.

written, one will easily become aware that, viewed in contradistinction against special histories, the universal historiographer needs to do the same thing that, in geography, a map does to the globe. The universal history must be short, must deal with the main revolutions, must narrate the general context of the details of special histories and the contemporaneous in all big transformations.” (Man erwäge nur mit Aufmerksamkeit den Zweck, warum eine Universalhistorie geschrieben wird, und man wird bald gewahr werden, daß sie, gegen Specialhistorien betrachtet, eben das in der Historie thun müsse, was in der Geographie die Charte vom Globus thut. Die Universalhistorie muß also kurz seyn, muß sich nur mit den Hauptrevolutionen beschäftigen, muß den allgemeinen Zusammenhang der Merkwürdigkeiten in den Specialhistorien, und das Gleichzeitige aller grossen Veränderungen ... erzählen.)⁶⁰

Recognising the authority of the Old Testament helped universal historiographers accommodate the seemingly divinely willed pluralism of coexisting states with the belief in the common origin of humankind. For example, Leiden historiographer Georg Horn, in his posthumously published *Introductio in historiam universalem*, employed the myth of the Flood as his highest criterion for dividing global history into “History before the Flood” (*Historia ante-diluviana*) and “History after the Flood” (*Historia post-diluviana*).⁶¹ In what came along as a Rameean classification system combining a spatial with a temporal order, Horn derived from that highest division all further special histories down to histories of particular states as the lowest level that allowed no further division. Passing over the “*Historia ante-diluviana*” as the period that allowed no division, Horn classified the “*Historia post-diluviana*” into the “ancient” (*Antiqua*) and the “more recent” (*Recentior*) history, with the occidental age of migration as the temporal boundary. Within the “*Historia Antiqua*”, the subsequent downward ordering steps were the three continents of the Old World, further divided with regard to Asia into “*Babylonica*”, “*Persica*”, “*Scythica*” and “*Indica*”. Horn thus used elements from the ancient division of the world empires. The “*Historia babylonica*” further fell apart into the histories of the Medians, the Babylonians and the Assyrians as the lowest level within Asian Antiquity, whereas the ancient history of Africa was to consist of the “*Historia Aegyptiorum*” and the “*Historia Aethiopum*” and the ancient history of Europe of the history of the Greeks and of the Romans.

⁶⁰ Gatterer, ‘Plan’ (note 33), pp. 62-63. Gatterer, *Abriß der Universalgeschichte* (Göttingen, 1765), pp. 22-23.

⁶¹ This and the following according to: Georg Horn, *Introductio in historiam universalem* (Leipzig, 1699), “*Tabula*”. For similar tables, condensing information on the past into hierarchical systems see: Christophe de Savigny, *Tableaux* (Paris, 1587) [reprint from the original in: Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August Bibliothek, H:01.2° Helmst., in: Steffen Siegel, *Tabula. Figuren der Ordnung um 1600* (Berlin, 2009), tables 1-39, s. p.]. Johann Heinrich Alsted, *Encyclopaedia* (Herborn, 1630) [reprinted in: Steffen Siegel, *Die Orte des Bildes im Alphabet des enzyklopädischen Textes*, in: Ulrich Johannes Schneider, ed. *Seine Welt wissen. Enzyklopädien in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Darmstadt 2006), p. 196]. On Horn see: Isenader von Schmitz-Auerbach, *Georg Horn, ein deutscher Geschichtsschreiber* (Karlsruhe, 1880). On systems as ordering devices see: Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, *Topica universalis* (*Paradeigmata*, 1), Hamburg 1983, 22, 39-52, 81-94, 265-272.

Within the “Historia Antiqua”, then, the number of ordering levels was small, compared to that relating to the “Historia Recentior”. Within the latter period, the division into Continents played no role; instead the distinction between the Old and the New World, extended by a reference to the Ptolemaean Southern Continent, featured at the highest level. During the period of the “Historia Recentior”, the Old World was synthesised from the “Historia Orientalis”, in turn composed from the histories of Europe and northern Eurasia (“Scythica”), the Arabian-African area together with the Indian Ocean (“Aethiopica”) and East Asia (“Cathaica”). Under its rubric “Historia Occidentalis s[ive] Americana”, the New World was not to receive any further division, as was the case for the “Historia Australis” as the history of the Southern Continent termed “Terra Australis” on the book’s title page. It was then only the “more recent” history of the Old World that received further divisions of up to five further downward levels. While using space as an ordering criterion predominantly with regard to “ancient” history and to continents, Horn allocated more significance to time as an ordering device when it came to “more recent” history. For the period of the “Historia Recentior”, Horn used the four cardinal directions, whereby the North did not feature in the systematic table but only on the title page as “Terra Borealis”. Thus, the title page displays the globe as a permeable land mass, with the “Terra Borealis” designed as the alleged land bridge between Asia and America in the north and the vision of a further landbridge connecting the “Terra Australis” with Southeast Asia. The further classification levels within the “Historia Recentior” bear ethnic names and are meant to denote larger or smaller states. In adding the “Historia Occidentalis s[ive] Americana” only to the classification scheme for the “Historia Recentior”, Horn claimed that the New World did not have an ancient history, thereby circumventing the old historiographic difficulty of having to link the history of the New World with the chronology of the Old Testament. The classification table serves as a table of contents in Horn’s book, and this is the reason, why page numbers have been added to the lowest ordering levels. In positioning narratives of interactions among states at the lowest level of universal historiography, Horn established linkages between universal historiography, world statistics and the historiography of international relations.⁶² Horn’s universal historiography was inclusionistic in approach, as he demanded that the globe as a whole should become the spatial base for the narrative.

By contrast, the use of the same inclusionism was not self-evident within the historiography of imperial expansion, as expansion took place in conjunction with military conquest, therefore demanding a justification. Providing that justification, historiographers working in the Iberian

⁶² He also produced a handbook of global statistics. Georg Horn, *Orbis politicus. Oder Beschreibung aller Kayserthumb, Königreiche und Republiken, so heute zu Tage in der Welt bekannt* (Budissin, 1669), part III: Die denckwürdigen Sachen der gantzen Welt von Anfang der Welt biß auf unsere Zeiten.

Peninsula during the second half of the sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth centuries, took over topoi which they derived from crusading ideologies,⁶³ following practices of which already Columbus⁶⁴ and Cortés⁶⁵ had availed themselves. The effort to accomplish inclusion, however, was most difficult to accomplish with regard to the Habsburgs. Once, Mennel's construct of the Habsburg genealogical descent from the Trojans had been abandoned, genealogy ceased to operate as a reservoir for supportive inclusionistic arguments, while, at the same time, the identification of the Habsburgs as the imperial dynasty weakened the dynastic ties with the expanding Iberian kingdoms. The only remaining possibility was the conjunction of the Burgundian device for Charles V with the retrospective narrative of apparent Habsburg achievements of expansion during the sixteenth century. In this context, *Plus Ultra* no longer only meant "still further", but also "as many as possible". In this way, however, the presentation of the Habsburgs as universal rulers not only fossilised into rulers' *memoria*, but also served the political purpose of smoothing out the consequences of the peace treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden, all of which featured negative results for the Habsburgs. In this latter context, it was possible to give out the two columns in front of the Vienna Karlskirche as transferring the use of the device *Plus Ultra* upon Emperor Charles VI not just "due to the similarity of the names, the dynasty, the glory and the regained Spanish crown" (wegen Gleichheit der Nahmen, des Geschlechts, der Glory und wiedererbrachten Spanischen Crone), but even more so because Charles VI appeared to have "circumnavigated and conquered this area [i e., the New World] in his own person with victorious weapons" (die halbe Welt umschiffend diese Gegend in höchster Person mit siegreichen Waffen erobert).⁶⁶ Correspondingly, the left column was to bear a globe showing the American continent on its front side.⁶⁷

Universal historiography and world statistics as text sorts of the historiography of international relations displayed conformity during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in that they narrated the histories of states anywhere on the globe and categorised their inhabitants as "nations" or "peoples" with their own specific histories. Expansion imperial and dynastic historiographies shared the expectation that history was taking place everywhere on the globe, yet with the proviso that the stability of states could be ascertained for the Old but not for the New World. Nevertheless, even

⁶³ Barros, *Asia* (note 39), Decada XII, chap. VII, p. 47. Antonio de Herrera Tordesillas, *Historia general de las hechos de los Castellanos en las Islas y Tierra Firme del Mar Oceano*, Decada I, book VII, chap. 4 [1601], edited by J. Natalicio González, vol. 3 Asunción and Buenos Aires, 1944), pp. 170-172.

⁶⁴ Christopher Columbus, [Christo ferens], in: Columbus, 'La historia del viaje qu'el Almirante Cristovál Colón hizo la tercera vez que vino a las Indias quando descubrio la tierra firme, como lo embió a los Reyes desde la Isla Española', in: Columbus, *Relazioni e lettere sul secondo, terzo e quarto viaggio*, edited by Paolo Emilio Taviani, Consuelo Varela, Juan Gil and Marina Conti, vol. 1 (Rome, 1992), p. 94.

⁶⁵ Hernán Cortés, 'Primera Carta [10 July 1519]', in: Cortés, *Cartas y documentos*, edited by Mario Hernández Sanchez-Barba (Mexico, 1963, pp. 3-32, at p. 27.

⁶⁶ Heraeus, *Neben-Arbeiten* (note 54), fol. F [1^r].

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

America was neither without states nor without history, and even for the postulated “Terra Australis”, Horn assumed the existence of a history. Hence, the inclusionism that was recognisable through the historiography of international relations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, conveyed not only statehood but also the existence of histories upon the globe at large and added the conviction that states might be transformed through “main revolutions”, but that they could not be destroyed through human action.

In summary, international relations took place, so to speak, in accordance with a kind of Linnéan *systema naturae*,⁶⁸ in which a firm place appeared to be given to every state. In the historiography of international relations, this model helped promote comprehensive surveys for all states and the full range of interactions among them. Here was no general criterion for exclusion, according to which states might become removed from historiographical narratives, even though, in the view of some late eighteenth-century universal historiographers, a few “peoples without history” might be admitted as existent.⁶⁹ Linné’s systems model as a global ordering frame differed from the particular systems current in political and international legal theories of the time, not in respect of its mechanicism, but in its spatial extension. Whereas, during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, some theorists of politics and international law assumed that some systemic ordering frame was applicable for and limited to Europe and parts of the American continent and the Caribbean then under European colonial control, universal historiographers and world statisticians of the same period expanded their systems model to the boundaries of the globe. Necessarily, the inclusionistic approach bound these scholars to accept Christian Wolff’s theoretical construct of the *civitas maxima* into historiography and obliged them to implement the premise that intra-systemic relations could take place under the rule of natural law. It is equally self-evident that also the historiography of imperial expansion and dynastic historiography applied the systems model enshrined in political and international legal theory. However, as a rule, universal historiography took a stance against world statistics in employing time as the highest ordering criterion, whereas space took the same role in world statistics. There were exceptions to this rule, the most prominent being the *English World History*. But that multi-volume historical narrative of international relations formed no more than a bookbinder’s synthesis and found scarce approval among universal historiographers at the time.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Carl von Linné, *Systema naturae*, first edn (Leiden, 1735) [reprints of this edn (Stockholm, 1977); (Utrecht, 2003)].

⁶⁹ Gatterer, ‘Plan’ (note 33), col. 16. For Gatterer’s maps see: Walter André Goffart, ‘The Plot of Gatterer’s “Charten zur Geschichte der Völkerwanderung”’, in: Dagmar Unverhau, ed., *Geschichtsdeutung auf alten Karten* (Wolfenbütteler Forschungen, 101) (Wiesbaden, 2003), pp. 213-220.

⁷⁰ Gatterer, ‘Plan’ (note 33), pp. 65, 68-69. Likewise still: Johann Gustav Droysen, *Historik* [1857], edited by Rudolf Hübner, fifth edn (Darmstadt, 1969), p. 382; newly edited by Peter Ley (Stuttgart, 1977) [latest printed version of 1882]. Thus finding does not support the argument, proposed in the course of discussions on the so-called “topographical turn” (or “spatial turn”) that time had been preferred to space as an ordering category in the methodology of historical research during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For this argument see

3. Sources and Methodological Conditions of the Historiography of International Relations during the Nineteenth Century

Recent work in the historiography of historiography has labelled the inclusionistic approach of the history of international relations as “Enlightenment” historiography and juxtaposed it to the so-called “historicism” of the nineteenth century. It has dated the transformation from “Enlightenment” historiography to “historicism” to the years around 1800 and has linked it with the replacement of the universalism by the particularism of the “idea of humankind” as well as the latter’s dynamisation through the use of the concept of “progress”.⁷¹ Leopold von Ranke has commonly been quoted as the key witness for that transformation.⁷² Already in his younger years, Ranke conceived the gist of his historiographical project under the goal of “finding the story of world history, that very course of occurrences and development of the human race, which should be seen as its actual contents, its core and its essence.” (die Mär der Weltgeschichte aufzufinden, jenen Gang der Begebenheiten und Entwicklungen unseres Geschlechtes, der als ihr eigentlicher Inhalt, als ihre Mitte und ihr Wesen anzusehen ist).⁷³ In proposing this research venue, Ranke radically departed from „Enlightenment“ historiography and would admit the option of displaying the contemporaneousness of histories solely in cases in which interactive actions among „nations“ were on record and would accept that option only for the period since c. 1500: “It can only be advantageous to observe various nations in their contemporaneous development, if their lives are intertwined, as this is only the case in recent times; but where it is not the case, as in ancient times, one tears to pieces the thread which ties together the parts forming the history of one single nation, and heaps fragment

Stephan Günzel, *Raum. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch* (Stuttgart, 2012), pp. 100-109. Günzel, ‘Einleitung’, in: Günzel, ed, *Raumwissenschaften* (Frankfurt, 2009), pp. 7-13 [second edn (Frankfurt, 2012)]. Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Raum und Geschichte’, in: Koselleck, *Zeitschichten* (Frankfurt, 2000), pp. 78-96, at pp. 80-89 [reprint (Frankfurt, 2003)]. Christine Rath, *Schamhafte Geschichte. Metahistorische Reflexion im Werk von Jorge Luis Borges* (Bielefeld, 2011), esp. p. 36.

⁷¹ Rüsen, ‘Aufklärung’ (note 15), p. 47. Friedrich Schiller, ‘Was heisst und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte? Eine akademische Antrittsrede [May 1789]’, in: Schiller, *Werke. Nationalausgabe*, vol. 17: Historische Schriften, Teil 1, edited by Karl-Heinz Hahn (Weimar, 1970), pp. 359-376, at pp. 364, 367 [first published in: *Der Teutsche Merkur* (November 1789), pp. 105-135; also in: Horst Walter Blanke and Dirk Fleischer, eds, *Theoretiker der deutschen Aufklärungshistorie*, vol. 1 (Fundamenta historica, 1) (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 521-535; Schiller, *Historische Schriften und Erzählungen*, edited by Otto Dann (Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 6 = Bibliothek deutscher Klassiker, vol. 171), vol. (Frankfurt, 2000), pp. 411-431].

⁷² Thus already: Gerhard Masur, ‘Der Begriff der Weltgeschichte’, in: Masur, *Rankes Begriff der Weltgeschichte* (Munich, 1926), pp. 101-133, at p. 127. Likewise: Gerhard Th. Mollin, ‘Internationale Beziehungen als Gegenstand der deutschen Neuzeit-Historiographie seit dem 18. Jahrhundert’, in: Wilfried Loth and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds, *Internationale Geschichte. Themen – Ergebnisse – Aussichten* (Studien zur internationalen Geschichte, 10) (Munich, 2000), pp. 3-30, at pp. 22-26.

⁷³ Leopold von Ranke, ‘[Brief an Heinrich Ranke, Berlin, November 1826]’, in: Ranke, *Zur eigenen Lebensgeschichte*, edited by Alfred Dove (Ranke, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 53/54) (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 161-162, at p. 162.

upon fragment.” (Nur dann kann es vorteilhaft sein, verschiedene Völker in gleichzeitiger Entwicklung zu betrachten, wenn ihr Leben zusammenhängt, wie dies in der neueren Zeit der Fall ist, aber wo dies nicht der Fall ist, wie der alten, da zerreißt man noch den Faden, der die Teile, welche die Geschichte Einer einzigen Nation bilden, zusammenhält, und häuft Fragment auf Fragment.)⁷⁴ For Ranke, “nations” did already exist in Antiquity but had then been isolated units and could therefore not serve as objects of the documentation of the “contemporaneity” of development.

In his Berchtesgaden lectures for King Maximilian II of Bavaria, his pupil and friend, Ranke further expanded upon his project in autumn 1854 and claimed that the “promotion of nations ... to the idea of humanity” (Herbeiführung der Nationen ... zur Idee der Menschheit) by way of improvements of the material conditions of life were obviously an instance of “progress”, which universal historiography had the task of describing.⁷⁵ Consequently, “humanity” as a whole no longer featured to Ranke as a given entity, but emerged as a construct from the separate histories of “nations” capable of materialising only at some future time. Explicitly, Ranke restricted the capability of contributing to the emergence of the construct of “humanity” to the allegedly “great nations”. By contrast, he wished to exclude the majority of the world’s population from the option of contributing to that type of “progress”: this, he thought, was so, “because history teaches us that some nations are not ready for culture and that, in many cases, earlier epochs were more moral than subsequent ones. ... From the point of view of humanity as a whole, it appears to be probable to me that the idea of humankind that is represented only in the great nations, should incrementally embrace all humankind, and this then would be equivalent to inner moral progress.” (denn die Geschichte lehrt uns, daß manche Völker gar nicht kulturfähig sind, und daß oft frühere Epochen viel moralischer waren, als spätere. ... Vom allgemeinen menschlichen Standpunkt aus ist es mir wahrscheinlich, daß die Idee der Menschheit, die historisch nur in den großen Nationen repräsentiert ist, allmählich die ganze Menschheit umfassen sollte und dies wäre dann der innere moralische Fortschritt.)⁷⁶ Ranke’s statement bears the hallmarks of a description of matters of fact, seemingly not in need of any supportive argument or proof of evidence. Against his usual habit of seeking to base every statement on a record, in this passage, Ranke took for granted that his statement was based upon facts contained in the past and would not allow any reasonable doubts.⁷⁷ Even the king, whose critical

⁷⁴ Leopold von Ranke, *Allgemeine Weltgeschichte I* [Lecture course, Berlin, 27 October to 18 November 1825]. Ms. Berlin: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Ranke Papers, Fasc. 29 L. 1; partly edited in: Ernst Schulin, *Die weltgeschichtliche Erfassung des Orients bei Hegel und Ranke* (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 2) (Göttingen, 1958), pp. 310-319, at p. 311.

⁷⁵ Ranke, *Epochen* (note 21), zweiter Vortrag, 26 September 1854, p. 34. Similarly still: Akira Irie [= Iriye], ‘The Making of a Transnational World’, in: Irie, ed., *Global Interdependence. The World after 1945* (A History of the World, vol. 6) (Cambridge, MA, and London, 2014), pp. 679-847, at p. 684 [first published (Munich, 2012)].

⁷⁶ Ranke, *Epochen* (note 21), erster Vortrag, 25 September 1854, pp. 32-33. Similarly: François Guizot, *Histoire [générale] de la civilisation en Europe* (Paris, 1985), pp. 58, 62 [first published (Paris, 1828)].

⁷⁷ Ranke delivered these lectures without access to source texts and research literature. Hence, references to detail

question to Ranke's lectures were recorded, remained silent at this point. On the one side, this means that Ranke provided a record of the matter-of-factliness with which "historicism" universal historiography as the historiography of international relations promoted a radical exclusionism. That exclusionism dismissed the majority of the world population either as apparent "peoples without history" or as nations trapped in immobility. On the other side, Ranke linked with his statement the straightforward rejection of the Hegelian perception of history as an "epíodos eis hautó"⁷⁸ and objected that sources would not provide positive evidence for that perception.⁷⁹ In other words, Ranke arrived at his postulate of the lack of history among the majority of world population upon perceptions of the past that differed from those transmitted within Hegelian philosophy of history. This finding implies that the judgment is premature according to which "historicism" should have positioned time above space as an ordering device for historiographic narratives. While it is correct to note that most nineteenth-century historiographers passed over aspects of space, their for doing so was not that the left space unconsidered but that they took it for granted as the platform on which the history of Europe as the promoting agency for the emergence of "humanity" was to be narrated. The claim that nineteenth-century intellectuals should have "despatialised" the objects of their research, is utterly difficult to maintain against massive evidence showing concerns for delineations of territory, the drawing of borders and the use of space as a major definitional element for institutions such as the state.⁸⁰

The question thus needs to be answered, which perceptions of the past Ranke attached himself to with his statement boosting nineteenth-century "historicism". These answers are complex and lead back into the eighteenth century. They relate to three issues, first the consequences of the abandonment of the belief in the authority of the chronology Old Testament for the historiography of international relations; second, the emergence of the priority of the particularist historiography of European states and "nations" over the universalist historiography of the states of the globe; third, the transformation of the historiography of expansion; and, *in fine*, the reconceptualisation of universal historiography by Ranke himself, a few of his second generation pupils and some other historiographers.

should not be expected in this text. Nevertheless, Ranke might have inserted general references on principally available sources. On the text see also: Eberhard Kessel, 'Rankes Idee der Universalhistorie', in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 178 (1954), pp. 269-308.

⁷⁸ Droysen, *Historik* (note 70, edn by Leyh), p. 421. *Contra*: François Hartog, 'Von der Universalgeschichte zur Globalgeschichte? Zeiterfahrungen', in: *Trivium* 9 (2011) [<http://trivium.revues.org/4059>; first published in: *Le Débat* (2009), pp. 54-66]. Ancient historian Hartog traced Ranke's perception of the past back to Hegel's philosophy of history.

⁷⁹ Ranke, *Epochen* (note 21), erster Vortrag, p. 31-32.

⁸⁰ Thus already: Masur, 'Begriff' (note 72), p. 111. Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies. The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London, 1989), pp. 1-2. For critical comments see: Karl Schlögel, "'Spatiale Atrophie'. Das Verschwinden des Raumes', in: Schlögel, *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit. Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik* (Munich and Vienna, 2003), pp. 36-47.

a) Consequences of the Abandonment of the Belief in the Authority of the Chronology of the Old Testament

Not just historiographers but also statisticians of the eighteenth century continued to apply Biblical mythology as the descriptive frame for their narratives. Engelbert Kaempfer, who provided the standard statistical description of Japan for the entire century, used the story of the Babylonian Tower in his explanation of the history of human settlement in continental as well insular East Asia, thereby tying Japanese history to the Biblical roots of universal human history.⁸¹ Martino Martini proceeded in the same manner in his history of China, published in 1658, when he placed Fo-Hi, whom he regarded as the first Chinese ruler, closely in time to Noah, thereby integrating both into the scheme of Biblical chronology.⁸² When Kaempfer described the differences between the Chinese and the Japanese languages, he reached the conclusion that they had completely different structures, although both were using the same basic system of writing. As, according to the myth of the Babylonian Tower, the divinely willed diversity of languages had been the main cause of human migration, Kaempfer postulated that the people ultimately settling in Japan had brought their language from Babylon. Consequently, he opined that the Japanese could not be an offspring from the Chinese, as older, mainly Jesuit literature on Japan had claimed, but ought to have left Babylon as a distinct group of their own. Moreover, as they had had the largest distance to cover from Babylon to their new homes, they ought to have been among the first to depart. Turning explicitly against “most geographers”,⁸³ Kaempfer insisted that the Japanese had always formed a group of their own and had not even passed through China, but through Siberia on their way to Japan. Moreover, in his view, the Japanese had acquired their own specific habits of “eating, drinking, sleeping, dressing, hair-cutting, saluting, sitting and other civil habits” (Essen, Trinken, Schlafen, Kleidung,

⁸¹ Not considered in: Arno Borst, *Der Turmbau von Babel. Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Völker*, 4 vols (Stuttgart, 1957-1963) [reprint (Munich, 1995)].

⁸² Martino Martini, *Sinicae historiae decas prima* (Munich, 1658), pp. 3, 11. Likewise: Andreas Müller, ‘De monumento Sinico commentarius novensilis’, in: Müller, *Opuscula nonnulla Orientalia* (Frankfurt on the Viadra, 1695), separate pag., section III, pp. 1-63. Müller, *Besser Unterricht von der Sineser Schrift und Druck* (Berlin, 1680). Müller, *Unschuld gegen die heftige Beschuldigungen die in Herrn Elias Grebnitzen Professoris und der Theologischen Facultät Senioris auff der Churfürstlich Brandenburgischen Universitet zu Fracfurt an der Oder so genannten Verthädigung enthalten seyn* (Stettin, 1683). ‘Catalogus librorum Sinicorum Andrae Mülleri Greiffenhagii’, in: *Monatliche Unterredung einiger guter Freunde von allerhand Büchern*, edited by Wilhelm Ernst Tentzel 9 (1697), pp. 182-193. On Müller see: Eva Susanne Kraft, ‘Frühe chinesische Studien in Berlin’, in: *Medizinhistorisches Jahrbuch* 11 (1976), pp. 92-128, esp. pp. 92, 97-107. Donald Frederick Lach, ‘The Chinese Studies of Andreas Müller’, in: *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 60 (1940), pp. 568-573.

⁸³ Engelbert Kaempfer, *Heutiges Japan*, edited by Wolfgang Michel and Barend J. Terwiel (Kaempfer, Werke, vol. 1) (Munich, 2001), p. 97. By implication, the criticism seems to have been directed against the statistical description of the “Kingdom of Japan” by seventeenth-century geographer Bernhard Varenius, who had mainly relied on sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Jesuit missionary reports, but had not himself visited Japan. See: Bernhard Varen, *Descriptio regni Japoniae* (Amsterdam, 1649) [German version, edited by Horst Hammitzsch and Martin Schwind (Darmstadt, 1974)].

Haarscheren, Grüßen, Sitzen und anderen bürgerlichen Gebräuchen) as well as their own „mindset“ (Gemütsart), Kaempfer maintained.⁸⁴ Along with their specific “mindset”, he believed, came their distinct statehood, which Kaempfer classed as an “Empire” (Reich), like China, thus using the Biblical migration myth in defence of the legitimacy of the sovereignty of the Japanese and other states. Kaempfer thus earmarked sovereignty in terms of language, normative habits and psychic disposition and, in doing so, operated within contemporary climate theory.⁸⁵ He did not call into question the evidential value of the Old Testament as a source for what he took to be facts of the past. Kaempfer’s interpretation of the Old Testament thus offered an explanation for the dissolution of the divinely willed unity of humankind into its diversity, with the history of Japan serving as a case. The explanation drew on the theological dogma that the Old Testament was a revelation of truth, while turning that dogma against Jesuit theology, to which Kaempfer as a Protestant was not well inclined.⁸⁶

Universal historian Samuel Schuckford followed Kaempfer in 1738, when he commented on the age of Chinese culture. He described Chinese characters as a general system of writing used for various languages and observed that this writing system had come into use for a variety of structurally dissimilar and historically unconnected languages. Schuckford referred to the legend, according to which Fo-hi was identical with Noah, and connected China with the Biblical migration myth.⁸⁷ At the same time, another author ascribed to Fo-Hi the invention of the Chinese characters and repeated that the script was applicable to both Chinese and Japanese, even though both languages were unrelated.⁸⁸ Kaempfer’s anti-Jesuitische interpretation of Chinese-Japanese cultural relations found

⁸⁴ Engelbert Kaempfer, *Geschichte und Beschreibung von Japan*, edited by Christian Wilhelm Dohm, chap. I, part 6, vol. 1 (Lemgo, 1779), p. 101 [reprint, edited by Hanno Beck (Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte der Geographie und der Reisen, 2) (Stuttgart, 1964)]. Similarly in Kaempfer, ‘Von dem Ursprung der Einwohner’, in: Kaempfer, *Japan* (note 83), pp. 67-78. With regard to language and literature, differences between China and Japan had already been emphasised by: Caspar Schmalkalden, *Die wundersamen Reisen des Caspar Schmalkalden nach West- und Ostindien. 1642 – 1652*, edited by Wolfgang Joost (Weinheim, 1983), p. 152 [entry in Schmalkalden’s diary for 22 June 1650].

⁸⁵ David Hume, ‘Of National Characters’, in: Hume, *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, edited by Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose, vol. 1 (London, 1882), pp. 244-258 [reprint (Aalen, 1964); first published (Edinburgh, 1741); third edn (London, 1748); expanded edn, edited by Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1987)]. On the concept of “national characters” in the eighteenth century see: Franz Karl Stanzel, ‘Schemata und Klischees der Völkerbeschreibung in David Hume’s Essay “Of National Characters”’, in: Paul Gerhard Buchloh, Inge Leimberg and Herbert Rauter, eds, *Studien zur englischen und amerikanischen Literatur. Festschrift für Helmut Papajewski* (Kieler Beiträge zur Anglistik und Amerikanistik, 10) (Neumünster, 1974), pp. 363-383. Stanzel, *Europäer* (Heidelberg, 1997), pp. 28-32 [second edn (Heidelberg, 1998)]. Stanzel, ‘Zur literarischen Imagologie’, in: Stanzel, ed., *Europäischer Völkering* (Heidelberg, 1999), pp. 22-23. From antiquity, climate theory had formulated the expectation that the climate and the fauna of an area can shape the character of a human being.

⁸⁶ He did so in accordance with the theologically well-founded theory that all humans are divinely created. The theory was still argued at length by: Matthew Hale, *The Primitive Origination of Mankind*, section IV, chap. 1, chap. 6 (London, 1677), pp. 299-300, 351-358 [German edn, edited by Heinrich Schmettau (Breslau and Leipzig, 1685)].

⁸⁷ Samuel Schuckford, *Histoire du monde sacrée et profane*, vol. 1 (Leiden, 1738), pp. 100, 239-241.

⁸⁸ *Histoire et Mémoires de l’Académie des Inscriptions* 6 (1724), pp. 623-624.

some acceptance during the first half of the eighteenth century.⁸⁹

At the end of the same century, after Emperor Joseph II had dissolved the Jesuit order, however, the Jesuit interpretation of Japan as a cultural secundogeniture of China found new popularity within pseudo-Enlightened criticism. Göttingen philosopher Christoph Meiners⁹⁰ would no longer trust myths as sources of knowledge about the past. He went to Jesuit missionary reports about Japan in support of his position that Japanese culture was a vulgarised derivation from Chinese culture, in 1796 subjected travel reports on Asia known to him to a scathing criticism aimed at determining the causes of the “productivity and lack of productivity” (Fruchtbarkeit und Unfruchtbarkeit) of the soil and of “the previous and current condition of the major countries in Asia” (des vormahligen und gegenwärtigen Zustand[s] der vornehmsten Länder in Asien) and included Japan into his criticism.⁹¹ Meiners used Kaempfer’s statistical description together with the more recent travel report by the physician Carl Peter Thunberg, who had been in Japan from 1775 to 1776.⁹² Meiners, who spent most of his life at Göttingen, would rank Kaempfer and Thunberg as “the two greatest natural scientists who have ever visited Asia” (zwey der größten Naturforscher, die jemals nach Asien gekommen sind).⁹³ Yet, at the same time, he censured both for “not having noticed anything else of Japan than what they could see on their way from Nangasacki to Jedo on horseback or in their palanquins” (von Japan weiter nichts bemerkt, als was sie auf dem grossen Wege von Nangasacki nach Jedo von ihrem Pferde oder aus ihrer Sänfte sehen konnten).⁹⁴ Because, Meiners thought, Japan had been a country closed to them, their descriptions were exaggerated and, by consequence,

⁸⁹ For details see: Friedrich Vollhardt, ‘Engelbert Kaempfers (1651 – 1716) Beschreibung seiner Japanreise und ihre Wirkung im 18. Jahrhundert’, in: Xenia von Ertzdorff-Kupffer and Gerhard Giesemann, eds, *Erkundung und Beschreibung der Welt* (Chloe, 34) (Amsterdam and New York, 2003), pp. 521-540.

⁹⁰ On Meiners see: Martin Gierl, ‘Christoph Meiners, Geschichte der Menschheit und Göttinger Universitätsgeschichte’, in: *Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen in Göttingen um 1800* (Göttingen, 2008), pp. 419-433. Alexander Ihle, *Christoph Meiners und die Völkerkunde* (Vorarbeiten zur Geschichte der Göttinger Universität und Bibliothek, 9) (Göttingen, 1931). Friedrich Lotter, ‘Christoph Meiners und die Lehre von der unterschiedlichen Wertigkeit der Menschenrassen’, in: Hartmut Boockmann and Hermann Wellenreuter, eds, *Geschichtswissenschaft in Göttingen* (Göttinger Universitätschriften, Serie A, Bd 2) (Göttingen, 1987), pp. 30-75. Melo Araújo, *Weltgeschichte* (note 18), pp. 133-138.

⁹¹ Christoph Meiners, ‘Ueber die Fruchtbarkeit oder Unfruchtbarkeit, den vormahligen und gegenwärtigen Zustand von Japan’, in: Meiners, *Betrachtungen über die Fruchtbarkeit oder Unfruchtbarkeit, über den vormahligen und gegenwärtigen Zustand der vornehmsten Länder in Asien*, vol. 2 (Lübeck and Leipzig, 1796), pp. 398-425.

⁹² Carl Peter Thunberg, *Reise durch einen Teil von Europa, Afrika und Asien, hauptsächlich in Japan in den Jahren 1770 – 1779*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1794), part I, pp. 48-56, part II, pp. 6-11, 18. [reprint (Heidelberg, 1994); first published (Uppsala, 1791), vol. 3, pp. 157-158, vol. 4, pp. 1-6; French version, edited by L. Langlès (Paris, 1796); reprints (Hildesheim and New York, 1994-1998); reprint of the third edn (London, 1795-1796), edited by Timon Screech, *Japan Extolled and Decried. Carl Peter Thunberg and the Shogun’s Realm. 1775 – 1796* (London, 2005)]. On Thunberg’s report see: Carl Jung, *Kaross und Kimono. „Hottentotten“ und Japaner im Spiegel des Reiseberichts von Carl Peter Thunberg* (Beiträge zur Kolonial.- und Überseegegeschichte, 85) (Stuttgart, 2002), pp. 67-94

⁹³ Meiners, ‘Fruchtbarkeit’ (note 91), pp. 398-399.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

unreliable.⁹⁵ In Meiners's judgment, raw materials from Japan, such as copper and manufactured products such as steel, laquerware, cloth, pottery and paper, could not have the overwhelming quality, which Kaempfer and Thunberg had ascribed to them.⁹⁶ If that were the case, these products ought to have been disseminated all over Asia, at the very minimum. Yet, Japanese vessels had a "weak structure" (leicht gebaut) and, therefore, appeared to be unsuited for overseas trade. There was, in Meiners's view, a complete lack of interest in competitive trade about products, and he regarded such interest as the main precondition for economic and technological improvement. He also detected a lack of beaux-arts and noted lightly built houses due to earthquakes.⁹⁷ Because, he thought, the Japanese were incapable of providing "proper calendars" (richtigen Calender), they displayed "the limited gifts of mind that they share with peoples of the same origin" (die beschränkten Geistesanlagen, die den Japanern mit den Völkern gleichen Ursprungs gemein sind).⁹⁸ Kaempfer's positive description of Japan met with staunch rejection at late English Enlightenment Göttingen.

Meiners stood under the impact not just of free trade theories of the Scottish Enlightenment⁹⁹ but also of theorists of culture, who were rearranging empirically observable cultural diversity into a temporal sequence apparently manifesting some "progress" that seemed to be specific to Europe.¹⁰⁰ However, Meiners took a step beyond his precursors in that he enriched his fantasies about some "step ladder" (Stufenleiter) of humankind with constructs, which he had learned from then popular comparative anatomy and even employed in service to the justification of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade.¹⁰¹ In addition, he described Japan as a closed country with an allegedly "despotic constitution"

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 413.

⁹⁶ Likewise: François Caron, *Beschrijvinghe van het machtigh Coninckrijck Japan* (Amsterdam, 1645) [fruther edn (Amsterdam, 1661); German version: Caron and Jodocus Schouten, *Wahrhaftige Beschreibung zweyer mächtigen Königreiche, Jappan und Siam* (Nuremberg, 1663); further German edn (Nuremberg, 1669; 1672); excerpt in: Peter Kapitza, *Japan in Europa*, vol. 1 (Munich, 1990), p. 560; partly newly edited by Detlev Haberland, *Beschreibung des mächtigen Königreichs Japan* (Fremde Kulturen in alten Berichten, 10) (Stuttgart, 2000)]. Varenius, *Descriptio* (note 83), p. 183, which Meiners did not use.

⁹⁷ Meiners, 'Fruchtbarkeit' (note 91), p. 416.

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 417-418.

⁹⁹ Annette Meyer, *Von der Wahrheit zur Wahrscheinlichkeit. Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen in der schottischen und deutschen Aufklärung* (Hallesche Beiträge zur Europäischen Aufklärung, 36) (Berlin and New York, 2008), pp. 84-86.

¹⁰⁰ Iselin, *Geschichte* (note 58). Ferguson, *Essay* (note 58), pp. 81-82: "From one to the other extremity of America; from Kamschatka westward to the river Oby, and from the Northern sea, over that length of country, to the confines of China, of India and Persia; from the Caspian to the Red Sea, with little exception, and from thence westward over the inland continent and the western shores of Africa; we every where meet with nations on whom we bestow appellations of barbarous [to whom property is "a principal object of care and desire"] and savage ["who is not yet acquainted with property"]. Johann Gottlieb Steeb, *Versuch einer allgemeinen Beschreibung von dem Zustand der ungesitteten und gesitteten Völker nach ihrer moralischen und physicalischen Beschaffenheit* (Karlsruhe, 1766) pp. 13-68. On Iselin see: Peter Hanns Reill, *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975), pp. 65-69. Schiller, 'Was' (note 71), pp. 364, 367.

¹⁰¹ Christoph Meiners, 'Ueber die Natur der afrikanischen Neger und die davon abhängende Befreyung oder Einschränkung der Schwarzen', in: *Göttingisches Historisches Magazin* 6 (1790), pp. 385-456 [reprint, edited by

(despotischen Verfassung), refusing to trade with the rest of the world and therefore without the possibility of having high productivity and being wealthy. By consequence, Kaempfer as well as Thunberg had been seriously mistaken in prematurely generalising specific observations: “It is thoroughly impossible that, given such a despotic constitution and administration as Japan has, in view of so tremendously high taxes as are due in Japan, with such a serious poverty of farmers, such a lack of animal husbandry and foreign trade, lastly of such numbers of beggars, pilgrims, hermits and further non-working classes of humans, of which Kaempfer and Thunberg are reporting, Japan as a whole should be so well cultivated and densely inhabited as some of those regions appear to be through which the Dutch emissaries passed annually on their way to Edo.” (Es ist durchaus unmöglich, daß bey einer solchen despotischen Verfassung und Verwaltung als die Japanische ist, bey so grossen Abgaben, als in Japan entrichtet werden müssen, bey einer solchen Armuth des Landmannes, einem solchen Mangel an Viehzucht und auswärtiger Handlung, endlich einer solchen Menge an Bettlern, Wallfahrtern, Einsiedlern und andern nicht arbeitenden Menschenklassen, dergleichen selbst Kämpfer und Thunberg schildern, ganz Japan so gut cultiviert und so stark bewohnt sey, als manche derjenigen Gegenden, durch welche die jährlich nach Jedo reisenden holländischen Gesandten kommen.)¹⁰²

Meiners was one of the first to give expression to those heterostereotypes, which were to achieve wide currency among European visitors to Japan, such as the British envoy Rutherford Alcock¹⁰³ around the middle of the nineteenth century and which continued up until the Nazi period.¹⁰⁴ Meiners, who, like Samuel Thomas Soemmerring would place Africans at the lowest step of his “step ladder of humankind” (Stufe des Menschengeschlechts),¹⁰⁵ at the same time was an early evolutionist, claiming to be able to order “human races”¹⁰⁶ into an evolutionary paradigm. In this

Frank Schäfer (Hanover, 1997); second edn of the reprint (Hanover, 1998); third edn of the reprint (Hanover, 2000)]. Meiners, ‘Über den Haar- und Bartwuchs der hässlichen und dunkelfarbigen Völker’, in: *Neues Göttingisches historisches Magazin* 1 (1792), pp. 484-508. Samuel Thomas Soemmerring, *Über die körperliche Verschiedenheit des Mohren vom Europäer* (Mainz, 1784) [second edn (Mainz, 1785); newly edited in: Soemmerring, *Anthropologie. Über die körperliche Verschiedenheit des Negers vom Europäer*, edited by Sigrid Oehler-Klein (Soemmerring, Werke, vol. 15) (Stuttgart, 1998)]. On Soemmerring see: Sigrid Oehler-Klein, ‘Der “Mohr” auf der “niedrigeren Staffel am Throne der Menschheit”?. Georg Forsters Rezeption der Anthropologie Soemmerrings’, in: *Georg-Forster-Studien* 3 (1999), pp. 119-166, at pp. 123, 132, 143-146. Gunter Mann and Franz Dumont, eds, *Samuel Thomas Soemmerring und die Gelehrten der Goethezeit* (Soemmerring-Forschungen, 1) (Stuttgart and New York, 1985). Manfred Wenzel, ed., *Samuel Thomas Soemmerring in Kassel (1779 – 1784)* (Stuttgart, Jena and New York, 1994).

¹⁰² Meiners, ‘Fruchtbarkeit’ (note 91), pp. 408-409.

¹⁰³ Rutherford Alcock, ‘Extracts from the Narrative of a Journey Through the Interior of Japan’, in: *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* (1861), pp. 201-202. Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon*, vol. 1 (London, 1863), pp. 282-283 [reprint (New York, 1969)].

¹⁰⁴ For example see: Ernst Schultze, *Die Weisse und die Gelbe Gefahr. Japans gewaltsame Erschließung und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung* (Stuttgart, 1935). Schultze, *Japan als Weltindustriemacht*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1935), pp. 61-66.

¹⁰⁵ Meiners, ‘Natur’ (note 101).

¹⁰⁶ Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, *De generis humani varietate nativa*, third edn (Göttingen, 1795) [first published

paradigm, Africans appeared to occupy a position closest to the animal world.¹⁰⁷ The inhabitants of East Asia, in Meiners's historical world picture, seemed to exist in proximity to Africans. For, he insisted, Asian "despotism" was regularly punishing even the "smallest infringements" (die kleinsten Vergehen) and was restricting civil "life" unreasonably, whereby he appears to have drawn on Montesquieu,¹⁰⁸ and he maintained that there was some single East Asian "race", of which the inhabitants of Japan were a part: "Even though Kaempfer struggled hard to derive the Japanese from the remotest part of western Asia and to document their complete diversity from the Chinese, the colour, physical shape and other characteristics of the Japanese confirm that they, like all indigenous inhabitants of southern Asian countries, have sprung from East Asia." (So sehr Kämpfer sich auch bemühte, die Japanesen aus dem fernsten westlichen Asien abzuleiten, und ihre gänzliche Verschiedenheit von den Chinesen darzuthun, so zeigen doch die Farbe, Bildung und übrigen Beschaffenheiten der Japanesen, daß sie, wie alle ursprünglichen Bewohner der südlichen Asiatischen Länder aus dem östlichen Asien entsprossen sind.)¹⁰⁹

With these speculative claims, rejecting Kaempfers cultural relativism,¹¹⁰ Meiners paved the way towards the doctrine of racism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, subordinating culture to the construed primacy of nature. In doing so, Meiners became one of the precursors of those Occidental theorists who, like Karl Haushofer early in the twentieth century, postulated some unity of East Asia seemingly derived from the dictates of nature. This alleged dictate of race, Haushofer expected, would result in "racial conflicts" in those areas around the Pacific in which migration out from China and Japan was taking place at that time.¹¹¹

However, unlike Haushofer, Meiners did not directly attack the natural right of residence late in the eighteenth century, thus not calling into question that humans had the right to reside at their inherited sites. By contrast, during the later nineteenth century, such tolerant attitudes were no longer in place. For one, Charles Wentworth Dilke, radical liberal Member of the British Parliament, upon return

(Göttingen, 1776); German version, edited by Robert Bernasconi (Leipzig, 1798). Reprint of this edn (Bristol, 2001)].

¹⁰⁷ Soemmering, *Verschiedenheit* (note 101). Christoph Meiners, *Untersuchungen über die Verschiedenheiten der Menschennaturen in Asien und den Südländern, in den ostindischen und Südseeinseln nebst einer historischen Vergleichung*, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, 1815), pp. 110-138. Meiners, 'Historische Bemerkungen über die sogenannten wilden oder über Jäger- und Fischer-Völker', in: *Göttingisches historisches Magazin* 6 (1790), pp. 273-311.

¹⁰⁸ Meiners, 'Fruchtbarkeit' (note 91), pp. 420-421. This passage appears to have been based on: Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, *L'esprit des lois*, book XVII, chap. 6 [(1748); various edns].

¹⁰⁹ Meiners, 'Fruchtbarkeit' (note 91), p. 418.

¹¹⁰ On the superiority discourse see: Ann Thomson, *Barbary and Enlightenment. European Attitudes Towards the Maghreb in the Eighteenth Century* (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, 2) (Leiden, 1987).

¹¹¹ Karl Haushofer, *Dai Nihon. Betrachtungen über Groß-Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung und Zukunft* (Berlin, 1913), p. 301. On Haushofer see: Christian Wilhelm Spang, *Karl Haushofer und Japan. Die Rezeption seiner geopolitischen Theorien in der deutschen und japanischen Politik* (Monographien aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien, 52) (Munich, 2013).

from a journey across British dependencies in 1866 and 1867, arrived at the verdict that “progress to universal dominion of the English people” through settlement colonisation was unstoppable and the “the dearer are, on the whole, likely to destroy the cheaper peoples, and that Saxondom will rise triumphant”.¹¹² He predicted: “Chili, La Plata, and Peru must eventually become English. The Red Indian race that now occupies those countries cannot stand against our colonists and the future of the table lands of Africa and that of Japan and of China is as clear.”¹¹³ The triumph of “Saxondom” “is not merely an English question – its continuance is essential to the freedom of mankind”.¹¹⁴ Dilke thus not only envisaged future settlement colonisation but also legitimised genocide as a consequence of colonisation. Population groups falling victim to genocidal colonisation had, in Dilke’s perception not only no right to live at their inherited residences but had neither a past nor a future.

During the 1760s and 1770s, emerging from the criticism of theological dogmata, a process took off, through which philosophers, historians and scientists subjected the empirically observable diversity of humankind to a temporal order. The postulate that the unity of humankind was manifest as universally valid legal norms, widely current throughout most of the eighteenth century, became submerged by the particularist expectation that cultural, economic and political change had occurred during the past in the form of the “progress” but that only Europeans and European settlers in overseas colonial dependencies had participated in that “progress”. In denying the capability of participating in change to most of the human population, all those philosophers and historians excluded these groups from their historiographical world picture and ascribed to them some lack of history in conjunction with continuous adherence to the apparent state of nature. It is impossible to isolate the particularism of nineteenth-century historiography of international relations from this historiographical world picture.

b) Competition between the Universal Historiography of International Relations and National Historiographies

How could the contradiction arise during the nineteenth century between, on the one side, the process of increasing intensification of international relations at the global level and, on the other, the gradual narrowing of the historiographic focus on European and North American states? The answer emerges against the backdrop of ideologies of nationalism and results from the analysis of some core narratives of the history of international relations published during that century.

¹¹² Charles Wentworth Dilke, *Greater Britain. A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries during 1866 and 1867*, vol. 2 (London, 1868), p. 405.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 406.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 407.

Ideologies of nationalism existed from the late eighteenth century and constituted “nations” as self-governing groups not subject to external rule.¹¹⁵ However, at that time, these ideologies found their way neither into universal historiography nor into other sorts of texts relevant to the history of international relations. Arnold Herrman Ludwig Heeren launched a different and novel orientation. In line with eighteenth-century methodology, Heeren was convinced that the historiography of the states system was not to be equated with the “historiography of individual states” (keineswegs die Geschichte der einzelnen Staaten), but should be written as “the historiography of relations among one another” (die Geschichte ihrer Verhältnisse gegen einander). Yet he did not position his narrative within universal historiography but within the framework of the “European states system and its colonies from the discovery of East and West India to the Establishment of the French Imperial Throne” (Europäischen Staaten-Systems und seiner Colonien von der Entdeckung beyder Indien bis zur Errichtung des Französischen Kayserthrons).¹¹⁶ Heeren thus already categorised international relations as the inter-statal interactions which had been taking place mainly in Europe and having effects that emerged from Europe onto the rest of the world through the expansion of colonial rule. He defended the temporal and spatial narrowing of his focus with the argument that Europe had accomplished “an significance in world historical terms within this period” (in diesem Zeitraum eine universalhistorische Wichtigkeit), “as had never happened before” (wie es dieselbe noch nie vorher gehabt hatte). Compared to Europe, Heeren could not make out “a single indigenous state of general significance” (keinen einzigen einheimischen Staat von allgemeiner Wichtigkeit) in Africa and Asia, “and among the three great empires of Asia, the Persian under the Sophis, the India under the Mughals and the Chinese, only the latter has continued, even though under an alien dynasty” (und von den drey großen Reichen Asiens, dem Persischen unter den Sophis, dem Indischen unter den Moguls, und dem Chinesischen erhielt sich nur das letztere, wiewohl auch nur unter einer fremden Dynastie).¹¹⁷ Heeren thus no longer looked at the stability of states but at the transformations under continuing endogenous rule, derived from what was, in his view, an alien group of rulers, a lack of “significance” of the state in question and, in doing so, affiliated himself with ideologies of nationalism. In Heeren’s historiographical world picture, states no longer stood under the rule of universal natural law. By contrast, he took for granted that law among states was established through positive legislative action or through customary practice and, in turn, “generating itself gradually, as a product of advancing culture, as international law not just drawn on explicit agreements but also on tacit conventions, making obligatory the observation of certain maxims, in peace as well as specifically also in war and was, though often violated, nevertheless

¹¹⁵ For example see: Friedrich Carl von Moser, *Von dem Deutschen National-Geist* (Frankfurt, 1765), pp. 5-6 [reprint (Selb, 1976)].

¹¹⁶ Heeren, *Handbuch* (note 26), pp. 5-6.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

most beneficial.” (erzeugte sich allmählig, als Frucht der fortschreitenden Cultur, ein Völkerrecht, das, nicht bloß auf ausdrücklichen Verträgen, sondern auch auf stillschweigenden Conventionen beruhend, die Beobachtung gewisser Maximen, sowohl im Frieden als auch besonders im Kriege, zur Pflicht machte, und, wenn auch oft verletzt, doch höchst wohlthätig wurde).¹¹⁸ In Heeren’s conception, then, international law was in existence solely as a system of positive and customary norms and resulted from human action exclusively. Heeren’s system of states appeared to rest on three “pillars” (Stützen), the “sanctity of recognised legal possessions” (Heiligkeit des anerkannt rechtmäßigen Besitzstandes),¹¹⁹ “the preservation of the so-called balance of political power” (die Erhaltung des sogenannten politischen Gleichgewichts)¹²⁰ and the “emergence of sea powers” (Entstehung von Seemächten).¹²¹ However, these “pillars” were not to result from the dictates of nature but from human will and, as a result, were changeable.

The historiographical work of Johann Peter Friedrich Ancillon, educator of the Prussian heir to the throne and subsequent King Frederick IV, featured a similar proximity to ideologies of nationalism, even though Ancillon, like Heeren, continued to operate within the legacy of eighteenth-century methodology. When he published a collection of essays simultaneously in Paris and Berlin in 1801, he supplemented a survey on theories of the balance of power to the text, thereby taking up what had been a fashionable topic in the century that had just ended.¹²² Correspondingly conventional was the title of the entire collection: *Considérations générales sur l’histoire. Ou Introduction à l’histoire des révolutions du système politique d’Europe pendant les trois derniers siècles*.¹²³ The title was not to announce a description of the revolutionary changes in France in the sense that later Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann would attach to his *Geschichte der französischen Revolution*,¹²⁴ but Ancillon

¹¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 11-12.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 12.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 14. This aspect of systemic international relations reflected Heeren’s strong interest in the history of the UK. See: Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren, ‘Versuch einer historischen Entwicklung der Entstehung und des Wachstums des Britischen Colonial-Interesses [1801]’, in: Heeren, *Historische Werke*, vol. 1 (Göttingen, 1821), pp. 113-343 [reprint (Frankfurt, 1987)].

¹²² For a survey see: Harald Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Völkerrechts in Krieg und Frieden* (Tübingen, 2013), pp. 245-252.

¹²³ Johann Peter Friedrich Ancillon, *Nécessité d’une garantie extérieure de l’existence et des droits des états. Pénence générale des peuples de l’Europe à créer un système d’équilibre. Plan et point de vue de cet ouvrage*, in: ders., *Considérations générales sur l’histoire. Ou Introduction à l’histoire des révolutions du système politique de l’Europe pendant les trois derniers siècles* (Berlin and Paris, 1801), pp. 71-99.

¹²⁴ Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, *Geschichte der französischen Revolution bis auf die Stiftung der Republik* (Leipzig, 1845), p. 13. For the previous terminology see: Gottfried Achenwall, *Vorbereitung zur Staatswissenschaft der heutigen europäischen Reiche und Staaten* (Göttingen, 1748), p. 10. Hume, ‘Characters’ (note 85), p. 244. Johann Stephan Pütter, *Grundriß der Staats-Veränderungen des Teutschen Reiches*, second edn (Göttingen, 1755 [first published (Göttingen, 1752)]. Steeb, *Versuch* (note 100), pp. 100-101, 187-190. Will, ‘Einleitung’ (note 36, edn by Blanke and Fleischer), p. 320. Gatterer, ‘Plan’ (note 33), pp. 62-63. Gatterer, *Einleitung* (note 34), part I, p. 1. Schlözer, *Vorstellung* (note 17), pp. 1, 107. Ferdinand Friedrich von Nicolai, *Betrachtungen über die vorzüglichsten Gegenstände einer zur Bildung angehender Officiers anzuordnenden Kriegsschule* [Stuttgart: Württembergische Landesbibliothek, Cod. Milit. 2° 33 (1770), fol. 235’], edited by Daniel

wished to treat, with confinement to Europe, state actions the major occurrences of past international relations that eighteenth-century terminology would encapsulate in the word revolution.¹²⁵ Ancillon used the term revolution not with regard to linear processes of fundamental change, as during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,¹²⁶ but remained within conventional usage of applying the term to circular movements¹²⁷ or important occurrences affecting governments of states but not state structures.¹²⁸ However, under his conventional title, Ancillon offered a new evaluation of balance-of-power politics. He started out with the existing postulate that European “nations” should be credited with a long-term existence since Antiquity. However, Ancillon observed that these “nations” had been isolated from one another in Antiquity,¹²⁹ had acted without “concert” (Konzert) and, failing to establish such cooperation, had permitted the Macedon king Alexander as well as subsequently the Romans to make extensive conquests. Ancillon would not acknowledge any changes in this practice during the Middle Ages.¹³⁰ From the fifteenth century, however, in Europe, and only there, a system of the balance of power had been formed among more closely interrelated states mutually guaranteeing their independence vis-à-vis would-be conquerors.¹³¹ Since then, Ancillon believed, there had been a pluralism of states with different constitutions and laws and that

Hohrath, in: *Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen* 41 (1992), pp. 115-141. Gottlob David Hartmann, ‘Ueber das Ideal einer Geschichte’, in: *Der Teutsche Merkur* 6 (1774), pp. 195-213 [edited in: Hartmann, *Nachgelassene Schriften*, edited by Christian Jakob Wagenseil (Gotha, 1779), pp. 245-270; also edited in: Horst Walter Blanke and Dirk Fleischer, eds, *Theoretiker der deutschen Aufklärungshistorie*, vol. 1 (Fundamenta historica, vol. 1) (Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 688-697, at p. 689]. Claude François Xavier Millot, *Universalhistorie alter, mittlerer und neuer Zeiten*, German version, edited by Wilhelm Ernst Christiani, Part 9 (Leipzig, 1787) [first published (Paris, 1772-1773); English version (London, 1779)]. Johann Georg Wiggers, ‘Versuch, die verschiedenen Pflichten eines Geschichtsschreibers aus einem Grundsatz herzuleiten’, in: Wiggers, *Vermischte Aufsätze* (Leipzig, 1784), pp. 1-73 [also edited in: Blanke as above), pp. 429-452, at p. 451]. Ewald Graf von Hertzberg, ‘Mémoire sur les révolutions des états, externes, internes et religieuses [1786/87]’, in: *Mémoires de l’Académie Royale* (Berlin, 1791), pp. 665-673. Johann Friedrich Freiherr von und zu Mansbach, *Gedanken eines norwegischen Officiers über die Patriotischen Gedanken eines Dänen über stehende Heere, politisches Gleichgewicht und Staatsrevolution* (Copenhagen, 1794). Woldemar Friedrich von Schmettow, *Patriotische Gedanken eines Dänen über stehende Heere, politisches Gleichgewicht und Staatsrevolution*, second edn (Altona, 1792) [first published (Altona, 1792)], at p. 111, combined the usage of the conventional concept of revolution with the new concept of a radical overthrow. Schmettow, *Erläuternder Commentar zu den Patriotischen Gedanken* (Altona, 1793). By contrast, the new concept of revolution is on record already in: Edmund Burke, ‘Thoughts on French Affairs [1791]’, in: Burke, *The Works*, vol. 3 (London, 1903), pp. 347-393, at p. 358. Nicolaus [Niklas] Vogt, *Anzeige wie wir Geschichte behandeln, benutzen und darstellen werden bei Gelegenheit der ersten öffentlichen Prüfung der philosophischen Klasse* (Mainz, 1783), p. 3.

¹²⁵ The announced description, however, is not contained in the collection of essays and has been left unpublished.

¹²⁶ For comments see: Karl Griewank, *Der neuzeitliche Revolutionsbegriff* (Weimar, 1955) [second edn (Frankfurt, 1969); third edn (Hamburg, 1992)]. Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Historische Kriterien des neuzeitlichen Revolutionsbegriffs’, in: Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt, 1979), pp. 67-86.

¹²⁷ Johann Heinrich Zedler, *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon*, vol. 33 (Leipzig and Halle, 1742), col. 954-955, s. v. ‘Revolutio planetæ’. *Encyclopédie. Ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, vol. 14 (Neuchâtel, 1765), p.237, s. v. ‘Révolution’.

¹²⁸ See above, note 17, and the dictionary entries quoted in note 127.

¹²⁹ Ancillon anticipated an observation by Ranke (see above, note 74).

¹³⁰ Ancillon, *Nécessité* (note 123), p. 91.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

such pluralism was witness to the wealth of Europe.¹³² These states were forming a “great society” (la grande société), from which no state could leave except at the price of the loss of the guarantee of preservation of the rule of law.¹³³ The states of Europe had, according to Ancillon, entered this society on their way out from the state of nature. And it was only within this society that might was being guarded against might, action was being placed against response, order, harmony and tranquillity were being preserved and, *in fine*, a balance of power was being in existence.¹³⁴ Yet, Ancillon judged humans to be the worst enemies of tranquillity, most notably those living under “republican” constitutions. This, he thought, was so because a republican constitution would release agitation for the promotion of change. Aristocratic constitutions, he opined, were most peace-promoting, as they feared change, were based on the “sleep” (sommeil) of “nations” and were striving for the preservation of immobility. Ancillon pointed to urban aristocracies such as Berne and Venice as examples, which, though, he explicitly did not recommend for imitation. In doing so, he put on record his conviction that he was not thinking of tradition-oriented political communities as the prototypes of stable states.¹³⁵ Consequently, the expectation was naive in his view that a states system, drawn on the balance of power, could be stable in the long run. Instead, he recommended as his maxim for the conduct of politics that no one could for ever expect to live in tranquillity and that all states would be naturally inclined to expand like all living bodies..¹³⁶ In Ancillon’s theory, then, law was absent as a factor of international relations.

In this essay, Ancillon delved in the use of the biologicistic imagery of the model of the living body, when he described states as if they were products of nature.¹³⁷ Almost twenty-five years later, he returned to balance-of-power theory and intensified his criticism. In a text published in 1825, Ancillon, like other contemporary authors,¹³⁸ rode a straightforward attack against eighteenth-century balance-of-power theory. There had never been any balance of power, he stated, and never would there be one. Even within a state, there could not be a balance of powers. By contrast, there had always been the predominance of one power, which would sooner or later give way to another one. If ever a balance of power had existed, revolutions would never have occurred and only an absolute and unchangeable “tranquillity“ (repose / Ruhe) would have existed. In the world of politics, balance of power was just as impossible as balance of wealth and balance of

¹³² Ibid., p. 78.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 86.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 94.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 84-85.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 86.

¹³⁷ The model turned out to become standard in nineteenth-century state theory. Among many see: Friedrich Schmitthenner, *Grundlinien der Geschichte der Staatswissenschaften, der Ethnologie, des Naturrechtes und der Nationalökonomie*, second edn (Schmitthenner, Zwölf Bücher vom Staate, vol. 1) (Gießen, 1839), pp. 3-5 [first published (Gießen, 1830); third edn (Gießen, 1845); reprint of the third edn (Frankfurt, 1967)].

¹³⁸ Constance Bertolio, *Le nouvel équilibre politique à établir en Europe* (Paris, 1801).

influence in civil society. In the latter case, balance was not only impossible but also completely undesirable. Eighteenth-century balance-of-power theory, in Ancillon's making, was therefore absurd.¹³⁹

Ancillon's analyses are remarkable for their publication in 1801. Even then, that is, before Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nations* of 1807¹⁴⁰ and before the publication of the nationalist balance-of-power theory of the Scottish lawyer Henry Peter Lord Brougham and Vaux in 1803,¹⁴¹ Ancillon credited "nations" with emotions such as "pride" (*orgueil*)¹⁴² and turned them into agents of the apparently unstoppable change. Before 1806, Ancillon positioned the "great society" of European states against alleged advocates of the forced establishment of universal monarchy in Europe,¹⁴³ and he may have used this argument against Napoleon. The rest of the world was absent from Ancillon's essay, not even the goal of the expansion of European rule across the world. In Ancillon's historiographical world picture, change was noticeable only in international relations within Europe, where states had left the state of nature.¹⁴⁴ And only in Europe since the sixteenth century had "nations" been so closely become intertwined with one another that international relations had come into existence.

In his early published work, Ranke radicalised the eurocentric dynamism inherent in Ancillon's texts without quoting them explicitly. More than once, Ranke defended his focus on Europe, which Ancillon had left unjustified, and included the defence into general statements he prefixed to his lectures and monographs or appended to them like Shaw's epilogues for slow-witted readers.¹⁴⁵ Already in the preface to the first edition of his first published work, Ranke felt obliged to argue why he had limited the range of his narrative to the "Histories" (*Geschichten*) of the "Germanic and Romance nations" (*germanischen und romanischen Völker*) within the period from 1494 to 1514. He rejected the then common use of geographical denominators such as "Europe", claiming that reference to the continental name "Europe" would have obliged him to take into his narrative the Ottoman Turkish Empire that he had wanted to leave out, and insisting that "Latin Christendom"

¹³⁹ Johann Peter Friedrich Ancillon, *Ueber den Geist der Staatsverfassungen und deren Einfluss auf die Gesetzgebung* (Berlin, 1825), p. 322.

¹⁴⁰ Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 'Reden an die Deutsche Nation. Erste Rede [Berlin 1807]', in: Fichte, *Werke*, edited by Immanuel Hermann Fichte, vol. 7 (Berlin, 1846), pp. 264-279 [reprint (Berlin, 1971)].

¹⁴¹ Henry Peter Lord Brougham and Vaux, 'Balance of Power', in: Brougham and Vaux, *The Works*, vol. 8 (London, and Glasgow, 1857), pp. 1-50 [first published anonymously as a review of Charles François de Broglie, *Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe*, 3 vols (Paris, 1802), in: *Edinburgh Review* 1 (1803), pp. 345-381].

¹⁴² Ancillon, *Nécessité* (note 123), p. 84.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹⁴⁴ Likewise, though even more explicitly: Schmitthenner, *Grundlinien* (note 137), pp. 10-11.

¹⁴⁵ Ernst Schulin, *Die weltgeschichtliche Erfassung des Orients bei Hegel und Ranke* (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 2) (Göttingen, 1958), p. 240, contended, without evidence, that Ranke should have only rarely made general comments on methodology in his historiographical work.

was not an option as that phrase would have compelled him to include Slavonic “nations” he had wished to exclude. He had decided to confine his work to “purely Germanic” (rein germanische) nations as well as nations “of mixed Germanic-Romance descent” (germanisch-romanischer Abkunft), as only these groups had participated in change throughout history and had thence warranted inclusion into his account.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, like Ancillon and Heeren, he rigorously equated the “histories” of these “nations” with what he termed the “modern period” since the end of the fifteenth century. For Ranke already at that time, the world beyond the “Germanic-Romance nations” was to be removed from accounts of the past, at least as far as the “modern period” was concerned.

In the course of his later lectures and publications, Ranke intensified his exclusionism, as did other contemporary historiographers. China and South Asia had, in his perspective, no history that could be based on a verifiable chronology and, therefore, were not to be accepted as veritable historiographical “objects”. He classed the Ottomans as rulers unfit to implement change,¹⁴⁷ and

¹⁴⁶ Leopold von Ranke, ‘Vorrede der ersten Auflage [October 1824]’, in: Ranke, *Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1514* [1824], second edn (Ranke, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 33) (Leipzig, 1874), pp. V-VIII, at pp. V-VI.

¹⁴⁷ Leopold von Ranke, *Idee der Universalhistorie* [Ms. Berlin: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Ranke Papers, 38ID, c. 1831/1832], edited in: Ranke, *Vorlesungseinleitungen*, nr 5 (Ranke, *Aus Werk und Nachlass*, vol. 4, edited by Volker Dotterweich and Walter Peter Fuchs) (Munich, 1975), pp. 72-89, at p. 85: “Endlich können wir auch jenen Völkern, die noch heutzutage in einer Art von Naturzustand verharren und vermuten lassen, daß derselbe von Anfang so gewesen sei, daß sich der Zustand der Urwelt in ihnen konserviert habe, nur eine geringe Aufmerksamkeit widmen. Indien und Sina geben ein hohes Alter vor und haben eine weit ausgereifte Chronologie. Allen selbst die scharfsinnigsten Chronologen können aus derselben sich nicht herausfinden. Ihr Altertum ist fabelhaft. Ihr Zustand gehört mehr der Naturgeschichte [the text breaks off at this point]”. Ranke, *Osmanen* (note 21), pp. 82, 95. For Ranke’s exclusionism see: Iggers, *Geschichtswissenschaft* (note 15), p. 27. Treischke later took the same stance vis-à-vis Africa. See: Heinrich von Treitschke, *Die Gesellschaftswissenschaft*. Phil. Habilitationsschrift (University of Leipzig, 1859) [new edn (Halle, 1927); reprint of the new edn (Darmstadt, 1980)], p. 86: “Umgekehrt wagt wohl Niemand den heutigen französischen Absolutismus mit einer jener geschichtslosen Despotien im Innern Afrikas in Parallele zu stellen. Darin liegt: das Importieren fremder politischer Institutionen wird immer unnatürlicher, je vielseitiger steigender Cultur die Gesellschaft gestaltet.“ Likewise: Jacob Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, edited by Jacob Oeri [„Neues Schema“], new edn (Burckhardt, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 4) (Basle and Stuttgart, 1978), pp. 1-196, at p. 29: „Freilich sind die metaphysischen Anlagen und Schicksale der Völker durchaus verschieden. Gleich ausgeschieden mögen hier die Religionen der geringern Rassen, die der Negervölker usw., der Wilden und Halbwilden werden. Sie sind für die Primordien des Geistigen noch weniger maßgebend als der Negerstaat für die Anfänge des Staates überhaupt. Denn diese Völker sind von Anfang an die Beute einer ewigen Angst; ihre Religionen gewähren uns nicht einmal einem Maßstab für die Anfänge der Entbindung des Geistigen, weil der Geist dort überhaupt nie zu spontaner Entbindung bestimmt ist.“ Likewise: Jacob Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, edited by Johannes Wenzel (Leipzig, 1985), pp. 40-86: “II. Von den drei Potenzen [Staat, Religion, Kultur]”; pp. 49-65: “2. Die Religion”, at p. 50; newly edited from the extant manuscripts by Peter Felix Ganz, Burckhardt, *Über das Studium der Geschichte* (Munich, 1982), p. 263]. Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology* (New York and London, 1877) [first published (London, 1876); further edns (London, 1882; 1893); (New York 1897; 1901; 1906; 1910; 1912); reprints (Osnabrück, 1966); edited by Stanislav Andreski (London and Hamden, CT, 1969); (Westport, CT, 1975); edited by Jonathan H. Turner (New Brunswick, 2002)], edn of 1910, p. 265. On exclusionism in international legal thought see: Miloš Vec, ‘Inside/Outside(s). Conceptualizations, Criteria and Functions of a Dichotomy in Nineteenth-Century International Legal Doctrine’, in: Gunther Hellmann, Andreas K. Fahrmeir and Miloš Vec, eds, *The Transformation of Foreign Policy. Drawing and Managing Boundaries from Antiquity to the Present* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 51-73. As late as in 2004, Fried, *Schleier* (note 20), p. 20, when critically reviewing the

even if they did so, as the Turkish government on the occasion of its reforms in Serbia during the 1840s, they committed nothing but serious mistakes in his judgment, because, he thought, they lacked insight into the principles of change-promoting politics.¹⁴⁸ Consequently, Ranke concluded his description of Serbian nineteenth-century history with a hymn on the seeming monopoly on ability for change and change-promoting capability purportedly in possession of the “Germanic-Romance nations” he referred to as his “we”-group: “If we look into the cause of the internal disruption of the Ottoman Empire and its decay in general, it is because it is confronted with another infinitely superior world power. This world power could destroy it any moment. ... The Ottoman Empire has been overpowered by Christian mind that has penetrated it from all sides. If we say: the Christian mind, we understand by it not exclusively religion, but even the words culture and civilization would be imperfect. It is the genius of the Occident. It is the mind that transforms nations into well-ordered armies, designs roads, digs canals, covers the oceans with navies and turns them into their property, fills distant continents with colonies, reveals the secrets of nature through exact research, has controlled all fields of knowledge and renovated them with ever-refreshing labour, without ever losing sight of the eternal truth and enforces order and the within humankind despite the diversity of their passions. We see that mind engaged in tremendous progress. It has wrested America from the brutal forces of nature and uncivilised nations and transformed it thoroughly. On various paths, it is penetrating into distant parts of Asia, and even China barely locks itself up against it; it is spanning the coasts of Africa; it is becoming thr master of the world, unstopably and in many different ways.” (Untersuchen wir, worin das innere Zerwürfnis des osmanischen Reiches und sein Verfall im Allgemeinen seinen Grund hat, so ist es, weil es einer anderen Weltmacht gegenüber steht, die ihm unendlich überlegen ist. Diese Weltmacht könnte es zertrümmern im Augenblick. ... Das osmanische Reich ist vom christlichen Wesen übermannt und nach allen Richtungen durchdrungen. Sagen wir: das christliche Wesen, so verstehen wir darunter freilich nicht

criticisms of the comparative approach by Ranke and Burckhardt, had just this to say: “Das Vorurteil gegen die Relevanz des interkulturellen Vergleichs, rassistisch abgeseget, genoß als höchste Autorität; Ranke teilte es selbstverständlich und gab es an seine Schüler und diese an die ihren weiter: Er wollte die ‘Urgeschichte’ aus der Historie ausgeklammert wissen. ... Indes, daß die ‘Urgeschichte’ noch in uns stecken könnte, daß Schicht um Schicht dieser Urgeschichte noch unser gegenwärtiges Leben und mit ihm alle Historie bedingt und beeinflußt, daß der kulturelle ‘Fortschritt’, die zivilisatorischen Transformationen, denen die Gesellschaften unterlagen, die biologischen Erwerbungen der Vergangenheit voraussetzt, dieser Gedanke kam Ranke nicht in den Sinn. Das Vorurteil blieb, auch nachdem die Ethnologie sich gewandelt hatte.” The problem then, in Fried’s view, was the sheer ignorance of nineteenth-century European historiographers, not the methodological inaptitude of linking the remote European past with the current socio-cultural condition of population groups in Africa and elsewhere in the world. Fried, thus unimpressed by several generations of discussants of problems of method in cross-cultural comparative research, continued to postulate that purported findings among groups objectified as targets of ethnographical reporting can be equated with gleanings from records from early medieval Europe, as if alleged “peoples without history” and distant from “civilisational transformations”, had ever actually existed and as if no criticism at all had become vocal against the mixing of archaeological evidence with ethnographical reports.

¹⁴⁸ Leopold von Ranke, ‘Das Fürstenthum Serbien unter der Einwirkung der europäischen Mächte seit 1842’, in: Ranke, *Serbien und die Türkei*, second edn (ders., *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 44) (Leipzig 1879), pp. 373-519, at pp. 518-519.

ausschließend die Religion; auch mit den Worten: Cultur, Civilisation würde man es nur unvollkommen bezeichnen. Es ist der Genius des Occidents. Es ist der Geist, der die Völker zu geordneten Armeen umschafft, der die Straßen zieht, die Canäle gräbt, alle Meere mit Flotten bedeckt und in sein Eigenthum verwandelt, die entfernten Continente mit Colonieen erfüllt, der die Tiefen der Natur mit exacter Forschung ergründet und alle Gebiete des Wissens eingenommen und sie mit immer frischer Arbeit erneuert, ohne darum die ewige Wahrheit aus den Augen zu verlieren, der unter den Menschen trotz der Mannigfaltigkeit ihrer Leidenschaften Ordnung und Gesetz handhabt. In ungeheurem Fortschritt sehen wir diesen Geist begriffen. Er hat Amerika den rohen Kräften der Natur und unbildsamen Nationen abgewonnen und durchaus umgewandelt; auf verschiedenen Wegen dringt er in das entfernteste Asien vor, und kaum China verschließt sich ihm noch; er umspannt Afrika an allen Küsten; unaufhaltsam, vielgestaltig, bemeistert er sich der Welt.) Accordingly, Ranke identified “European world rule” (Weltherrschaft von Europa) as the main object of his universal historiography.¹⁴⁹

Ranke approved of this passage again in 1874 for the re-edition of his collected works. It represents a *locus classicus* for the linking of exclusionism with expansionism, that none of the propagandists for colonial expansion could have improved upon. Bits of colonialist ideologies were already enshrined in Ranke’s hymn on the “Germanic and Romance nations” before the government of the German Empire opted for a policy of colonial expansion. Ranke thus filled the reservoir for these ideologies with the narration of “histories”. As was revealed in the subsequent study by John Atkinson Hobson, these ideologies were not only elements of colonialist apologetics but also informed critical attitudes. Even Hobson took it to be a matter of fact that colonial rule should and could provoke what he perceived as material and moral progress. Hence, Hobson, like most of his contemporaries, assumed that the consciousness of change and the determination to promote change even at the expense of genocide were to be found solely among colonial rulers.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. See also: Ranke, *Die Universalgeschichte in ihrem allgemeinen und inneren Zusammenhang* [Ms. Berlin: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Ranke Papers, 1833], edited in: Ranke, *Vorlesungseinleitungen*, nr 8 (Ranke, *Aus Werk und Nachlass*, vol. 4, edited by Volker Dotterweich and Walter Peter Fuchs) (Munich, 1975), pp. 98-101.

¹⁵⁰ John Atkinson Hobson, ‘Imperialism and the Lower Races’, in: Hobson, *Imperialism. A Study* (London, 1902), pp. 235-304, at pp. 244-245, 294 [fourth edn (London, 1954); fifth edn (London, 1954); further edn (London, 1988)]. For comments see: Peter J. Cain, *Hobson and Imperialism* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 152-155, 223-229, 279-280. The British colonial administrator of the Uganda Protectorate took genocide at African populations sah auch der britische Kolonialadministrator Harry Hamilton Johnston to be an acceptable consequence of the imposition of what appeared to him as “advanced” standards of productivity. See: Harry Hamilton Johnston, *History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races*, second edn (Cambridge, 1913), pp. 388-389, 450-451 [first published (Cambridge, 1899)]. The perception of communities outside Europe as rooted in an unchangeable world found its way into ethnological research. For example see: Henri Joannes Maria Claessen, ‘The Balance of Power in Primitive States’, in: Claessen and S. Lee Seaton, eds, *Political Anthropology* (The Hague, 1979), pp. 183-195, at p. 187.

Ranke himself did not live up to his own narrative plan to describe the history of international relations among “nations”. Instead, he offered accounts of actions taken by governments of some states, which, in line with nationalist ideologies,¹⁵¹ he ranked as institutional embodiments of “nations”. He took for granted that the identity of state and state population was the result of historical change that he spotted only in Europe. However, Ranke not only remained unfaithful to his own narrative principles but also used the simple model of power politics as the core element in explanations for the sequences of occurrences he was describing. For one, the Ottoman Empire, in Ranke's prognosis, was doomed to face destruction, as, in his view, it was incapable of adapting to the allegedly mandatory changes. He would locate the power of promoting and enforcing change only in the “genius of the Occident”, that seemed to be able to annihilate the Ottoman Empire, whenever it wanted to do so. This was an account of power politics pure, simple and unrestrained by religious faith.¹⁵²

c) Nineteenth-Century Historiography of Expansion

Ranke could apply his model of power politics in his judgments about the relations among European states solely at the price of the shallowness of his theoretical foundations and of the exclusion of the rest of world. Had he not just focused on diplomatic records of European provenance but reviewed records from the perspective of the victims of European colonial expansion, he would have come across the variegated forms of resistance against the expansionist politics of European and the US governments. This is the reason, why most historiographers of the expansion of European colonial rule, just like most of his contemporaries outside the German-speaking areas, did not follow Ranke's model of power politics but built their narratives upon the novel concept of “civilisation”, in turn tied to the notion of “progress”. From the early nineteenth century, European historiographers of expansion no longer looked at America but at South Asia. Their purpose was to explain and, thereafter, to justify British colonial rule to the extent that it the English East India Company (EIC) had formally undertaken it up until the middle of the century. As the company was striving to combine profit maximisation with displays of military strength and political clout, James Mill, one of the historiographers of British colonial expansion, set out to demonstrate the usefulness of the expansion of colonial rule in service to the company's profits and the interests of its shareholders.

¹⁵¹ Schmitthenner, *Grundlinien* (note 145), p. 3.

¹⁵² *Contra* Eckart Conze, ‘Abschied von Staat und Politik? Überlegungen zur Geschichte der internationalen Politik’, in: Conze, Ulrich Lappenküper and Guido Müller, eds, *Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen. Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin* (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna, 2004), pp. 15-43, at pp. 19-20. Conze, ‘Jenseits von Männern und Mächten. Geschichte der internationalen Politik als Systemgeschichte’, in: Hans-Christof Kraus and Nicklas Thomas, eds, *Geschichte der Politik* (Historische Zeitschrift. Beihefte, N. F. 44) (Munich, 2007), pp. 41-64, at pp. 44-45, who repeatedly argued that Ranke's concept of power was restrained by religious overtones and, consequently, left vague, when compared with Weberian terminology.

Historiographers of expansion started off from the contention by company strategists who were claiming that there was natural state of peace among states in South Asia, that the peoples subject to indigenous rulers had no sense of politically viable collective identities and could, consequently, not count as “nations”.¹⁵³ These strategists proclaimed this alleged feature of international relations in South Asia as a serious defect, against which they argued, in agreement with late eighteenth-century political theory, the need for soliciting a common collective identity of the population as the main task of rulers.¹⁵⁴ As, in the perception of these strategists, indigenous South Asian governments were failing to fulfill this task, the verdict was that there was no government-controlled “civilized society” and that these governments were unwilling to practice the “art of peace”. In consequence, „civilisation“ and peace could only be accomplished under the rule of the EIC. According to James Mill, then, “civilization” and pacification were unconditional prerequisites for profitable trading business, and the EIC had accomplished its mission with great success: agriculture appeared to be thriving, the population to be increasing, profits from trade to be mounting, arts and sciences to be flourishing and tranquillity and security to be guaranteed, wherever in South Asia company rule was in place and installing “civilization”.¹⁵⁵ “Progress” out from the state of nature seemed to be recognisable everywhere in the Subcontinent, not jest with “Hindus”, but also with purported “savages” in remote areas.¹⁵⁶

In taking this approach, the historiography of expansion intensified the awareness of the expansion of European colonial rule seeming to promote change specifically in South Asia already early in the nineteenth century. Different from Ranke, who would conceive of power as a value in itself, historiographers of expansion instrumentalised military power and political clout. Even though they

¹⁵³ Neil Benjamin Edmonstone, ‘[Letter to Lord Hastings, Vice-President of the English East India Company, 1813]’, partly printed in: Dirk H. A. Kolff, ‘Colonial War in India. 1798 – 1818’, in: Patrick J. N. Tuck, ed., *The East India Company*, vol. 5: Warfare, Expansion and Resistance (London, 1998), p. 178: the states of India “should be willing to cultivate the arts of peace and to attend only to the internal improvement and prosperity of their respective dominions. That a regular constitution and a system of administrative law should exist within their territories, that the subjects of each should form as it were a nation connected by mutual relations and actuated by a feeling of patriotism. In short that a civilized society and civilized dominion should already have been implanted in them.” [also printed in: Biswanath Ghosh, *British Policy Towards the Pathans and the Pindaris in Central India. 1805 – 1818* (Kolkatta, 1966), pp. 198-199].

¹⁵⁴ Ewald Friedrich von Hertzberg, ‘Betrachtung über die innerliche Stärke der Staaten und ihre verhältnißmäßige Macht gegen einander. Welche in der öffentlichen Versammlung der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin den 24. Jänner 1782, am Geburtstagsfeste des Königs abgelesen worden’, in: Hertzberg, *Drei Abhandlungen*, edited by Christian Conrad Wilhelm Dohm (Berlin and Leipzig), 1782, separate pag., pp. 1-16, at p. 10. Joseph von Sonnenfels, ‘Vortheile der Verbreitung der Vaterlandsliebe in der Regierungsform’, in: Sonnenfels, *Über die Liebe des Vaterlandes* (Sonnenfels, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 7) (Vienna, 1785), pp. 88-133, at p. 120. Johann Joseph Winckler, *Arcanum regimen. Das ist: Ein Königlich Geheimniß Für einen regierenden Landes-Herrn. Darinnen ihm entdeckt wird, damit er eine Vereinigung bey seinem Volcke unvermerckt stiftet* (Wittenberg, 1703). Carl Abraham Zedlitz, *Sur le patriotisme considéré comme objet d’éducation dans les états monarchiques* (Berlin, 1776).

¹⁵⁵ James Mill, *The History of British India from 1805 to 1835*, vol. 3 (London, 1858), pp. 394-396.

¹⁵⁶ James Mill, *The History of British India*, vol. 1 (London, 1858), p. 316.

regarded the “civilization of Europe” as “advanced”,¹⁵⁷ they did not have in mind to document allegations of the superiority of some “genius of the Occident” in terms of power politics, but made efforts to give a record of the “progress” that “civilization” had accomplished in South Asia. In other words, their benchmark for estimating usefulness was “progress” in the enforcement of “civilization”. In taking this stance, they denied to populations in South Asia any potential for endogenous change. As late as in the 1850s, Karl Marx followed this logic, even though he converted it into an argument in support of his prediction of a revolution against British rule in South Asia.¹⁵⁸

Nevertheless, the range of applicability of this theory of the enforcement of “civilization” in service to the justification of colonial expansion remained limited. This was so, because the theory had been conceived for the purposes of long-distance trading companies and was useless in service to government-controlled expansion processes. Moreover, the theory ran into the contradiction that long-distance trading companies as holders of monopolies were bent on preserving their trading privileges and could do so only as long as they remained successful in keeping constant the very conditions under which they could carry out their businesses. By implication, these companies were hostile to change, whenever it seemed to oppose their business interests. The most important countermeasures the British government had taken from the late eighteenth century, was the offensive promotion of free-trade policies. Free-trade rules stood in fundamental conflict with efforts to maintain trading monopolies, and, consequently, the EIC, as the last remaining long-distance company with executive sovereign powers, found it hard to carry out profitable trade in the first half of the nineteenth century. At that time, it was in charge only of parts of South Asia and a small part of Southeast Asia and could execute its powers as a colonial ruler only in the name of the British government. Hence, few possibilities were left to the company to enforce “civilization” effectively in the sense of the historiography of expansion, while at the same time generating the expected profits from trade. With the Indian Rising of 1857 to 1859, the company eventually lost its sovereign privileges. However, the Rising not merely ended EIC territorial rule in South and Southeast Asia, but also revealed the poverty of the justification for colonial expansion that company strategists had provided. This was so, because the resistance forces made it clear that they were unwilling to undergo any process of becoming “civilized”. Eventually, when the British government took over the full administration of South Asia, it had to use different modes of justifying towards a domestic

¹⁵⁷ Mill, *History* (note 155), p. 396. On Mill see: Tony Ballantyne, ‘Empire, Knowledge and Culture. From Proto-Globalization to modern Globalization’, in: Anthony G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (London and New York, 2002), pp. 115-139. Michael Bentley, ‘Shape and Pattern in British Historical Writing, 1815 – 1945’, in: Stuart Macintyre, Juan Maiguashca and Attila Pók, eds, *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*, vol. 4 (Oxford, 2011), pp. 204-224, at pp. 212-217.

¹⁵⁸ Karl Marx, ‘The British Rule in India’, in: *New York Daily Tribune* (25 June 1853); also in: Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Gesamtausgabe (MEGA)*. Series I, vol. 12 (Berlin, 1984), pp. 166-173 [<https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/25.htm>].

audience the expansion of colonial rule through state institutions. Late nineteenth-century historiography of expansion thus could no longer seek to defend the usefulness of colonial expansion but had to provide reasons why the British government was expanding its own rule beyond the confines of the United Kingdom and British overseas settler colonies. Put differently, whereas the historiography of expansion in service to the long-distance trading companies had had the task of retrospectively accommodating the performance of company officials as territorial rulers with shareholder interests, late nineteenth-century historiographers of expansion had the duty of awarding probability to the prospect of the perpetuity of government colonial rule in the future. The promotion of “civilisation” among the “natives” in territories under European colonial rule would have been counterproductive, because successes in providing “civilisation” would eventually have turned redundant colonial rule. Admitting this contradiction does not imply that colonial rule was no longer justified as a “civilising mission”, but the task of claiming the need for such missions moved from the historiography of expansion to missionary theology,¹⁵⁹ and was then no longer reactively linked to past expansion processes but proactively focused on the future subjection to European administration and military control of areas and population groups that had already come under colonial rule.

John Robert Seeley, Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge from 1869 to 1895, was by far the most influential among historians devoting themselves to the study of colonial expansion towards the end of the nineteenth century.¹⁶⁰ At Cambridge, Seeley gave lectures that he published as a monograph under the title *The Expansion of England* in 1883 and that became a bestseller instantaneously. Seeley’s book became proverbial for his pointed claim, later turned into a joke, that

¹⁵⁹ Carl Mirbt, *Die evangelische Mission. Deutschland unter dem Druck des gegenwärtigen Weltkrieges* (Berlin, 1917), pp. 15-17. Julius Richter, *Weltmission und theologische Arbeit* (Gütersloh, 1913), p. 8. Ernst Troeltsch, ‘Die Mission in der modernen Welt’, in: *Die christliche Welt* 20 (1906), col. 8-12, 26-28, 56-59, esp. col. 57. Gustav Warneck, *Die gegenwärtigen Beziehungen zwischen der modernen Mission und Cultur. Auch eine Kulturkampfstudie* (Gütersloh, 1879), pp. 40-42, 51-52, 137. Warneck, *Die Heidenmission. Eine Großmacht in Knechtsgestalt* (Halle, 1883), p. 24. Warneck, *Missionsmotiv und Missionsaufgabe nach der modernen religionsgeschichtlichen Schule* (Berlin, 1906), pp. 31-34. On the imperialist bias of missionary activity at the turn towards the twentieth century see: Horst Gründer, *Christliche Mission und deutscher Imperialismus* (Paderborn, 1982). Gründer, *Christliche Heilsbotschaft und weltliche Macht. Studien zum Verhältnis von Mission und Kolonialismus* (Europa – Übersee, 14) (Munster, 2004). Rebekka Habermas, ‘Wissenstransfer und Mission. Sklavenhändler, Missionare und Religionswissenschaftler’, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 36 (2010), pp. 257-284. Thoralf Klein, ‘Mission und Kolonialismus – Mission als Kolonialismus. Anmerkungen zu einer Wahlverwandtschaft’, in: Claudia Kraft, Alf Lüdtker and Jürgen Martschukat, ed., *Kolonialgeschichten. Regionale Perspektiven auf ein globales Phänomen* (Frankfurt, 2010), pp. 142-161.

¹⁶⁰ Next to him also: James Anthony Froude, *Oceana. Or England and Her Colonies* (London, 1889) [further edn (London, 1898); reprint (Freeport, 1972)]. Froude took the title of this work from: James Harrington, *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (London, 1700) [second edn (London, 1737); third edn (London, 1747); further edn (Dublin, 1758); newly edited in: Harrington, *The Political Works*, edited by John Greville Agard Pocock (Cambridge, 1977)]. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes* (Paris, 1874) [second edn (Paris, 1882)].

the British empire had come into existence in a “fit of absence of mind”.¹⁶¹ However, Seeley had been thoroughly serious about his contention, which, indeed, encapsulated the gist of his book: the British Empire, so his repeatedly advocated position, was neither drawn on any internal logic nor any any systemic approach, nor on any long-term goal, nor on a master plan. Instead, he argued, the British Empire owed its expansion exclusively to “fortune”.¹⁶² Seeley approached the expansion of the British Empire from a comparative point of view. His starting point was the assumption that the British Empire belonged to a class of empires, and then proceeded with outlining the specific features that distinguished the British from all other empires. He took into consideration the empires of the Ancient Near East, of Alexander III of Macedonia, of the Romans of Antiquity and, with respect to the modern period, the empires of France, the Netherlands, the Ottomans, Portugal and Spain.¹⁶³ His initial observation was that the British Empire was the only empire continuing into Seeley’s own lifetime and had expanded its rule more extensively than all other empires. All empires of Antiquity, he noted, had come into existence through conquest and had therefore been in existence only for a limited period of time. The same, he opined, was the case with regard to the Ottoman Empire.¹⁶⁴ Except for the British Empire, all other empires of the modern age had disappeared after revolutions, as those of Portugal and Spain, or had been come under British sway, as the empires of France and the Netherlands.¹⁶⁵

This view was, put mildly, based on a rather selective scrutiny of records. Yet Seeley derived from it the question of how the British empire could have not just sustained to the crisis that the American Revolution had forced upon it, but even further expanded thereafter. He drew for his answer on his comparison with the empires of Antiquity. As results of conquests, these empires appeared to be conglomerates of heterogeneous groups of subjects, failing to establish a common collective identity under alien and despotic rulers and thence seeking to use every available opportunity to cut ties with their rulers.¹⁶⁶ By contrast, the British Empire, in Seeley’s narrative, appeared not to have been founded upon conquest “not in the main”, but upon the settlement of migrants from the British Isles.¹⁶⁷ However, unlike Greek colonists in Antiquity, settlers emigrating from the United Kingdom, had not campaigned for their independence from the state of origin but had, so to speak, carried the British state in their intellectual luggage. Contrary to the Ancient Greek concep of the state, that had been restricted in scope to the city and, in that capacity, had not allowed expansion, the British

¹⁶¹ Seeley, *Expansion* (note 23), p. 10.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 55 and elsewhere.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-65.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 52. Seeley wrote the text prior to the launching of the Scamble for Africa, but after the subjection of Southeast Asia to French control.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51, 55.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, . 51.

Empire had been established as a single unitary state, manifest all over the world in British institutions of rule. Migrating British settlers had retained their nationality and had thereby transferred British state institutions wherever they had gone, with the sole exception of the USA. Against the differences in the legal bases of British colonial rule, manifest in treaties under international law with governments in Africa, West, South and Southeast Asia as well as in the South Pacific, Seeley postulated that the British Empire was something equivalent of an extensive political entity on the territory of the British state. In taking this view, he agreed with the ordinary propaganda for European colonial expansion at the end of the nineteenth century.¹⁶⁸

In direct opposition against early nineteenth-century historiography of expansion, South Asia took only a marginal role in Seeley's explanation of British colonial expansion. Everywhere in Asia, Seeley found, British people were "but an imperceptible drop in the ocean of an Asiatic population",¹⁶⁹ and that was why there was no British state in that continent. He also admitted that British rule in South Asia had been established through conquest.¹⁷⁰ Yet it had been the fate of British colonial expansion to direct their overseas settlement to "comparatively empty" parts of the world, where, he thought, no more than few "natives" were living.¹⁷¹ The British overseas settlement colonies, seemingly founded on virgin land, could then guarantee the continuity of the British Empire as a would-be nation-state. Thus, Seeley not only did not employ the "civilisation" discourse of the early nineteenth-century historiographers of expansion, but also did not resort to the Rankean model of power politics. Instead, the migration of British nationals served him as the core factor of the rise and the essential guarantor of the continuity of the Empire. It is through this construct that Seeley grasped what might be termed the demographic factor of British empire-building in conjunction with the use of biologicistic ideologies of nationalism, of which population of a state as some "ethnological unity" formed the base.¹⁷² Yet Seeley ignored the revolutionary context that had driven marginalised population groups out of the British Isles during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, likewise, passed over the migrations that had been encouraged by the long-distance

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 48-51. For contemporary descriptions of the pluralism of types of British rule and overrule within the Empire see: Henry Jenkyns, *British Rule and Jurisdiction beyond the Seas* (Oxford, 1902), pp. 91-98. For propaganda in favour of the expansion of European colonial rule before Seeley see: Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *Colonisation* (note 160), second edn, pp. VIII-IX.

¹⁶⁹ Seeley, *Expansion* (note 23), p. 54.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 54. Through this purported explanation, Seeley turned topsy-turvy a demand that John Milton had inserted in his opinion for Oliver Cromwell relating to settler colonies in North America. Milton had then argued that settler colonies, albeit providing the securest title for overseas rule, should be established only in uninhabited lands or on completely unused soil. See: John Milton, 'Scriptum Dom[ini] Protectoris Republicae Angliæ, Scotiæ, Hiberniæ etc. ex consensus atque sententia concilii sui editum, in quo hujus Reipublicæ Causa contra Hispanos justa esse demonstratur [(London, 1655)]', in: Milton, *The Works*, edited by Frank Allen Patterson, vol. 13: *The State Papers* (New York, 1937), pp. 510-563, at p. 554 [partly edited in: Wilhelm Carl Georg Grewe, ed., *Fontes historiae juris gentium*, vol. 2 (Berlin and New York, 1992), pp. 457-463].

¹⁷² Seeley, *Expansion* (note 23), p. 59.

trading companies and had not been tied to state-centered collective identities. It was solely with an eye on the government-bolstered policy of the so-called “Assisted Passage” of the earlier nineteenth century that Seeley could argue that migrants leaving the United Kingdom had expanded the “English” state.

Moreover, Seeley reduced to a negligible affair the overseas wars that first the English and subsequently the British government had fought since the sixteenth century. Only by way of this reductionist approach could Seeley have set apart the British Empire from its alleged forerunners in Antiquity and claim non-military expansion as the platform for the stability of colonial rule. In his justification of British colonial expansion, he also employed arguments he reached deeply into the bag of tricks of European theologians and jurists,¹⁷³ who had committed themselves to the nonsensical argument that the destinations of British overseas settlement migrations, mainly in America, Australia and New Zealand, had been vacant *terrae nullius*¹⁷⁴ in which no other groups than “nomads” appeared to be roving, would not use their lands for agriculture and would thereby open them for farmers from Europe.¹⁷⁵ Seeley had to take this position in order to be able to maintain that the British Empire had been established essentially without the use of force. Likewise, he did not hesitate to invoke contemporary racist discourse in that he placed Native Americans, Australian “Aborigines” and the Māori in Aotearoa (New Zealand) “low in ethnological scale”¹⁷⁶ and denied all potential for resistance to them.¹⁷⁷ Native Americans appeared to him to be like sheep, who were unable to accomplish anything against wolves, seemed to behave like antelopes running away when faced with a suddenly approaching group of hunters.¹⁷⁸ Even when they had been somewhat more numerous, as in Peru during the early sixteenth century, they had been unable to mount effective resistance, their states had been destroyed and their ruling dynasties had been annihilated, he insisted.¹⁷⁹ Likewise, no “trouble” was to be expected from “Aborigines”.¹⁸⁰ And,

¹⁷³ Similar arguments are extant from: Francisco de Vitoria, ‘De Indis recenter inventis relectio prior’, book III, chap. 3, edited by Ernest Nys (Washington, 1917), pp. 217-268, at pp. 258-259 [reprints (New York, 1964); (Buffalo, 1995)]; also in: Walter Schaezel, ed., *Klassiker des Völkerrechts*, vol. 2 (Tübingen, 1954), pp. 118-171; Vitoria, *Vorlesungen*, edited by Ulrich Horst, vol. 2 (Theologie und Frieden, 8) (Stuttgart, 1997), pp. 542-605; Facsimile edn of the Palencia Codex of 1539 (Madrid, 1989)]. Emer[ich] de Vattel, *Le droit des gens. Ou Principes de la loi naturelle appliquées à la conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains*, book I, chap. 7, nr 81 (London [recte Neuchâtel], 1758), pp. 78-79 [second edn (Paris, 1773); third edn (Amsterdam, 1775); Nouvelle édition, edited by Silvestre Pinheiro-Ferreira, Jean Pierre Baron de Chambrier d’Oleires and Paul Louis Ernest Pradier-Fodéré (Philadelphia, 1863); reprint of the first edn, edited by Albert de Lapradelle (Washington, 1916); reprint of the reprint (Geneva, 1983)].

¹⁷⁴ For criticism of the use of this term see: Lauren A. Benton and Benjamin Straumann, ‘Acquiring Empire by Law. From Roman Doctrine to Early Modern European Practice’, in: *Law and History Review* 28 (2010), pp. 1-38, at pp. 2, 7, 38.

¹⁷⁵ Seeley, *Expansion* (note 23), pp. 53-54.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

finally, the Māori, whose war-proneness Seeley could not pass over in silence after more than thirty years of “Māori Wars”, had been defeated, reduced to a few people and were doomed to disappear quickly.¹⁸¹ Seeley’s projection of genocide agreed with racist analyses by contemporaries like Dilke. For both of them, purported fundamental change had resulted in the postulate of a permanent hierarchical physical-psychic distinction among human population groups. In accordance with these racist perceptions, many of these groups, specifically Native Americans, “natives” of the South Pacific, parts of Asia as well as Africa were doomed to be excluded from participating in “civilisation” promoting change and face destruction.

With the line of argument, late nineteenth-century historiographers of expansion legitimised colonial rule. Indeed, Seeley as a universal historian understood his historiographical efforts as political education and hoped that his lectures were becoming “a great seminary for politicians”.¹⁸² The tremendous success of his *Expansion of England*, beginning immediately upon the publication and continuing until the 1950s and providing a highly constructed description of British empire-building without recourse to sources, is hard to explain except under the assumption that Seeley played with perceptions that a majority of his contemporaries shared, that later generations carried well into the twentieth century and, even after the end of World War I, became condensed into some purported “obligation for colonisation”.¹⁸³ Universal historiography, which received a restoration at the turn towards the twentieth century, provides evidence that these perceptions actually existed.

d) The Restitution of Universal Historiography towards the End of the Nineteenth Century

Apart from the compendia that appeared as collections of histories of states in Europe around 1900,¹⁸⁴ universal historiographies planned or published at the time demonstrate the willingness of

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁸² George Peabody Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, second edn (London, 1920), pp. 369-370 [first published (London, 1913)]. Bentley, ‘Shape’ (note 157), pp. 213-214.

¹⁸³ Thus: Samuel Curtis Vestal, *The Maintenance of Peace. Or The Foundation of Domestic and International Peace as Deduced from a Study of History* (New York and London, 1920), pp. 454-455 [second edn (New York and London, 1923)]; Vestal supported this purported “obligation” with the exclusionistic rhetoric of “civilisation” and “free trade”: “A great part of the earth is still condemned to barbarous anarchy and inutility which have been its lot through all past ages. Should it be allowed to remain in this condition for all future time? We believe that every portion of the earth must be subservient to the welfare of the whole. ... It is to the interest of the entire civilized world that as large a portion of the earth’s surface as possible should be open to commerce.” As late as in the 1950s, a select edition of the English original of Seeley’s work appeared as a kind of textbook, edited by U. Matsuo (Tokyo and Kyoto, 1951). For the reception of the work see see: Benedict Stuchtey, ‘World Power and World History. Writing the British Empire. 1885 – 1945’, in: Stuchtey and Eckhardt Fuchs, eds, *Writing World History. 1800 – 2000* (Oxford and New York, 2003), pp. 213-253, at pp. 245, 249-250. Gustav Adolf Rein, *John Robert Seeley. Eine Studie über den Historiker* (Langensalza, 1912) [reprint (Die EU und ihre Ahnen im Spiegel historischer Quellen. Series 9, vol. 1) (Hanover, 2008); English version (Wolfboro, 1987)].

¹⁸⁴ Helmolt, *Weltgeschichte* (note 19). Weber, *Weltgeschichte* (note 19). Henry Smith Williams, *The Historians’*

their authors and editors to leave unnoticed large parts of the human population. At the end of his life, Ranke himself was still convinced that he could limit his universal historiography to the Ancient Near East and Europe: “A collection of national histories in a narrower or wider scope would not be equivalent of a universal history; it would lose sight of the interdependencies among things. But it is precisely the task of scientific universal historiography to establish these interdependencies, to record the sequence of major occurrences that connects and dominates all nations. That such a community exists, is obvious.” (Eben darin aber besteht die Aufgabe der welthistorischen Wissenschaft, diesen Zusammenhang zu erkennen, den Gang der großen Begebenheiten, welcher alle Völker verbindet und beherrscht, nachzuweisen. Daß eine solche Gemeinschaft stattfindet, lehrt der Augenschein.)¹⁸⁵ For Ranke, world history was the object of scientific research before it could become a historiographical narrative. According to his own programme, he wanted to see it focused upon relations among “nations” he deemed significant everywhere on the globe; in practice, however, he actually looked at the Mediterranean world and Europe only. He constructed the history of relations among these “nations” as if he was describing a metaphysical curriculum vitae shaped by conflicts: “There is historical life moving on from one nation to the other, from one circle of nations to the other. Universal history emerges from the very struggle among systems of nations, and nationalities have acquired their own self-consciousness, because nations are by no means naturally grown.” (Es giebt ein historisches Leben, welches sich fortschreitend von einer Nation zur anderen, von einem Völkerkreise zum anderen bewegt. Eben in dem Kampfe der verschiedenen Völkersysteme ist die allgemeine Geschichte entsprungen, sind die Nationalitäten zum Bewußtsein ihrer selbst gekommen; denn nicht durchaus naturwüchsig sind die Nationen.)¹⁸⁶ When using the term “systems of nations”, Ranke operated within eighteenth-century terminology,¹⁸⁷ but filled it with new meaning: The “nations” were not to have their own definite places like states in something equivalent of a Linnéan system, but were to have acquired their own self-consciousness in the course of their “lives”. Ranke thus described “nations” in categories of biologism, not of mechanicism. To him, “nations” were embodiments of the „progress“ he was postulating. Only those “nations” might participate in that „progress“ that had become conscious of their own nationhood. Ranke would not grant such consciousness to population groups he spotted in a “natural” condition of “life”. In restricting to Europe the capability of acquiring “national” self-consciousness, he excluded the largest part of the human population from his universal historiography.

Ludwig Rieß, whose teacher Hans Delbrück had been a student of Ranke’s and who taught at Tokyo Imperial University from 1888 to 1902, also believed in a global international “community”

History of the World, 25 vols (London, 1908).

¹⁸⁵ Ranke, *Weltgeschichte* (note 22), p. VII.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. IX.

¹⁸⁷ Gatterer, ‘Plan’ (note 33), p. 42, used the term “national systems” (Nationalsysteme).

(Gemeinschaft). Yet he would not regard it as a derivative from “nations” but constituted it as an entity in its own right with its own “separate life”: “If one attempts to give an historical account, he must be convinced that the community which forms its subject, has a separate life, a common existence, an individuality; and that this fact is clear to the immediate intuition and inward feeling of every sensible observer.”¹⁸⁸ Like Ranke, Rieß saw no need to provide evidence for the existence of some “separate life” of the international community he was postulating: “Now that *all* nations and tribes on earth at the present moment form one community to which they attach themselves and of which they are conscious or that they have ever done so, cannot be contended.”¹⁸⁹ Despite his reluctance to implement the historians’ academic obligation of adducing evidence from sources, Rieß, again following Ranke, ranked universal historiography as the object of scientific inquiry: “From the whole mass of events which concerned only the condition of one nation, he [i. e. Ranke, H. K.] separates those through which one has influenced the other so that many of them now form one living community. In the totality of such events, he hoped to comprehend the growth of one great community of nations, as it now exists. If we adopt this plan, we comply with the requisites of a scientific historical treatise.”¹⁹⁰ According to Rieß as well as to Ranke, conflicts dominated that international community, like all other types of communities, and resulted from the diversity of their members. These conflicts might either jeopardise the existence of a community or might restrict its “effectiveness” (Wirksamkeit) if they entailed separatisms: “Every historian accepts such a *principium diversitatis* as the rule for the healthy development of a social entity. But he imagines it in a more concrete way, namely that among individuals joined into a community, contending movements come up, which transform into parties trying to have their own specifically targeted impacts upon the community. And the historian also accepts the premise that thereby the affairs of the community acquire intensified concerns for every member and become carried out with stronger sacrifices. Once the internal cleavages become too strong, the entire community can be torn apart or its effectiveness can be removed from certain kinds of affairs by an *Itio in partes*.” (Als Regel nimmt ja auch jeder Historiker für ein solches *principium diversitatis* in gesunder Entwicklung befindliches soziales Gebilde ein solches an. Er denkt sich das aber gleich bestimmter derartig, daß zwischen den einzelnen, die zu einer Gemeinschaft verbunden sind, entgegengesetzte Bestrebungen auftauchen, nach deren Maßgabe sich Parteien bilden, die auf die Gemeinschaft in verschiedener, je nach ihren besonderen Zwecken zum Ausdruck kommender Weise einzuwirken versuchen, und daß gerade dadurch die Angelegenheiten der Gemeinschaft für jeden Beteiligten ein erhöhtes Interesse gewinnen und mit stärkeren Opfern betrieben werden. Werden die inneren Gegensätze zu stark, so kann der ganze Verband gesprengt werden oder durch ein [sic!] *Itio in partes* seine Wirksamkeit von

¹⁸⁸ Rieß, *Survey* (note 19), vol. 1, pp. 3-4.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

bestimmten Gebieten ausgeschlossen werden.)¹⁹¹ Rieß applied these principles, which he borrowed from early twentieth-century sociology of political parties, to his universal historiography, styled as a historiography of international relations. In doing so, Rieß postulated that the unity of the global international community could only be preserved by the activities of governments that were equipped with global “consciousness”. In Rieß’s historiographical world picture, such governments appeared to exist only in Europe and North America; hence, he believed to be justified to exclude from his universal historiographical narrative all other parts of the world, as long as they had not come under European or North American influence.¹⁹² Conceptually, Rieß’s international community was identical with the “family of nations” of contemporary international legal theorists.

It is not completely clear why the Japanese government established a professorship of history at Tokyo Imperial University in the European academic tradition and appointed Rieß, who was then a totally unknown figure in the academic world.¹⁹³ He had received his doctoral degree for a thesis on the history of English electoral law¹⁹⁴ and had not had any relations with East Asia before his appointment. Moreover, his command of English was imperfect, and the focus of his lectures on the Mediterranean area and Europe during periods prior to the sixteenth century¹⁹⁵ met with little interest among students.¹⁹⁶ His influence on university affairs was limited, although he was asked to draw up a design for an historiographical institute to be established in Tokyo Imperial University. Rieß submitted the design for the structure of the institute, emphasising the importance of auxiliary sciences for the academic study of history and assigning to the historiography of Japanese its proper place in universal historiography. However, the design had no impact on the history curriculum of Tokyo Imperial University and Rieß was not involved in the actual process of the foundation of the

¹⁹¹ Ludwig Rieß, *Historik. Ein Organon geschichtlichen Denkens*, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1912), p. 89. Following: Gustav Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik als Teil der Soziologie und Grundlage der Wissenschaft*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1893), pp. 19-21.

¹⁹² Rieß, *Survey* (note 19), vol. 1, pp. 14-15. Similarly: Rieß, *Notes of a Course of Lectures on Universal History*, 5 issues (Tokyo, 1892) new edn (Tokyo, 1897; 1899)]. Rieß, *Notes of a Course of Lectures on Methodology of History* (Tokyo, 1896). For the sociology of political parties see: Robert Michels, ‘Der konservative Grundzug der Partei-Organisation’, in: *Monatsschrift für Soziologie* 1 (1909), pp. 228-236, 301-316 [reprinted in: Michels, *Soziale Bewegungen zwischen Dynamik und Erstarrung* (Berlin, 2008), pp. 198-213].

¹⁹³ On Rieß see: Kentarō Hayashi, ‘Ludwig Riess, einer der Väter der Geschichtswissenschaft in Japan’, in: Josef Kreiner, ed., *Japan-Sammlungen in Museen Mitteleuropas* (Bonner Zeitschrift für Japanologie, 3) (Bonn, 1981), pp. 31-45. Georg Gerson Iggers, Q. Edward Wang and Supriya Mukherjee, *A Global History of Modern Historiography* (Harlow, 2008), pp. 141-145. Margaret Mehl, *Eine Vergangenheit für die japanische Nation. Die Entstehung des historischen Forschungsinstituts Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo (1869 – 1895)* (Europäische Hochschulschriften. Series III, vol. 538) (Frankfurt, 1992), pp. 163-170. Madoka Kanai, ‘Rekishigaku. Rūtouihi Riisu wo megutte’, in: *Oyatoi gaikokujin*, vol. 17: Jinbun kagaku (Tokyo, 1976), pp. 108-201. Kanai, ‘Rūtouihi Riisu to Nihon kankei kaigai shiryō’, in: *Shigaku zasshi*, vol. 87, issue 10 (1978), pp. 43-53.

¹⁹⁴ Ludwig Rieß, *Geschichte des Wahlrechts zum englischen Parlament im Mittelalter*. Ph. D. thesis (University of Berlin, 1884) [English version (Cambridge, 1940)].

¹⁹⁵ For example, see the penetration of German syntax into Rieß’s English text in the quote above note 190.

¹⁹⁶ Mehl, *Vergangenheit* (note 193), pp. 166.

institute.¹⁹⁷ In Japan, then, Rieß met with virtually no response for his scientific version of Rankian exclusionism.

Nevertheless, the Japanese government does not seem to have randomly selected an academic from the German-speaking areas. In addition to its generally high willingness to give priority to the employment of Germans in higher administration between 1885 and 1895, the government seems to have approached Rieß in response to an earlier initiative it had launched in 1879. Already in that year, it had commissioned the Hungarian born activist during the Revolution of 1848 and former Habsburg secret service agent Gustav Georg Zerffi,¹⁹⁸ then living in the United Kingdom, to write a survey on the methodology of the study of history and report on major historiographical works of European provenance from Greek Antiquity.¹⁹⁹ The government intended to disseminate the work among Japanese intellectuals and university teachers. According to the “Instructions” prefixed to the text of his work, Zerffi was to enumerate great authors whose work had accomplished the ideal of a perfect historiographers,²⁰⁰ to introduce the study of history as an academic discipline with all its sub-disciplines,²⁰¹ review the most important historical sources,²⁰² demonstrate the usefulness of knowledge about the past²⁰³ and analyse the “growth of civilisation”.²⁰⁴ Zerffi, who had received training as an historian, delivered a 733 page volume, to which he added a preface dated 15 October 1879. In his preface, he disclosed that he had written his book “especially for Japanese scholars”, and had “striven to leave nothing untouched that might serve to make them acquainted with the free

¹⁹⁷ Ludwig Rieß, ‘[Comment of the Plan for the Establishment of a Research Institute for Japanese History at the Imperial University of Tokyo, 30 November 1888], in: *Tōkyō teikoku daigaku gojūnenshi*, vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1932), pp. 1299-1302. On the text see: Margaret Mehl, *History and the State in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Basingstoke and New York, 1999), pp. 95, 102.

¹⁹⁸ His likely original name was Gusztáv György Cerf or, the family name in its German version, Hirsch. On Zerffi see: Tibor Frank, *From Habsburg Agent to Victorian Scholar. G. G. Zerffi. 1820 – 1892* (East European Monographs. 576 = Atlantic Studies on Society and Change, 105) (Boulder and Highland Lakes, 2000). Zerffi’s influence upon the recruitment of Rieß see: Kanai, ‘Rekishigaku’ (note 193), p. 133. On the statistics of the employment of foreigners in Japanese government service see: *Japan Weekly Mail*. Series 4, vol. 8 = vol. 41 of the entire series (6 August 1887), p. 122; also in: Heyo Erke Hamer, *Mission und Politik* (Perspektiven der Weltmission, 32) (Aachen, 2002), p. 369 [first version as Ph.D. thesis University of Hamburg, 1997]; Microfiche edn (Egelsbach, 1998), apparently quoted from: Yasuzu Suzuki, ‘Hermann Roesler und die japanische Verfassung’, in: *Monumenta Nipponica*, vol. 4 (1941), pp. 53-87, vol. 5 (1942), pp. 61-113, at p. 112. According to this list, the number of advisers (oyatoi gaikokujin) of German origin doubled between 1878 and 1887 from 22 to 44, whereas, during the same period, the number of advisers of British origin declined from 178 to 71. Another list featuring slightly different figures (76 British and 43 German advisers in 1887) is in: Karl Rathgen, *Japans Volkswirtschaft und Staatshaushalt* (Staats- und sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, 10) (Leipzig, 1891), p. 94.

¹⁹⁹ Kenchō Suematsu, ‘Introductory Letter [dated 6 March 1879]’, in: Gustav Georg Zerffi [Gusztáv György Cerf or Hirsch], *The Science of History* (London, 1879), pp. VII-XIII. On pp. IX-XIII, the letter gives “Instructions” to Zerffi.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. IX.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. X.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. X-XI.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. XI-XII.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. XII-XIII.

and independent mode of thinking in the West”.²⁰⁵

In by far the longest part, the work featured a review of European historiography from Greek Antiquity,²⁰⁶ following an introduction on the theory of history (pp. 1-54). In the introduction, Zerffi referred to what he chose to term “physical science” and imposed a vulgar distinction between “morality” as a static, constraining and correcting “force” and “intellect” as the dynamic, advancing, researching and inventing “force”.²⁰⁷ In his view, “civilisation” existed, when there was a perfect balance between moral and intellectual “forces” in.²⁰⁸ “Civilisation” in this sense appeared to have developed during six “periods”, from its original condition “in exorable despotism of nature”, wherein the seemingly childlike brain of human appeared to have been incapable of memory,²⁰⁹ to fully fledged “civilisation”, which “morality” and “intellect” were to keep in balance²¹⁰ and which Zerffi would recognise only in Europe. He would credit the “black races” in South Asia and Africa with having neither history nor historiography, as they appeared to remain confined to the state of nature.²¹¹ The “yellow races” in Asia, he believed, had history, but their history, in his view, was “static”,²¹² whereas only the “white races” were in possession of their own “progressing” history, directed by the “intellect”.²¹³ In short, Zerffi did not hesitate to unfold the full spectre of European exclusionism, drawn on the belief in evolution, draped into scientific diction and racist mumbojumbo.

It has remained unknown, how the commissioners in the Japanese government responded to Zerffi’s volume and to the exclusionist racism explicit in it. The book does not seem to have been disseminated through government channels, and the planned translation into Japanese did not grow beyond humble beginnings.²¹⁴ The investments in Zerffi’s work, then, did not seem to have paid in Japanese perspective. Yet, the work did not remain unnoticed, as Zerffi concluded his historiographical survey with a praise of some major pieces of German eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historiography, named authors such as Gervinus, Gatterer, Schlözer, Justus Möser, Johannes von Müller, Eichhorn and Heeren,²¹⁵ confirmed that their books were hardly known “in England”, but insisted that they were worth reading. This, he wrote, was mandatory,

²⁰⁵ p. III.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 55-773. Gustav Georg Zerffi [Gusztáv György Cerf or Hirsch], *The Science of History* (London, 1879),

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 17.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 55.

²¹² Ibid., p. 56.

²¹³ Ibid., p. 57.

²¹⁴ Mehl, *Vergangenheit* (note 193), pp. 124-138.

²¹⁵ Zerffi, *Science* (note 205), pp. 762-765.

because the Germans "were, and still are, indefatigable on the field of general and special History".²¹⁶ Hence, Zerffi might have directed the attention of academic planners in the Japanese government to German-speaking academics, thereby kicking off momentum towards Rieß's employment. Yet Rieß, who was appointed to disseminate knowledge about the past not through written texts but the spoken word, instructed his students with a somewhat more cautiously expressed variant of Zerffi's Eurocentric perceptions. Zerffi's and Rieß's unreflected attempts to display specifically European exclusionistic approaches to universal historiography and the historiography of international relations as globally valid means of the acquisition of knowledge about the past and to couch them into scientism, were counterproductive. Both authors, unwillingly, contributed to the cultural specification of the European perception of history as "epídisis eis hautó",²¹⁷ whose claim for global validity immediately broke apart when confronted with non-Hegelian perceptions of the past elsewhere in the world.

The attraction of the exclusionistic approach to universal historiography and the historiography of international relations was strong enough to even fascinate the strongest contemporary critic of academic studies of history at the turn towards the twentieth century. Karl Gotthard Lamprecht was the most determined representative of comparative universal historiography, a rare approach around 1900. At least in his methodological essays, he would not admit any spatial limitations for the scope of universal historiography, went far beyond compilations of histories of states and upgraded the "full historicisation of ethnology" (volle Historisierung der Völkerkunde) to the programme for the inclusion of all "human communities" (menschlichen Gemeinschaften) into his historiographical world picture.²¹⁸ He demanded that "every deeper and, that means, any categorisation of human occurrences as objects of cultural history" (jede tiefere, und das heißt kulturgeschichtliche Auffassung menschlichen Geschehens) "should have a global scope" (universalgeschichtlich sein), as the hallmarks of national identity could only become recognisable against the backdrop of what is generally human in kind.²¹⁹ However, he correctly diagnosed that "time has not come for an

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 763.

²¹⁷ Nach Droysen, *Historik* (note 70, edn by Leyh), p. 421. Similarly: Julius Kaerst, 'Studien zur Entwicklung und Bedeutung der universalgeschichtlichen Anschauung (mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Geschichte des Altertums)', in: *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 106 (1911), pp. 473-534, vol. 111 (1913), pp. 253-320, at pp. 479, 490.

²¹⁸ Karl Gotthard Lamprecht, 'Universalgeschichtliche Probleme', in: Lamprecht, *Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft* (Berlin, 1905), pp. 103-130, at p. 122. Nothing on Lamprecht in the review of the history of cross-cultural comparative historical research by Heinz Gerhard Haupt, 'Historische Komparatistik in der internationalen Geschichtsschreibung', in: Gunilla-Friederike Budde, Sebastian Conrad and Oliver Janz, eds. *Transnationale Geschichte* (Göttingen, 2006), pp. 137-149. Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Transkulturell vergleichende Geschichtswissenschaft', in: Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, eds. *Geschichte und Vergleich* (Frankfurt and New York, 1996), pp. 271-313 [reprinted in: Osterhammel, *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 147) (Göttingen, 2001), pp. 11-45].

²¹⁹ Lamprecht, 'Probleme' (note 218), p. 104.

absolutely cosmopolitan approach to historical knowledge” (die Zeit einer absolut weltbürgerlichen Betrachtung geschichtlicher Erkenntnis ist nicht gekommen), and “even the historical method” (die historische Methode) itself was “specific to nations“ (national gebunden).²²⁰ Thus, Lamprecht, as Ranke or Rieß, together with like contemporary ethnologists and international legal theorists to whom he was close,²²¹ was unwilling to ascribe global scope to the international community. He did expect, though, that such an international community would emerge at some future time.

Quite in line with contemporary functionalist ethnological theory of society,²²² Lamprecht postulated that “human communities” (menschlichen Gemeinschaften) were comprehensive static or dynamic systems, each of which was supported by an identifiable particular group and which he saw as capable of determining the actions of members of these communities. Nationalism thus shaped Lamprecht’s world picture and would not tolerate the inclusionistic perception of the international community with a distinct collective identity of its own. He equated communities with „nations“ and assumed that each “nation” had some “importance” for universal history to be found by historiographers. In a Hegelian vein, Lamprecht imagined universal history as an “epíodos eis hautó”. He assigned to historiographers the task of using archaeological finds and ethnographical findings to the end of constructing “sequences of steps” (Stufenfolgen): “Once that has happened, the ascertainment of the universal historical significance of every human community with respect to the genuineness of its development will become possible and, on that basis, a scientific world historiography will become imaginable.” (Ist das dann geschehen, so wird ein Abmessen der universalgeschichtlichen Bedeutung jeder einzelnen menschlichen Gemeinschaft auf das ihr Eigentümliche der Entwicklung möglich und damit eine wissenschaftliche Weltgeschichte denkbar sein).²²³ While, in Lamprecht’s world picture, then, “nations” existed that could more or less actively participate in the apparent dynamics of human history, he wished to limit the scope of historiographical narratives to the cultures of “the presently especially lively nations” (der heute besonders lebendigen Völker).²²⁴ In his ascription of which appeared to constitute the “liveliness” of nations, Lamprecht agreed with senior contemporaries like Zerffi and focused on the “mind” (Geist): the “fluid, so to speak light elements” (flüssigen, gleichsam erdlichten Elemente) he identified with “elements of highest intellectual activity, namely the elements of religion, art, poetry and science.

²²⁰ Karl Gotthard Lamprecht, *Universalgeschichte*, part I: Einleitung. Die universalgeschichtlichen Gedanken des deutschen Subjektivismus, Ms. Bonn: Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, Lamprecht Papers, S 2713 (PL 9), fol. 5^r.

²²¹ Specifically his Leipzig colleague, anthropologist Karl Weule. Of relevance in the present context: Weule, *Die Kultur der Kulturlosen. Ein Blick in die Anfänge menschlicher Geistesbetätigung* (Stuttgart, 1910).

²²² For example: Edward Burnett Tylor, *Anthropology. An Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilization* (London, 1881), pp. 402, 410-411.

²²³ Lamprecht, ‘Probleme’ (note 218), p. 125. Lamprecht, ‘Grundaussstellung’, in: *Amtlicher Führer der internationalen Ausstellung für Buchgewerbe und Graphik. Halle der Kultur* (Leipzig, 1914), p. 16.

²²⁴ Lamprecht, ‘Probleme’ (note 218), p. 121.

Specifically these elements constitute world historical interdependence.” (Elemente höchster geistiger Betätigung, die Elemente der Religion, der Kunst, der Dichtung und der Wissenschaft. Sie recht eigentlich konstituieren den weltgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang.)²²⁵ “Nations” purportedly not participating in the universal “*epíodos eis hautó*” counted as “inferior” (niedrig) in Lamprecht’s world picture.²²⁶

In not only permitting but even demanding the use of parallelisms between archaeological finds and ethnographic findings as contributions to historical research, Lamprecht classed the cultures of seemingly “inferior nations”, which were the objects of ethnographical reports at that, as remaining in the condition of “primitiveness” (Primitivität). As the world historical “*epíodos eis hautó*” appeared to proceed with uneven speed in various parts of the world, there could be no contemporaneity of cultures: “German history reaches back to periods, which can be termed ethnological cultures at first sight.” (Die deutsche Geschichte reicht in Zeiten zurück, die man auf den ersten Blick als die der völkerkundlichen Kulturen bezeichnen kann).²²⁷ In making this claim, Lamprecht voiced his opinion that the universal historical “*epíodos eis hautó*” had taken place only in Europe and had there reached the “step”, at which the “elements of highest intellectual activity” were becoming possible. From this point of view, it made sense that Lamprecht instructed students at his “Royal Saxon Institute of Cultural and Universal History” (Königlich-Sächsisches Institut für Kultur- und Universalgeschichte) to attend his lectures on Tacitus’s *Germania* before joining his comparative exercises in “cultural and universal history”.²²⁸ In the latter type of classes, Lamprecht reviewed processes of the transfer bringing forth some universal historical interdependence, whereby he understood transfer as the reception of a purportedly “higher” culture into a seemingly “lower” culture, the differentiation between both types being the essential achievement of “scientific” research and allowing the positioning of each culture within the sequences of universal historical “steps” or stages.²²⁹ He used the example of Japan, on the history of which he delivered lectures in 1909 and 1910, to describe how the migration of some “yellow race” (gelber Rasse) had been the formative phase of Japanese culture,²³⁰ from which subsequently Buddhism had emerged in the

²²⁵ Ibid., pp. 118-119.

²²⁶ Ibid., p. 122.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 121. See also: Lamprecht, *Die gegenwärtige Entwicklung der Wissenschaften, insbesondere der Geisteswissenschaften, und der Gedanke der Universitätsreform* (Berlin, 1910). Lamprecht, ‘Universalgeschichtliche Untersuchungen mittelalterlicher Verfassungsprobleme (Lehnswesen und Entstehungsgeschichte der Städte. Mitteilungen über Übungen, welche im Königlichen Institut für Kultur- und Universalgeschichte bei der Universität Leipzig in der Zeit vom Wintersemester 1911/12 bis Wintersemester 1912/13 abgehalten worden sind [Ms. Bonn: Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, Lamprecht Papers, S 2713 (UL 6)]’, in: Lamprecht, *Alternative zu Ranke*, edited by Hans Schleier (Leipzig, 1988), pp. 405-415, at p. 410.

²²⁸ [Karl Gotthard Lamprecht], Erläuterungen zum Studium. 1910, Ms. Bonn: Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, Lamprecht Papers, S 2713 (UL 6).

²²⁹ Lamprecht, ‘Probleme’ (note 218), p. 122.

²³⁰ Karl Gotthard Lamprecht, *Japanische Geschichte*. Ms. Bonn: Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, Lamprecht

context of interactions with continental East Asia.²³¹ In his view, universal historiography was identical with the historiography of international relations, in the context of which processes of transfer launched by migrants seemed to have imbued “lower” cultures with elements from “higher” cultures: “Nations with a very low culture may be destroyed through imports from very high cultures.” (Völker mit einer sehr niedrigen Kultur können an dem Import sehr hoher Kulturen zugrunde gehen.)²³² It was through this observation that Lamprecht left to cultures that he ranked as “low” merely the choice between destruction and participation in the universal historical “epíodos eis hautó”.²³³

The collections in the library of Lamprecht’s “Royal Saxon Institute for Cultural and Universal History” reveals the range of cultures he discussed in his exercises. Already in the year of the foundation of the institute, the collection held 17.000 volumes of printed books, approximately 140.000 children’s drawings and several “primitive sculptures” (Sammlung primitiver Plastiken), which appears to have been destroyed in the bombing of Leipzig on 4 December 1943, when the

Papers, S 2713 (V16a), typescript of the contents of the lecture course, abridged version.

²³¹ Karl Gotthard Lamprecht, *Japanische Geschichte*, Hs. Bonn: Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, Nachlass Lamprecht S 2713 (V16a), part V. Announced in: Lamprecht, *Historische Methode und historisch-akademischer Unterricht* (Berlin, 1910), p. 16. On Lamprecht’s interest in Japan see: Peter Griss, *Das Gedankenbild Karl Lamprechts. Historisches Verhalten im Modernisierungsprozeß* (Europäische Hochschulschriften, Series 3, vol. 338) (Berne, 1987). Griss, ‘Japan and Karl Lamprechts universalgeschichtliche Anschauung. 1900 – 1914’, in: *Comparativ* 4 (1991), pp. 94-107 [reprinted in: Gerald Diesener, ed., *Karl Lamprecht weiterdenken. Universal- und Kulturgeschichte heute* (Leipzig, 1993), pp. 156-176]; pp. 95-97, 102-104: on Lamprecht’s perception of Japanese reception of Western norms and values.

²³² Lamprecht, ‘Probleme’ (note 218), p. 115. Treitschke (note 147), loc. cit., had already insisted that such transfers were “unnatural” (unnatürlich).

²³³ On Lamprecht see, among many: Roger Chickering, ‘Karl Lamprechts Konzeption einer Weltgeschichte’, in: *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 73 (1991), pp. 437-452. Chickering, *Karl Lamprecht. A German Academic Life (1856 – 1915)* (Atlantic Highlands, 1993). Karl Czok, *Karl Lamprechts Wirken an der Universität Leipzig* (Sitzungsberichte der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philol.-Hist. Kl., vol. 124, nr 6) (Berlin, 1984). Eckhardt Fuchs, ‘Contemporary Alternatives to German Historicism in the Nineteenth Century’, in: Stuart Macintyre, Juan Manguerra and Attila Pók, eds, *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*, vol. 4 (Oxford, 2011), pp. 59-77. Griss, ‘Japan’ (note 231). Friedrich Jaeger and Jörn Rüsen, *Geschichte des Historismus. Eine Einführung* (Munich, 1992), pp. 141-146. Hans Schleier, ‘Karl Lamprechts Universalgeschichtskonzeption im Umfeld seiner Zeit’, in: Gerald Diesener, ed., *Karl Lamprecht weiterdenken. Universal- und Kulturgeschichte heute* (Leipzig, 1993), pp. 145-155. Herbert Schönebaum, ‘Karl Lamprecht’, in: *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 37 (1953), pp. 269-305. Schönebaum, ‘Karl Lamprechts Mühen um innere und äußere Kulturpolitik’, in: *Die Welt als Geschichte* 15 (1955), pp. 137-152. Emil Jakob Spieß, *Die geschichtsphilosophie Karl Lamprechts*. Ph. D. thesis (University of Freiburg, 1921). Friedrich Seifert, *Der Streit um Karl Lamprechts Geschichtsphilosophie* (Augsburg, 1925). Luise Schorn-Schütte, *Karl Lamprecht. Kulturgeschichtsschreibung zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik* (Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 22) (Göttingen, 1984). Schorn-Schütte, ‘Karl Lamprecht und die internationale Geschichtswissenschaft an der Jahrhundertwende’, in: *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 67 (1985), pp. 417-464. Schorn-Schütte, ‘Karl Lamprecht als Wegbereiter einer historischen Sozialwissenschaft?’, in: Notker Hammerstein, ed., *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft um 1900* (Stuttgart, 1988), pp. 153-191 [reprinted in: Schorn-Schütte, *Perspectum. Ausgewählte Aufsätze zur Frühen Neuzeit und Historiographiegeschichte*, edited by Markus Friedrich, Holger Kürbis and Anja Kürbis (Historische Zeitschrift. Beihefte, N. F., vol. 61) (Munich, 2014), pp. 144-190]. Matti Viikari, *Die Krise der “Historistischen” Geschichtswissenschaft und die Geschichtsmethodologie Karl Lamprechts* (Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae. Dissertationes Humanarum Litterarum, 13) (Helsinki, 1977). However, these studies show no concern for Lamprecht’s exclusionism.

institute's building was hit. Next to volumes of general interest, the library of printed books featured sections on "Development Psychology" (Entwicklungspsychologie), "Animal and Child Psychology" (Tier- und Kinderpsychologie) and section on "the History of East Asia, Mainly Japan" (Bibliothek zur ostasiatischen, vornehmlich japanischen Geschichte), "the history of Ancient American Cultures" (Bibliothek zur Geschichte der altamerikanischen Kulturen) and on "Colonial History and Ethnology as well as on the Social Psychology of Nations" (Bibliothek zur Kolonialgeschichte und Völkerkunde sowie zur Völkerpsychologie).²³⁴ Books on Native American cultures outside Mesoamerica, African South Asian²³⁵ and South Pacific cultures were completely absent, as Lamprecht left these topics to Karl Weule, the Leipzig ethnologist, with whom Lamprecht cooperated closely. The arrangement of the institute's collections thus made it clear that Lamprecht did not regard as relevant for universal historical inquiries all cultures that seemed to have remained in the natural condition of "primitiveness".²³⁶ Against his general methodological principles, Lamprecht left these cultures without history and excluded them from his historiographical world picture. He thus made explicit the paradoxical character of comparative historical research. The paradox resulted from the contradiction between, on the one side, the deductive setting of the criteria of the comparability of the objects of historiographical inquiry and, on the other, the inductive synthesis of these objects into historiographical narratives of processes of transfers across cultures. Lamprecht could only construct the collective identities of "nations" as apparent bearers of

²³⁴ [Karl Gotthard Lamprecht], *Königl[ich]-Sächsisches Institut für Kultur- und Universalgeschichte bei der Universität Leipzig in räumlicher Verbindung mit dem Universitätsseminar für Landesgeschichte und Siedlungskunde* (Leipzig, 1909), p. 7 [Bonn: Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, Lamprecht Papers, S 2713 (UL 6)].

²³⁵ Books about South Asia were included among works on Buddhism with the section of East Asia.

²³⁶ Karl Lamprecht, 'Denkschrift über Entwicklung, gegenwärtigen Stand und Zukunft des Königlich Sächsischen Instituts für Kultur- und Universal-Geschichte bei der Universität Leipzig [Ms. Bonn: Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, Lamprecht Papers, S 2713 (UL 6)]', in: Lamprecht, *Alternative zu Ranke*, edited by Hans Schleier (Leipzig, 1988), pp. 421-435, at p. 428. Historian Shinshichi Miura (三浦新七, 1877 – 1947) worked at the institute. Lamprecht's extensive interest in Japanese history attracted some students, who wrote doctoral dissertations and even one *Habilitationsschrift* on Japanese history. See: Justus Franz Karl Hermann Leo, *Die Entwicklung des älteren japanischen Seelenlebens nach seine literarischen Ausdrucksformen* (Beiträge zur Kultur- und Universalgeschichte, 2) (Leipzig, 1907). Johannes Ueberschaar, *Die Stellung des Kaisers in Japan. Eine staatsrechtlich-historische Skizze* (Leipzig, 1913). Gottfried André Wedemeyer, *Japanische Frühgeschichte. Untersuchungen zur Chronologie und Territorialverfassung von Altjapan bis zum 5. Jahrh[undert] n[ach] Chr[istus]* (Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, 11) (Tokyo, 1930). Wedemeyer, 'Die ostasiatischen Studien in Leipzig', in: *Akademische Rundschau* 2 (1914), pp. 432-434. Leo spent his life in adult education. Ueberschaar joined the Nazi party, briefly held a professorship in Japanese studies at Leipzig and moved to Japan to become involved in foreign cultural policy. Wedemeyer, who studied Japanese with Miura, became the first incumbent to the Leipzig professorship in Japanese studies and remained at the university until his retirement in 1956. On Wedemeyer see: Horst Hammitzsch, 'André Wedemeyer in memoriam (1875 – 1958)', in: *Oriens extremus* 5 (1958), pp. 252-254. Oskar Nachod, 'Lamprechts Bedeutung für die Wissenschaft vom Fernen Osten', in: *Ostasiatische Zeitschrift* 4 (1915/16), pp. 109-112. Helga Steininger, Hans Steininger and Ulrich Unger, eds, *Sino-Japonica. Festschrift André Wedemeyer zum 80. Geburtstag* (Leipzig, 1956). Professorenkatalog der Universität Leipzig [www.research.uni-leipzig.de/catalogus-professorum-lipsiensium/leipzig/Wedemeyer_369/]. On Ueberschaar, who briefly held a professorship at Leipzig, see: Ulrich Goch, 'Gesellschaft und Auslandswissenschaft am Beispiel der deutschen Japanologiegeschichte', in: *Bochumer Jahrbuch zur Ostasienforschung* 3 (1980), pp. 98-129, at p. 108.

universal historical “*epídoxis eis hautó*” through deduction from the universal historiographical context, which, in turn, he first had to synthesise from historiographies of “nations”. Obviously, this paradox has prevented Lamprecht from ever attempting to compose a universal historical narrative himself, in sharp contradistinction against his Berlin colleague and rival Kurt Breysig.²³⁷

e) Summary

It goes without saying that Lamprecht was in conflict with Rankeans with regard to the methodology of universal historiography and the historiography of international relations. In Rankean perspective, Lamprecht’s theory of universal cultural “steps”, first and foremost, appeared to contain a pledge for the distillation of general laws from historical evidence. But also his selection of sources, his

²³⁷ This paradox remained a continuous feature in Lamprecht’s methodological writings: Karl Gotthard Lamprecht, ‘Die kultur- und universalhistorischen Bestrebungen an der Universität Leipzig [Vortrag auf dem Berliner Internationalen Historikertag, 11. August 1908]’, in: *Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik*, vol. 3, issue 9 (1908), pp. 1114-1150 [reprinted in: Lamprecht, *Alternative zu Ranke*, edited by Hans Schleier (Leipzig, 1988), pp. 365-373]. Lamprecht, ‘Was ist Kulturgeschichte. Ein Beitrag zur empirischen Historik’, *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*. N. F., vol. 1 (1896/97), pp. 75-150 [reprinted in: Lamprecht, *Ausgewählte Schriften zur Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte und zur Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft*, edited by Herbert Schönebaum (Aalen, 1974), pp. 257-327; also in: Lamprecht, *Alternative* (as above), pp. 213-272]. Lamprecht, ‘Zur universalgeschichtlichen Methodenbildung’, in: *Abhandlungen der Königlich-Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., vol. 27, nr 2 (1909), pp. 33-63 [reprinted in: Lamprecht, *Schriften* (as above), pp. 633-661; also in: Lamprecht, *Alternative* (as above), S. 374-404]. Lamprecht, ‘Über geschichtliche Auffassung und geschichtliche Methode’, in: Lamprecht, *Alte und neue Richtungen in der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Berlin, 1896), pp. 1-25 [reprinted in: Lamprecht, *Schriften* (as above), pp. 173-255; also in: Lamprecht, *Alternative* (as above), pp. 143-207]. Lamprecht, ‘Über die Entwicklung der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft’, in: Lamprecht, *Schriften* (as above), pp. 397-475. Lamprecht, ‘Die Entwicklungsstufen der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft seit Herder’, in: Lamprecht, *Schriften* (as above), pp. 477-499 [first published in: *Zeitschrift für Kulturgeschichte*. N. F., vol. 5 (1898), pp. 385-420, vol. 6 (1899), pp. 1-45]. Lamprecht, ‘Zur Psychologie der Kulturzeitalter überhaupt’, in: Lamprecht, *Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft* (Berlin, 1905), pp. 77-102. At Berlin, Kurt Breysig tried to advance the foundation of a research institute for comparative history, encompassing all humankind, in 1909, but failed due to massive resistance from among Berlin university historians. Yet, he did publish a comparative study of the history of humankind, originally only in one volume: Breysig, *Die Geschichte der Menschheit*, vol. 1: Die Völker ewiger Urzeit. Die Amerikaner des Nordwestens und des Nordens (Berlin, 1907). Subsequently, he expanded the work into altogether five volumes. Vol. 1: Die Anfänge der Menschheit. Urrassen, Nordasiaten, Australier, Südamerikaner (Breslau, 1936); vol. 2: Völker ewiger Urzeit (Breslau, 1936) (= vol. 1 of the first edn); vol. 3: Frühe Hochkulturen (Breslau, 1936); vols 4/5: Jugend der germanisch-romanischen Völker (Breslau, 1936) [reprints of all five vols (Berlin, 1955; 2001)]. Like Lamprecht, Breysig denied to population groups outside Europe, East and South Asia the capability of endogenous change. On Breysig and on ethnological research in the German Empire during the Wilhelminian period see: Bernhard vom Brocke, *Kurt Breysig. Geschichtswissenschaft zwischen Historismus und Soziologie* (Historische Studien, 417) (Lübeck, 1971), pp. 268-273. Benedict Stuchey and Eckhardt Fuchs, ‘Introduction. Problems of Writing World History. Western and Non-Western Experiences. 1800 – 2000’, in: Stuchey and Fuchs, eds, *Writing World History. 1800 – 2000* (Oxford and New York, 2003), pp. 1-44, at pp. 7-8. Eckhardt Fuchs, *Henry Thomas Buckle. Geschichtsschreibung und Positivismus in England und Deutschland* (Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und vergleichenden Geschichtsforschung, 9) (Leipzig, 1994). Christoph Marx, ‘Völker ohne Schrift und Geschichte’. *Zur historischen Erfassung des vorkolonialen Afrika in der deutschen Forschung des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts* (Beiträge zur Kolonial- und Überseegegeschichte, 43) (Stuttgart, 1988), pp. 203-307. Andrew Zimmerman, ‘Geschichtslose und schriftlose Völker in Spreeathen. Anthropologie als Kritik der Geschichtswissenschaft im Kaiserreich’, in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 47 (1999), pp. 197-210.

predilection for poetic texts and pieces of fine art, met with disagreement.²³⁸ However, there were also major commonalities between Lamprecht and Rankeans concerning the evaluation of international relations between Europe on the one side, Africa, large parts of America, Asia and the South Pacific on the other. Like the Rankeans, Lamprecht maintained that his approach of embedding the historiography on international relations into universal historiography and of basing these narratives on “facts” to be gleaned from sources, was scientific in kind.²³⁹ They classed “nations” in their states as “actors” in universal history and constituted human history as a metaphysical dynamic process at which just a few “nations” appeared to be capable of participating. They set out to admit only that type of historiography of international relations as scientific, which made the intuitively consensual decision of selecting “nations” for participation in the universal historical process. Lamprecht was as little prepared as Ranke to set aside the exclusionistic postulate that the largest part of the world's human population appeared to lack history. In contradistinction against historians of international relations, who had worked up until the late eighteenth century and had inclusionistically taken for granted the principal linkages between past and present for all states and cultures of the world, from the end of the nineteenth century, historians of international relations expected that, initially in Europe alone, a breach of culture had resulted in the separation of the past from the present, that secondarily both dimensions of time were linked together again through change and that only what appeared to be perceivable as change conditioned the historicity of a culture. For parts of the world beyond Europe, these historians negated the perception that change might occur and be recognised as such, and then claimed some lack of dynamics of cultures, specifically in East Asia, as well as the complete lack of history within the seemingly continuing state of nature. Historians of international relations, like historians of expansions, were sure that they could legitimately exclude the alleged “nations” without history from their narratives.

For the historiography of international relations, the change of perspectives had grave implications with an impact continuing into the twenty-first century. This has been so, because, within the

²³⁸ Among many, see: Georg von Below, ‘Die neue historische Methode’, in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 81 (1898), pp. 193-273. Hermann Oncken, *Lamprechts Vertheidigung. Eine Antwort auf: Zwei Streitschriften, den Herrn H. Oncken, H. Delbrück, M. Lenz zugeeignet (Berlin 1897)* (Berlin, 1898). Felix Rachfahl, ‘Über die Theorie einer “kollektivistischen” Geschichtswissenschaft’, in: *Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*. 3. F., vol. 13 (1897), pp. 659-902. Gustav Schnürer, ‘Zum Streit über Lamprechts Deutsche Geschichte’, in: *Historisches Jahrbuch* 21 (1900), pp. 772-785. Gerhard Seeliger, ‘Karl Lamprecht’, in: *Historische Vierteljahrschrift* 19 (1919/20), pp. 133-144. Ludwig Rieß, [review of Justus Leo, *Die Entwicklung des älteren japanischen Seelenlebens nach seinen literarischen Ausdrucksformen* (Beiträge zur Kultur- und Universalgeschichte, 2) (Leipzig, 1907)], in: *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 28 (4 May 1907), pp. 1111-1113.

²³⁹ Ludwig Rieß, *Notes of a Course of Lectures on Methodology of History* (Tokyo, 1896), pp. 1-5. Consequently, the often noted parochialism, mainly of German historiography at c. 1900 [thus, among many: Dominic Sachsenmaier, *Global Perspectives on Global History* (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 110-171] did not primarily result from political problems of constructing a national state in German-speaking areas, but in methodological difficulties and world views cherished among professional historians in universities.

exclusionistic perspective on the history of international relations, the beginning of the purported imposition of legal norms in the course of the nineteenth century seemed to be an indicator for the breach between the past and the present. Both Ranke and Rieß as well as the historiographers of expansion around 1900 posited intuitively that a previously non-existent international legal community had been formed that could legislate international law legitimately on the globe at large, even though membership in that international legal community was then practically restricted to states in Europe, America and a few others elsewhere. Even Lamprecht shared this view on principle, although he judged this community to be as yet imperfect with regard to historiographical matters. This historiographical perspective boosted the retrospective within which international legal theorists insisted that the power of sovereign states could only be hedged within the selective international legal community and that might would have to have priority over right beyond the reach of that community. Historiographers of international relations as universal historiographers, like Lamprecht, were not only receptive to Pan-German phantasies of the expansion of the rule of European governments but also provided ideologies for the justification of colonial suppression. Still at the turn towards the twenty-first century, historiographers of international relations restated the theory that international law could not be enforceable outside the international community of states.²⁴⁰ That this community was a product of colonial rule, supporters of this theory carefully passed over in silence.

²⁴⁰ Francis Harry Hinsley, 'The Rise and Fall of the Modern International System', in: *Review of international Studies* 5 (1982), pp. 1-8 [also in: David Stanley McLellan, William Clinton Olson and Fred Albert Sonderman, eds, *The Theory and Practice of International Relations*, seventh edn (Englewood Cliffs, 1987) (Olson as sole ed.), pp. 101-108, at p. 101; first edn of this text (Englewood Cliffs, 1960); second edn (Englewood Cliffs, 1966); third edn (Englewood Cliffs, 1970); fourth edn (Englewood Cliffs, 1974); fifth edn (Englewood Cliffs, 1979) (Sonderman as main ed.); sixth edn (Englewood Cliffs, 1983)]. Dieter Langewiesche, 'Wie neu sind die Neuen Kriege?', in: Ulrich Lappenküper and Reiner Marcowitz, eds, *Macht und Recht. Völkerrecht in den internationalen Beziehungen* (Otto von Bismarck-Stiftung, Wissenschaftliche Reihe 13) (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zurich, 2010), pp. 317-331, at p. 331 [first published in: Georg Schild and Anton Schindling, eds, *Kriegserfahrungen* (Krieg in der Geschichte, 55) (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zurich, 2009), pp. 289-302]. Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt* (Munich, 2009), p. 731 [fifth edn (Munich, 2010); further edn (Berlin, 2010)].